

A Review of the Theory of "The Spirit of Meaning" with Emphasis on Al-Ghazali's Point of View*

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Article Info	ABSTRACT
<p>Article type: Research Article</p> <p>Article history: Received 11 August 2023 Received in revised form 13 December 2023 Accepted 16 December 2023 Published online 29 January 2024</p> <p>Keywords: words, hermeneutic interpretation, spirit of meaning, Al Ghazali, Ibn Arabi</p>	<p>Considering the fact that the words in the intra-religious attitude are considered in two ways, the first is towards jurisprudential words and the second is a rational and conceptual view focusing on their meanings. we have tried to deal with one of the most important issues of intra-religious attitude with a rational approach by descriptive and analytical method, which is the category of "hermeneutic interpretation" of words, especially the most influential idea of interpretation & that is the view of the "spirit of meaning" of Ghazali. After Ghazali, Ibn Arabi used this theory of Ghazali regarding the development of meaning in creating his new idea, and by re-reading Ghazali's idea with a mystical approach, he presented his own theory regarding the expansion of meaning. While accepting the argument of the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning, he removes it from the exclusivity to the "linear", and for this purpose, he brought up arguments as well as the Conditions of Hermeneutic Interpretation in this regard. Ibn Arabi's arguments on transversal interpretation include new formulations in the argument, which after him, this theory was favored and accepted by Mulla Sadra, and then it was accepted by his students.</p>

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Introduction

Words in the intra-religious attitude are considered in two ways. In the first view, words, like other objects in the world, belong to the jurisprudential (Fiqh) debate just as religion has instructions for objective matters from obligatory matters (Wajib) to forbidden matters (Haraam), it has also given jurisprudential instructions for words. The second intra-religious view of words is a rational and conceptual view focusing on their meanings. For example, the permission to use Persian words has been reported by Ibn Abi Sheiba (235 AD) and is the subject of the jurisprudential permission to use words. In other words, is a Muslim allowed to use Persian words in his everyday religious conversations? Ibn Abi Sheiba himself, who lived close to the textual (Naş) period, reports this issue negatively and positively in two separate chapters (Ibn Abi Sheiba, 2013, 4-32).

In the second view, however, the issue is not whether the subject has the religious permission to use the word or not. Rather, the issue is whether the rational and conceptual possibility of using the word with regards to God and other than God is common or not. For example, can homologous words which give the illusion of corporeality in their original sense, be used for God? For instance, can it be said that God has a hand?

In this article, we will turn to the second approach, focusing on Ghazali and Ibn Arabi who used his works to create a new idea. Ghazali's re-reading with a mystical approach provides a context for the comparison of these two characters even in Ghazali's period.

One of the most important issues is the intra-religious attitude with a rational approach to the category of words is "hermeneutic interpretation". The possibility and method of hermeneutic interpretation have been considered in different traditions and religions. For example, Ibn Maimun (Maimonides) refers to this issue in the Jewish tradition and deals with the typology of its addressees (Ibn Maimun, n. d, 654-655). The importance of hermeneutic interpretation is so great that it has been disputed at the highest levels of philosophers, for example, we can refer to Mulla Sadra's objections to Avicenna's hermeneutic interpretations in Ozhawiyah about physical resurrection (Shirazi, 1988, 214).

One of the most influential hermeneutic interpretive ideas is the view of "the spirit of meaning", which belongs to Ghazali. While Al-Ghazali, enumerating the origin of interpretation, points out that in some cases it is not possible to take the original apparent meaning from religious texts because it is contrary to the Definite Intellect (Al-Ghazali, n. d, 102), he later reports the various approaches to dealing with these texts which range from radical insistence on appearances to manipulations of bounders and levels of meaning (Al-Ghazali, n. d, 103). Al-Ghazali points to the dilemma that there are two conflicting commands in religion regarding the hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts – and specifically the Qur'an. And if one is inclined to one of these aspects and instructions; for example, to accept that the Qur'an has no other than apparent meaning,

he has in fact, given two analytical commandments. One of them is that the meaning of religious words is exclusive in their apparent sense.

