

Religious Inquiries

Volume 4, No. 7, Winter and Spring 2015, 5-16

A “Beatitude Paradox” for Certain Monotheists?

Adam Wood¹

Received: 2014-10-01; Accepted: 2014-12-01

This article discusses the apparent contradiction between the corporeal nature of human beings, which points to a bodily nature for their happiness, and the belief of many monotheists that happiness consists in the incorporeal state of union with God. The article focuses on the works of two important Muslim and Christian thinkers, Ibn Tufayl and Thomas Aquinas, and explores the solutions they provide in this regard.

Keywords: union with God, happiness, corporeal, Ibn Tufayl, Aquinas, resurrection.

Introduction

I have a vivid childhood memory of asking my father what heaven would be like, while riding in the front seat of the car on a cross-country road-trip. As I recall, he made it sound like heaven would be like a church service that went on and on with no end. At that point in my life I didn't much enjoy church-going. I burst into tears and declared I didn't want to go to heaven anymore. My father tried to reassure me that by the time we arrive in heaven our desires will be so thoroughly re-configured that an eternity worshipping God will be a blessed, joyful state, not a boring, dreary one. But my father's reassurance here, correct as it may be, poses a problem that I think many monotheists share.²

Many monotheists want to say that happiness, the ultimate good for us humans, consists in union with God. Given God's incorporeal nature, however, it is difficult to conceive of union with Him being accomplished through any sort of bodily activity. My father

1. Assistant Professor, Wheaton College, USA (Adam.Wood@wheaton.edu)

2. It may well be that certain polytheists face the same difficulty as I outline here. I restrict my attention to monotheists here partly just because I am more familiar with their views. It does seem to me, however, that part of the motivation for thinking that happiness consists in union with God stems from a regard for God as the “being than which no greater can be conceived,” as St. Anselm puts it, and it seems likely to me that there could only be one such being.

6 / *Religious Inquiries* 7

characterized it in terms of worship. Others describe it in terms of knowledge, together with the enjoyment that accompanies knowing the best possible thing there is to know. The problem is that even as grown-ups we can sympathize with my youthful horror at being told that any sort of spiritual or intellectual activity—even one as exalted as worshipping or knowing God—is our ultimate aim. Surely part of what makes us happy is bodily activity; not in a merely hedonistic sense, either. Part of what makes us happy is having certain jobs to do, including certain bodily duties to fulfill. It is hard to imagine being happy without having such tasks to perform.

To pose the problem more formally, it seems on the face of it that many monotheists are committed to the following:

- (1) Happiness consists in union with God.
- (2) Union with God is achieved in some incorporeal way.
- (3) Happiness consists at least in part in fulfilling certain bodily duties.

Propositions (1)–(3) form, on the face of it, an inconsistent set. So monotheists appear to face a sort of “beatitude paradox.”

Now, in order to show that the paradox is not an outright contradiction, monotheists have various options. They may find some way of explaining why the inconsistency of (1)–(3) is *merely* apparent. They may find some way of rejecting or relaxing one of these propositions. Below, I’ll consider several strategies along these lines. Before I do, however, I want to motivate each of (1)–(3) further by considering in the first section of this paper how they arise in one monotheistic philosophical treatise, the twelfth-century Andalusian Ibn Tufayl’s work *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*. In the second section of the paper, I’ll examine what solution Ibn Tufayl appears to favor in response to the paradox, together with the way a different medieval monotheist, Thomas Aquinas, adopts a very similar solution. I’ll conclude by sketching a different solution to the paradox also suggested by certain comments of Aquinas’s, which (I’ll argue) he should have preferred. Perhaps the same goes for other monotheists like Ibn Tufayl as well, although I won’t try to demonstrate this here.

1. The Beatitude Paradox in *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*

Ibn Tufayl’s version of Hayy’s story begins with two competing accounts of its protagonist’s appearance on the tropical island where he spends his first fifty years: one involving spontaneous generation, the other involving the product of a clandestine marriage being placed in a little ark to escape a proud tyrant. It doesn’t seem to matter much which of these we favor. In fact, however, both accounts are prefaced by

