

Comparison of the views of the Mu'tazilite and Leibniz on Divine Justice

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Abstract:

Mu'tazilite was a group of Muslim theologians, who attributed themselves to the just people; Reference of justice among them was that God calculates human actions. They believed each person is responsible for his actions. This was the problem that caused many disagreements between Muslims. Is the man responsible for his actions or not? Whether human on their actions have a will or not? And this old proposition in which the human mind is always engaged is also important in the Mu'tazilite.

The Mu'tazilite believes that good and evil are essential and rational and the command of legislator is discoverer and demonstrator not proving (the subject that of witch something affirmed). And before the arrival of the Religions, the wise men based on their wisdom have the ability to distinguish between Good and Evil and are obliged to perform good actions and avoided from evil and sins. But Asharites said: Good and Evil of objects and actions are juridical.

The Mu'tazilite believes that divine actions have purposes. Because, if god has not a purpose in creation, his actions would be futile. While, the god is omniscience and futile act from he will not be issued. From the view of the Mu'tazilite, the god should be act witch for human is right, this requires wisdom, justice and Divine perfection. Since, God does everything, looking for rational reason for it; So, He could not ask anything less than ideal situation for humans. But according to Asharites, the right act is not necessary for God. Divine will of God is absolute, no conditions or restrictions for it, except the possibility of the objects. So, everything belongs to Him and His will and nothing is impossible for Him. But Mu'tazilite based on this belief that the system of universe is the fittest and complete, were deprived any kind of defect, evil and oppression from God with this difference that there are two words: Some of the Mu'tazilite believed that God is able to do oppression and tyranny, but he does not it; but Nazzam (One of the Mu'tazilites), and some of the others says: God is not capable to doing evil and sins and oppression. He said: "The evil inherently is Incorrect and that is just the evil that obstacle to attribute the evil act to God. So, prescribing and occurring of evil by Him is also evil, therefore, the evil prevents prescribing of evil action from God:

(فاعل العدل لا يوصف بالقدرة على الظلم)

Leibniz, European philosopher of the seventeenth century, for many concepts such as good and justice and many other moral concepts, independent of the Divine will, values and knows them in itself, Containing of meaning and reasonable essence. Leibniz even express this issue against Descartes view: "Descartes says if objects are good or evil, they are so, just according to the factor of divine will... the answer of Leibniz is that if we accept the speech of Descartes on Divine Will, and eternal truths, the conclusion will be denying the Divine Knowledge. According to him (Leibniz), If the truth is dependent on the will of God, not on essence of objects, divine knowledge will be precedent on essence of objects and as a result, it does not have the truth as its belonging and such a knowledge will be irrational.

The principle of sufficient reason present that why in God's creation, for example, some things have been existed rather than being not, what is the main aim of this entity? And the application of this principle is a negation of preponderance without there being a preponderant.

Leibniz intends, with applying the principle of sufficient reason, the first, to remove the necessity from voluntary actions of God and humans, and the second, put the final causality instead of subjective causality in the truths of possibilities. Indeed, he finds out from the causality, some kind of necessity. Because, he uses in the truths of the possibility, reason instead of cause. "... We call it prior reason, and cause in the objects is in accordance with the reason in truths; this is the reason, why the "cause" indeed is called the reason and in particular, final cause".

Thus we can say that as the Mu'tazilite believed in essential and intellectual good and bad, and considered objects with essential Expediency and corruption. Leibniz also has believed in intellectual good and bad. Mu'tazilite has attributed to god, will and intention that there is addition to inherent. Leibniz also has gone the way of Mu'tazilite by separating the Divine Will and considering it as particular possibility from essence and knowledge.

The rule of preponderance without there being a preponderant is similar to the principle of sufficient reason, although it can be said that Leibniz used this principle in his philosophy much more than Mu'tazilite used the rule of preponderance without there being a preponderant. In such a way that elimination of the principle of sufficient reason from the philosophy of Leibniz does completely destroy it. Regarding the fittest system and the issue of the evil, the positions of both sides are the same. Because, God should create a world which is the fittest and the complete. And so the evil in itself and because of being evil is not counted as the act of God, but rather evil finds meaning in order to good and within it. In the Mu'tazilite, free will is absolute and they believe in discretion. Leibniz agrees with human authority, although does not believe in absolute will, but he considers conditions for will in which, if there is similarity between God and humans, it will be carried out.

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