By analyzing this component, he reduces the previous commandment to "news of the existential level of the ruling subject" and the ruling agent has acted correctly in this commandment. The second judgment of the cognitive agent is that he has reduced all the other subjects to the degree of his understanding and he is wrong in this judgment (Al-Ghazali, n. d, 289). As it can be seen, in any absolutism of the cognitive agent, two analytical rulings are being expressed; in one of these sentences, the subject has acted in accordance with reality and in the other, has acted in contrast to reality. The important point in this initial relativism is whether this relativism through the subject also means relativism of the meanings of the concepts of the Qur'an.

Al-Ghazali established the theory of the spirit of meaning in response to this question, which later became influential in the view of many philosophers, theologians, and commentators. What he means by the spirit of meaning is to refer to the analytical components of the meaning of a concept (word) and to bypass its denotative features. To understand his point of view, it is very important to refer to the issue that we can only understand the meaning of a word if we understand the relationship between the celestial realm and the material world; because there is no concept in the material world unless it is an example and manifestation of the celestial world. And the material world is contained (manifestation) in the celestial sense. Therefore:

- 1) The material world is the manifestation of the celestial world.
- 2) Words are coined for the truth of meaning, and the features of the examples are not within their true meaning and the truth of their meaning.
- 3) So, material features, as well as celestial features, are not included in the meaning of a concept.
- 4) Conclusion: The true meaning is the "spirit of meaning" of a concept that includes the material meaning as well as the spiritual meaning (Al-Ghazali, 2014, 26-27). As can be seen in Ghazali's argument, he has mentioned the order of the levels of existence. And this has been questioned and criticized by some people, and we will forgo addressing it since it is not related to the main issue of the article.

1. The Chronological Hierarchy of The Theory of The Spirit of Meaning

A) In the first step of this theory, it is accepted that the meanings and concepts of words are sensory and material. For example, in the word "light", the material examples of light that are perceived by the senses are the essential and real examples of light. Thus, in the first step, al-Ghazali does not seek to deny the apparent meaning and oppose the arguments and verbal rules of a word.

B) By analyzing the semantic components of a word, non-intrinsic elements and components are separated. The first category is the spirit and the truth of meaning and the second category is the characteristics of the examples.

In the example of "light", by discovering the analysis of semantic components he arrives at the two components of manifestation and perception (manifestation for perception). Other things, such as the material type of manifestation, which is the basis of sensory perception, as well as having color and intensity of light, etc., will not be the main features of "light". The result is that light is not exclusive to material light and also includes immaterial light (up to God Almighty). In other words, grasping the spirit of meaning (and not the features of the instances) extends the range of the word light from material instances to immaterial instances.

The theoretical basis of this extension, as mentioned before, is that from the ontological point of view, al-Ghazali believes that the relation of the world of sense (material world) and the unseen world (the celestial world) is like the relationship between form and shape with the spirit, although, form is the manifestation of the spirit, not its affect. The explanation is that the central difference between rational sciences and mysticism in analyzing the relations between the immaterial world and the material world is that in the rational sciences, the lower world is caused by the higher world, while in mysticism, the world is the manifestation of infinite existence and not its effect.

c) In the second step, the chronology of the theory of the spirit of meaning was pointed out, in which the truth of a meaning also includes its material examples. This means both the material example and the immaterial instance are examples of the truth (spirit) of meaning. At this stage, he goes beyond this and considers spiritual and higher affairs as examples of higher priority. In other words, the amount of benefit of the instances of the immaterial world from the spirit of meaning is more than the instances of the material world (Al-Ghazali, 2017, 5-9).