several pages in which Ibn Tufayl sets out his subject-matter, namely the "ecstasy" to which he was transported upon being requested to unfold the secrets of Ibn Sina's "oriental philosophy" by the work's addressee.¹ Though this ecstasy is an indescribably wonderful state of sublimity, it is nonetheless the sort of state that makes one desire to express it, hence the various attempts by Sufi mystics and philosophers alike to do so: Ibn Tufayl cites sayings of Bistami, Hallaj, and al-Ghazali to this effect. Rationalist philosophers like Ibn Bajja miss out on this state: the works of Aristotle, al-Farabi, or even Ibn Sina's philosophical treatises will leave you, as the latter himself warns, "far from perfection" (101/15). As for al-Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl notes the inconsistency between Ghazali's condemning the philosophers' denial of bodily resurrection at one point, but endorsing the Sufis' adherence to the same view at another. Perhaps the answer is contained in the "esoteric works" Ghazali wrote not for mass consumption that simply haven't made their way to Spain (102/18). At any rate, Ibn Tufayl says he can only hope to guide his addressee to the point where he is able to enjoy ecstasy for himself. The story of Hayy is his way of doing so.

I won't recite all the details of Hayy's upbringing by a doe, or the scientific, philosophical, and spiritual explorations her death initiates; I'll stick to noting a few features of his saga particularly relevant for our present purposes.

One realization Hayy reaches concerning her metaphysical make-up is that her deceased body has lost some component that previously gave it motion and direction (115/45). He eventually decides that this must be a sort of fiery vital spirit that uses the body's various organs as tools for accomplishing various vital operations (117/50–52). Still later, he determines that the same vital spirit present throughout all of an individual animal's bodily parts must in fact be present throughout the animal's whole species, and indeed throughout the whole animal kingdom, the entirety of the living world, and in fact all of physical reality. Hayy calls this spiritual component present throughout the physical world "soul" or "form" at various points depending on whether it is present in a living or non-living thing.² Dwelling on it makes him

1. Possibly Ibn Tufayl's patron, the Almohad sultan Abu Ya'qub Yusuf.

All parenthetical references to *Hayy ibn Yaqzan* (henceforth HIY) in this paper are to page numbers in Goodman's English translation (Ibn Tufayl and Goodman 2009), with page references to the edition from which Goodman translated (Gauthier 1936) following a slash.

2. Ibn Tufayl thinks of the spiritual component he calls "soul" or "form" as playing a sort of unifying function — within a given physical thing (119/56), within species and genera of physical things (120/57–58), and indeed within the entire physical world (122/61). In these regards it sounds like he has Aristotelian soul/form in mind. But Aristotle couldn't agree that soul or form was a fiery substance, as Hayy does.

8 / Religious Inquiries 7

contemptuous of physicality (124/65), and prompts his first awareness of God, as the being from whom their actions in physical bodies must ultimately stem (128/74). The fifth seventh-year span of his life Hayy devotes to getting to know God better through arguments based upon his observations of the heavens and other bodies.¹ He becomes obsessed with God, detecting in every feature of creation signs of his workmanship. He realizes furthermore that because God is non-physical, it must be through some non-physical faculty that Hayy apprehends him (135/92). Indeed that non-physical feature whereby Hayy apprehends the Necessarily Existent (as he takes to calling God at this point in the text [137/95]) must be his true self, imperishable and separable from the body (136/92–93). Because God's perfection is infinite, constant awareness of Him must be "joy without lapse, unending bliss, infinite rapture and delight," whereas losing hold of God must be "infinite torture as long as He is not found" (137/95). Eschatologically speaking, however, Hayy also realizes that in order to secure unending joy after separation from his body, he must practice continuous concentration on God now, unmarred by the passions or "demands of the bodily powers" (138/96).

Continuous concentration on God proves difficult.² Hayy's senses and bodily needs keep intruding. To solve this problem, Hayy decides he must model his life on the heavenly bodies, the one part of creation he's fairly sure is able to contemplate the Necessarily Existent continuously (142/105). In fact, he decides he has three sets of duties: those whereby he imitates the heavenly bodies, those whereby he imitates God himself, and those whereby he cares for and preserves his own body, dull and dark and demanding though it is, since he reflects that it hadn't been linked with him for nothing (142/106). The last set of duties are purely instrumental—necessary solely for the sake of preserving the vital spirit whereby he's able to imitate the heavenly bodies. He therefore imposes strict restrictions on how much food, drink, clothing, shelter, etc. he's willing to employ to protect the vital spirit. Beyond these tight negative constraints, however, Hayy also decides that imitating the heavenly bodies requires him positively to care for his own body, cleaning it, scenting it, etc., along with caring

Also confusing is Ibn Tufayl's tendency to call this substance, at least as it is present in Hayy, the "vital spirit," even though the same substance is apparently present in non-living things as well.

