

Abd ál-Razzaq Lahiji on Divine Wisdom: A Critical Assessment

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Abstract

This paper is going to examine Abd ál-Razzaq Lahiji's view on divine wisdom. According to him, divine wisdom is the same as divine purposefulness. That is to say, God's actions are always purposeful. But these purposes, in fact, belong to the creatures, since when a purpose is achieved, a need of the purpose-setter would be satisfied, but God is all-rich, i.e. God has no need at all. Lahiji presents two arguments in favor of his claim; one is based on intrinsic good or evil in actions, and the other one, is based on God's free will. This paper, first of all begins with analyzing of Lahiji's attitude toward "purposefulness" of creature and tries to determine its connection with "free will" and "satisfying the needs of the purpose-setter". The conclusions will be drawn from it is as follow: (1) Achieving a purpose does not satisfy only the needs of the purpose-setter, but might also do the others' needs; (2) The mechanism of setting a purpose should not be tied to either "free will" or "determinism". Then, Lahiji's two arguments is taken into consideration and we proved that both arguments are weak and cannot be used in defense of divine wisdom.

Keywords: divine wisdom, free will and determinism, essential good and evil, purposefulness.

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