D) At this step, he goes beyond priority and states that infinite existence is the true example of the aforesaid words and finite beings are not the essential and real instances of words but rather their figurative instances (Al-Ghazali, 2017, 4). In other words, in the first step, when the word light included material instances, its inclusion of immaterial instances (including God or infinite existence) was a figurative form, while material light is the real light. This means that material light is essentially and truly light, while immaterial light is a metaphorical and figurative light and has been considered as light by the extension of instances and in an unrealistic way (it is not light, but is assumed to be light). In the second stage, he believes that the aforementioned extension is not hypothetical but real. The result is that both material and immaterial instances are really light. And in the fourth stage which is the first stage in a way light in its infinite instance (in the religious literature regarding God and in the philosophical literature regarding infinite existence) is the real instance of light and material light is its figurative instance.

It is worth noting that the fourth stage was questioned during his lifetime. Al-Ghazali realized the problem, and his final answer was to emphasize the correctness of the fourth stage of interpretation. He re-examines light as an example and re-analyzes its semantic components and then states that the existence of objects is "figurative" for them. And only the predication of infinite

existence to it is true (Al-Ghazali, 1954, 20). As can be seen, 150 years before Ibn Arabi, it was al-Ghazali who stated the figurativeness of beings other than God, while the theory of the unity of existence is attributed to Ibn Arabi.

This view the theory of the spirit of meaning was later accepted by many philosophers and mystics. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, it went beyond the Peripatetic philosophy and was fully accepted by Mulla Sadra and his followers. And it was accepted in the tradition of mysticism by Ibn Arabi and his followers. However, in the context of mysticism, it developed significantly, which we will deal with in the continuation of this article, after referring to the philosophical success of the theory of the spirit of meaning.

2. The Theory of the Spirit of Meaning in the View of Transcendent Philosophy

Although Mulla Sadra accepted a kind of existence for other than the Infinite (God) in the early and middle stages of his philosophy, however, at the end of his philosophical reflections, he considered real existence to be limited to its infinite instance. Following the mystics, he emphasizes that this view is in accordance with the Shari'a (religion) and then states that all his claims are consistent with the apparent words of the Shari'a; provided, of course, that the correct linear hermeneutic interpretation is made. And what is meant by interpretation is not the view of theologians or the like (Shirazi, 1988, 342).

Following al-Ghazali, Sadra considers the origin of the discussion to be that although the apparent aspect of words is acceptable; however, the monopoly of meaning in the initial appearance is the beginning of subsequent errors (Shirazi, 1999, 160). He analyzes the common view in confronting interpretation as well as the requirements of philosophical theology of their utterances in four categories and while criticizing the three categories, presents his final opinion (Shirazi, 1999, 152). In the final view, Sadra argues that we should not interpret because of the problem of coherence of concepts and rational rules with literal appearances, rather the appearances of words should be preserved.

The original meaning is only epistemically accessible provided that the properties of the instance that have been mistaken for the concept and meaning are first removed and the truth and essence of the meaning is obtained. (Shirazi, 1999, 170) He also notes that the reason for obtaining the characteristics of the instance in the essence of the concept and meaning is the predominance of the rules of material instances with which the soul deals with at first (Shirazi, 1999, 173). This self-deception can be set aside only if the cognitive agent knows the connection between the material and meta-material realms (the celestial realm and the material realm (which is manifestation) (Shirazi, 1999, 175). Sadra also formulates this view in Tafsir (interpretation of the Quran) and considers the issuance of any verb from God as real and as mentally-positing from others (Shirazi, 1999, 219).