1. Ibn Tufayl seems to develop an extended Cosmological-style Argument from 128/75 to 133/86. Hayy is baffled by the question whether the universe is temporally finite or not (131/82) but eventually recognizes that either way, it is necessary for there to be a non-corporeal, good, intelligent first mover of the entire universe (131/83–133/85). At 134/88–90 he develops a Teleological-style Argument for God's wisdom, perfection, goodness, and mercy based upon the wonders of the Maker's craftsmanship.

2. Indeed, it occupies at least 15 years of Hayy's life, from age 35–50.

for the bodies of the plants and other animals on his tropical island (146/114–116). He becomes quite proficient in this sort of lifestyle. Then, rather abruptly, he discards it. It turns out, he realizes, that caring for himself and other living beings at all is merely a hindrance to the unfettered contemplation of God. He begins instead to sit in his cave, blocking out all sense-experiences, focusing just on God, sometimes for days. He tries to die to himself.

And then, Ibn Tufayl tells us: "At last it came. From memory and mind all disappeared ... All that remained was the One, the True Being, Whose existence is eternal, who uttered words identical with himself: 'Whose is the Kingdom on this day? God's alone, One and Triumphant!'" (149/120, quoting Qur'an 40:16). Hayy has reached ecstasy. Ibn Tufayl goes on to describe Hayy's ecstatic vision for several pages. He "sees," first of all, that he has attained identity with God Himself, and indeed with all disembodied beings who know Him. This immediately tempts Hayy to suppose that the multitude of these beings has been obliterated, but God "mercifully" guides him back to the truth: such questions about "unity" or "multiplicity" stem only from "some shadows of the physical or taint of sensory things [that] still lurked within him" (150/124). Such quantitative predicates do not apply to the immaterial. It may be that Ibn Tufayl senses this isn't an entirely satisfactory thing to say. He reiterates the extreme difficulty of the task he is attempting. He quotes the hadith about witnessing "what no eye has seen nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man to conceive."¹ He also refers to Aristotle's famous saying about bats in the daytime (*Metaphysics* 2.1.993b10). He also falls back on imagery. Hayy sees a "being corresponding to the highest sphere" along with various other immaterial spheres of descending goodness, beauty, joy, and bliss. Below the sphere of the moon, he sees a being with seventy thousand faces praising God, one of which he recognizes as his own. He sees less fortunate beings too, with their backs turned to God, tarnished, dimmed, and unravelling. The last sight is so terrible as to jar him out of his vision. For while Hayy has succeeded in "dying to himself" in some metaphorical sense, he isn't actually dead. He's still alive, returning as often as he can to blissful contemplation, longing that God would "ease him altogether of his body" (155/135).

It is at this point that Absal arrives from a neighboring island whose inhabitants are "followers of a certain true religion, based on the teachings of a certain ancient prophet" (156/136). Absal comes seeking the solitude that the religious Law proposes as a means to salvation and

1. Attested in multiple collections of hadiths (Sahih Muslim, Sahih Buhkari, etc.) as related by Abu Hurayrah, who says the Prophet recited Qur'an 32:17: "No soul knows what comfort is laid up for them secretly, as a recompense for that they were doing." The hadith bears a noteworthy similarity to 1 Corinthians 2:9, which in turn quotes a scripture which may be a free translation of Isaiah 64:4.

10 / *Religious Inquiries* 7

spiritual triumph. What he finds, once he teaches Hayy how to talk, is someone who has seen directly precisely those matters the traditions of his religion speak about. Hayy, in turn, recognizes in the religious traditions of Absal's people a "faithful picture" of "what he had seen for himself from his supernal vantage point" (161/145). Hayy even decides to undertake observance of the prayer-life, poor tax, fasting, and pilgrimage that Absal describes as obligatory acts of worship. He is, nevertheless, confused as to why the prophet of Absal's faith would have relied so heavily on symbolism, allowed the amassing of property, indulging in pastimes, or eating of more than is strictly necessary for survival. It takes a failed attempt at preaching his own unadulterated approach to the Necessarily Existent to Absal's countrymen for Hayy to realize that not all humans are as gifted as he himself is: "He saw that most men are no better than unreasoning animals, and realized that all wisdom and guidance ... was contained already in the words of the prophets and religious traditions" (164/153). Hayy returns to his own island, with Absal in tow, and the two return to the pursuit of ecstasy. Together, they "served God on the island until man's certain fate overtook them" (165/155).