As can be seen, the origin and principle of Sadra's view are taken from Ghazali's theory. Removing the characteristics of the instance from the essence of the concept and meaning, insisting on the rules of the word and not violating them, analyzing the cause of the formation of the problem of the confusion of concept and instance, and finally, explaining the theological-philosophical implications of the view of the spirit of meaning is one of the main influences of Sadra in this theory. This acceptance was established in Sadra and his students. Feyz Kashani, a direct student and son-in-law of Mulla Sadra, has referred to this view from the point of view of acceptance in various mystical, interpretive, and moral books, as well as in his treatises. He considers the criterion of the truth of a concept and meaning in various instances as their real unity, which is the same as Ghazali's argument (Al-Kashani, 1996, 203), and considers the degree of understanding of death as a function of understanding the relationship between realms in reality. (Al-Kashani, n. d, 30)

He also considers this view – the spirit of meaning – to be effective in accepting the analysis of heaven and hell (Al-Kashani, 2004, 360). Following al-Ghazali, we see the four stages of the monopoly of the material instance, the sharing of the immaterial instance, the truth of the immaterial instance, and the monopoly of the infinite instance in Fayz as well. (Al-Kashani, 2007, 49) This scientific practice continued in the students of Sadra's school and was accepted as a basis for the practical aspects of philosophy. For example, in the book "Leqa'a Allah", it was implemented as a basis for ethics (Maleki Tabrizi, 2006, 15).

. In the same way, the clarification of the denial of permission became more analytical from the point of view of the spirit of meaning (Amin al-Shari'a khoei, 2004, 1483).

3. Ibn Arabi and The Spirit of Meaning

The view of linear hermeneutic interpretation – the spirit of meaning – was also fully accepted in mysticism. From this point of view of the mystics, such an interpretation of the word is quite clear, and basically, there was no problem or important question in the matter until the Prophet's era (Ibn Al-'Arabi, 2004, 122) and because of its clarity, it did not require much argumentation. Ibn Arabi in his treatise "Radd al-Motashabeh ela al-Mohkam" (turning back ambiguous verbal matters to unambiguous verbal matters) points out that I do not mean to mention theological arguments in writing this treatise. Rather, I want to prove that all the attributes that cause the illusion of physicality and are attributed to God are attributed to Him according to verbal rules (Ibn Al-'Arabi, 2004, 126). His method throughout the treatise is that he first extracts an analytical component of the meaning of the words and in the second stage he compares them to immaterial examples; of course, the use of the second stage is a function of the user's ability (Ibn Al-'Arabi, n. d, 112).

As stated, one of the main preliminaries of al-Ghazali in the theory of the spirit of meaning was the existential connection of words with meanings. Ibn Arabi also confirms this central principle

and uses it as an important principle in explanation and hermeneutic interpretation (Ibn Al-‘Arabi, n. d., 593).

What is noteworthy is that the existential relationship between word and meaning in Ibn Arabi's view is twofold:

One is that it justifies the relationship between word and meaning and the other is that it justifies the relationship between levels of meaning. The explanation is that in Ibn Arabi's view, the absolute essence, with its manifestation, creates the name; the name also creates the word with its manifestation in the realm of words. So, the meaning is the essence that has manifested (existential noun) and the word is the noun that has manifested in the container of words which is called the noun of the noun (Ism Al-Ism) (AL-Qunawi, 2002, 98).

It is observed that it is the same existential link that is between essence and noun that is also established between the noun and noun of the noun (realm). This process of manifestation is the first type of the existential relationship between word and meaning in Ibn Arabi's system; which Ghazali did not mention. And in al-Ghazali's arguments on the theory of the spirit of meaning, it is not mentioned and is not used. The second type of existential relationship between word and meaning is the same as observed in Ghazali.

This means that the meaning of a word is not limited to the primary meaning, material meaning, or specific instances, and includes all higher levels. In the first type, the meaning is the spirit of the word, but not in the sense of al-Ghazali's spirit of meaning (Ibn Al-‘Arabi, n. d, 98).

Rather, it means that just as the body is the soul that has become subtle; similarly, the word is also the manifestation of meaning. However, in the second type, the meaning of the word is the soul of a word and it is the sum of the analytical components contained in the word, which clearly includes all instances from the material up to the higher instances.

4. Transverse Hermeneutic Interpretation

Ibn Arabi's Exclusive Development in Ghazali's Theory of the "Spirit of Meaning". As we have seen, the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning is the recognition of the intrinsic components of the meaning of a word. Al-Ghazali, by explaining this focal point, concluded that if we separate the properties of material instances from the essence of meaning, not only will we not have any problem in using them for immaterial instances, but immaterial instances would also have priority of prediction over material instances. Rather, real transportation is limited to immaterial instances, which we have called linear interpretation. But the role of Ibn Arabi in the development of al-Ghazali's model is irreplaceable because while accepting the argument of the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning, he removes it from the exclusivity to the "linear". In his view, by emptying the essence of meaning, it will be from the properties of material and immaterial linear instances. Rather, there will be more than one meaning at one time and all of them are correct and undamaged according to the rules of vocabulary and the exclusivity of

meaning to just one of them, simply because it comes to mind sooner, is unreasonable. We call this result a transversal hermeneutic interpretation. The meaning of transverse hermeneutic interpretation is that which is understood according to the verbal rules of the verses of the Holy Qur'an, that is, the speaker refers to God. To explain further, it means that is that all lexical coinages and linguistic rules are involved when combining words that make up sentences. Now, if the result of this combination of situations and rules is several lateral semantic aspects, all of them are the intention of the speaker. Note that this category of interpretation is specific to the divine word or similar contexts, which is why it will be mentioned in the first argument of Ibn Arabi.

The First Argument:

1- Those meanings apply to the word. That is, the coining of singular words as well as the different types of combinations of vocabulary, possess all those meanings according to verbal rules.

2- The predicator is aware of all these aspects. That is, the speaker knows that in all ages and also in different situations, this word will be used and will have more than one meaning literally (vocabulary - verbal rules).

3- Although he knows the word has various lateral meanings; He has not forbidden any of them.

4- Conclusion: All the aforementioned aspects are intended by the speaker (Ibn Al-‘Arabi, n. d, 119 & 567).

According to the second clause, the argument is clear that this attribute is only specific to the word of God because it is only, He who has encompassing knowledge of all the aspects that may apply (Ibn Al-‘Arabi, n. d, 119 & 567).

Therefore, he believes in the general principle that all the lateral meanings are the word of God and His purpose and intention (Ibn Al-‘Arabi, n. d, 112 & 136).

The Second Argument:

1- The essence of the word (vocabulary - rules of the composition of vocabulary) has the potential for various meanings.

2- The addressee has considered the limitations and characteristics of the instance as part of the essence of meaning, which has caused the numerous meanings that are laterally present in the essence of the word to be limited to his perception.

3- If we get rid of restrictive content, we will arrive at the truth of multiple meanings.

As it is known, the main axis of the argument is the focal point of Ghazali's argument in favor of linear hermeneutic interpretation. Al-Ghazali, by setting aside the nature of the object, discovered the gradational nature of meaning and invalidated its exclusivity in a linear order. And Ibn Arabi, by expanding in the field of infusing specificity from linear levels to transverse meanings, invalidated the monopoly of meaning in a transverse meaning. In other words, just as in the case of linear skepticism we may mistakenly assume the properties of the instance within the essence of the meanings, in transverse instances the same methodological error may occur.

Ibn Arabi's view of "transverse hermeneutic interpretation" was considered by mystics and philosophers after him. His most important student, Qunawi, while reinterpreting Ibn Arabi's argument, claims more holistically that no word in the Holy Qur'an can be interpreted in a variety of meanings unless all of them are intended by the Almighty and none of the theologians speak about the words of Almighty according to the rules of language unless it is the word of Allah and also the purpose of the Supreme Being (AL-Qunawi, 2002, 187). He goes on to use this general rule regarding the word "religion" in verse four of the chapter of al-Hamd (Master of the Day of Retribution), and considers all its meanings, including habit, obedience, and dignity, to be God's intention, and considers it the result of unjustified purification and abstraction in a special sense. After him, one of his most important students, Jundi, while rephrasing the claim and argument of transverse interpretation, points out that the possible meanings of the word are all meant by God when they are in the circle of verbal rules (Jundi, 2003, 290).

The importance of this reinterpretation is that it ultimately recognizes the nature of linear and transverse interpretation as being the same. Another important point in Jundi's argument is the existential part of Ibn Arabi's dual arguments. In a way that states that the purpose of each meaning in relation to its comprehension is the result of the emergence and manifestation of truth in the position of any understanding according to it. We will see later that this complement is emphasized to prevent irregular relativity.

It is worth mentioning that this basis – transverse interpretation – has gone beyond the level of merely being a basis and in its mystical origins has found noteworthy applications in various sciences such as interpretation, ethics, etc.

Harally, for example, in the interpretation of the holy verse number 139 of chapter 6 (Soon He will requite them for their allegations) states that the attributes and character of the speakers will be their punishment for concrete polytheism, and with this interpretation, the verse is equivalent to verse 24 of chapter 56 (a reward for what they used to do) (Harally Almarakeshi, 1997, 148).

This is while other commentators, on the other hand, interpret the verse as meaning that the polytheists will be punished for describing God in a polytheistic sense. The fact that the moral punishment of the moral agent is his character and attributes make the importance of moral knowledge extremely crucial.

The truth of various lateral interpretations, which we mentioned as transverse interpretation, is also widely used in traditions. For example, Jabir asks Imam Baqir (as) a question from the Qur'an and receives an answer other than the Imam's previous answers. In response to his question, the Imam (as) confirms the various semantic aspects of the Holy Qur'an (Majlesi, 1982, 95).

5. Conditions of Hermeneutic Interpretation

In the history of rational thought, interpretation has created grounds for confrontation and denial. For example, the Mutazilites' unwarranted interpretations for the religious justification of their

rational views are worth mentioning. (Another group whose interpretations were severely denied was the Shari'a apostates. This group, which was not accepted by mystics and philosophers of the first rank, refused to follow the Shari'a by relying on unreasonable interpretations on the pretext that their interpretive understanding of religious sources has negated the obligation to the Shari'a. As can be seen, even this second category, in principle, does not make a new claim for using religion as a binding source; but with a new method of interpretation (linear-transverse), they were somehow removed from the scope of the Shari'a obligation.

In order to avoid mostly intentional mistakes in understanding of interpretation, the conditions for using the method of interpretation were specified by mystics and then philosophers aligned with them. Note that these terms are not new rules and at the beginning of the formation of interpretation, were explicitly considered and noted with respect to the above-mentioned damages:

1- The main condition of interpretation is compliance with verbal rules. This means that interpretation is defined within the scope of verbal rules and with reference to them and it is not a new rule, and if any addressee (whoever is the addressee of the phrase Sharia) refers to them only on the basis of verbal rules and not rigidly based on their preconceived beliefs, will achieve these results. The conditionality of verbal rules can be seen in all the main texts of mystics who have dealt with the category of interpretation (Ibn Al-ʿArabi, vol. 2, n. d, 567 & 595, and vol. 1, 136).

The extraction of meanings based on verbal rules by the mystics has been approved and acknowledged by professional lexicographers, and this acknowledgment has not been neglected. For example, Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Sha'rani mentions the confirmations of Firuzabadi, the author of the book *Al-Qamoos Al-Muhit*, regarding mystical interpretations and their correspondence with the apparent aspect of the knowledge of words (Al-Sha'rani, n. d, 138).

Qaisari analyzes the problems that the formalists (a group of people who care about the apparent aspect) raised against Kashani in the interpretation of "In the name of God (Bismillāh)" and considers them to be the result of their ignorance, and, in defense of Kashani, he reconciles the semantic components of Bismillah with what Kashani interprets (Qaisari, 2015, 138).

This attention to the issues and rules of words in Sufi interpretations is not a matter to be treated with tolerance in any way; rather, it holds a central position. Citing examples of this important point would lengthen the discussion and, of course, is not the main purpose of this article. Just as an example, we can refer to Ibn Ajibah's commentary. He brings a hermeneutic interpretation and before those lexical points below each verse. For example, in the interpretation of why al-Hayat is *manṣoub* (a noun form that shows the noun to be a direct object of a verb) in a verse addressed to the Pharaoh by the sorcerers, which states: You can only decide about the life of this world, he mentions the exact reason for it and opposes the famous commentators (Hasani, 2015, 291).

The second condition is to not oppose Sharia. It should be noted that adherence to the Shari'a is emphasized as a fundamental principle in mysticism; however, here said the discussion is that

interpretation contrary to the Shari'a is false, which is a sign of non-observance to the rules. Abdul Karim Jily, in his commentary on Ibn Arabi's treatise, al-Anwar, in which the author, commentator, and the subject of the treatise are in the area of interpretation, states that the mystics' interpretation cannot oppose the apparent aspect and analyzes the aforesaid argument (Al-Jily, 2012, 46).

Al-Ghazali asserts that only if all the conditions of producing a proof are complete can it be used as a means of interpretation— even for distant meanings (Al-Ghazali, 2017, 249). As one can observe, interpretation cannot in any way oppose the Shari'a, and anyone who claims to have eliminated it has distorted it (Al-Sha'rani, 2010, 29).

6. Time to Sum Up

As it was mentioned, one of the most important issues of intra-religious attitude with a rational approach to the category of words is "hermeneutic interpretation" and one of the most influential ideas of interpretation is Ghazali's view of the "spirit of meaning". Therefore, the second approach was addressed by focusing on Ghazali and Ibn Arabi's use of his works in creating a new idea and reviewing Ghazali's idea with a mystical approach. What he means by the spirit of meaning is to refer to the analytical components of the meaning of a concept (word) and to bypass its denotative features. He argues in this regard, and in Ghazali's argument, Chronological Hierarchy is mentioned. And finally, it is concluded that the true meaning is the "spirit of meaning" of a concept, which includes the material meaning as well as the spiritual meaning.

It was stated that by revisiting the example of light and reanalyzing its semantic components, he said that the existence of objects is "virtual" for them, and only the existence of infinity is true; Therefore, as it was mentioned - the theory of the unity of existence -stated 150 years before Ibn Arabi, this is Ghazali who specifies the virtuality of existences for other than God.

This view - the theory of the spirit of meaning - was later favored and accepted by many philosophers and mystics. The main point of view presented by Mulla Sadra in this regard is derived from Ghazali's theory. Removing the characteristics of the instance from the essence of the concept and meaning, insisting on the rules of the word and not violating them, analyzing the cause of the formation of the problem of the confusion of concept and instance, and finally, explaining the theological-philosophical implications of the view of the spirit of meaning is one of the main influences of Mulla Sadra in this theory. This acceptance was established in Mulla Sadra and his students.

In this regard the role of Ibn Arabi in the development of al-Ghazali's model is irreplaceable. because while accepting the argument of the focal point of the theory of the spirit of meaning, he removes it from the exclusivity to the "linear". And for this purpose, he brought two arguments. In other words, just as in the case of linear skepticism we may mistakenly assume the properties of the instance within the essence of the meanings, in transverse instances the same methodological error may occur. this basis – transverse interpretation – has gone beyond the level of merely being

a basis and in its mystical origins has found noteworthy applications in various sciences such as interpretation, ethics, etc.

and finally in this paper, in order to avoid mostly intentional mistakes in understanding of interpretation, we stated the conditions for using the method of interpretation were specified by mystics and then philosophers aligned with them.

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