Now there are many mysterious aspects of the account I just related. Here are four:

(a) Regarding Hayy's duties to maintain his own body in existence, we might pose a question like Cebes' to Socrates in the *Phaedo* (53d): if having a body is such a burden to Hayy's contemplation of God, why doesn't he just kill himself, or allow his body to perish?

(b) What becomes of Hayy's duties to imitate the heavenly bodies by caring for his own physical appearance and for other living things on his island? Hayy's concern for these matters drops off rather abruptly, and doesn't appear to resume even when he returns to his island with Absal.

(c) How is Hayy's death of self and union with God compatible, ontologically speaking, with his fulfillment? If he exists no more, then it is hard to see how he can be fulfilled.¹

(d) Even though Ibn Tufayl urges us repeatedly not to bring this question up, why must he rely on such resolutely bodily imagery to relate Hayy's beatific vision? Why all the talk of zooming around, observing spheres and faces?

I would suggest that all four of the questions are closely related to the beatitude paradox I outlined above. Consider Ibn Tufayl *appears*, at least, to subscribe to each of the propositions I mentioned earlier. Describing Hayy's ecstatic vision, he writes that

1. Sami S. Hawi calls this problem "the Pantheistic Paradox" in his study of Hayy (Hawi 1974, 217).

His true self was the Truth. What he had once supposed to be himself, as distinct from the Truth, was really nothing in itself, but was in reality in no way distinct from the Truth. ... [T]he Truth, glorified and exalted be He, was not in any sense plural and His self-knowledge was himself. ... [W]hoever gains consciousness of His essence wins that essence itself. Hayy had attained his identity. That identity could be reached only by Himself; indeed this Self-awareness was His identity. If so, then Hayy must be identical with Him, and so must every disembodied being that knows Him. (150/123)

Here we see Ibn Tufayl confirming both that Hayy's fulfillment consists in union with God, as per (1) above, and that this union is achieved through a conscious act of knowledge or awareness and requires disembodiment as per (2) above. On the other hand, the disembodied aspect of Hayy's ecstatic state is somewhat diminished by what I mentioned at (d) above—namely, the bodily imagery Ibn Tufayl uses to describe Hayy's vision. In general, it is difficult to reconcile Hayy's ecstatic disembodiment with the fact that he appears to remain embodied, in his cave, while having his vision, or with his previous conviction that he is, indeed, an "ideally balanced animal, kindred spirit of the celestial bodies" (141/104). It is, after all, the fact that he is a living body, akin to the celestial bodies, that gives rise to various bodily duties for Hayy, as per (3) above. For instance, Hayy must feed himself rather than allowing himself to die, and he must care positively for his body, along with those of other living things. But the question, as at (a) and (b) above, is why, considering that Hayy's true self isn't embodied at all. It seems as though Ibn Tufayl wants Hayy's ecstatic vision to transform him into an entirely different sort of thing than he was previously. Not just a caterpillar-into-butterfly transformation either, but an "ideally balanced animal"-into-Necessarily Existent transformation. My question at (c) above, however, is whether this sort of transformation is a real ontological possibility.

Ibn Tufayl and Thomas Aquinas's Solution(s) to the Beatitude Paradox

So much for Ibn Tufayl's account of Hayy's life and times, together with some of the difficulties it presents the interpreter. Let me turn now to a couple of routes by which Ibn Tufayl might resolve the problems I have raised. The second of them, I'll argue, is quite similar to the strategy Thomas Aquinas employed against the Beatitude Paradox. The first, however, I call "the mystical solution": acknowledging that (1)–(3) are jointly true, and that this raises a perplexing puzzle, but then claiming that we shouldn't expect any theoretical solution to the puzzle given certain limitations inherent in our present state of being.

Ibn Tufayl declares before beginning to relate Hayy's saga that he intends to bring his reader along the paths he has travelled, and let the reader swim in seas he has crossed, that the reader might "undergo the

12 / *Religious Inquiries* 7

same experience and see with the eyes of [the] soul all that [he himself has] seen” (103/19). This implies, I take it, that it requires a special sort of experience, acquired after a period of training, to apprehend ecstasy. In a similar vein, before describing Hayy’s ecstatic vision, Ibn Tufayl warns,

Now do not set your heart on a description of what has never been represented in the human heart. For many things that are articulate in the heart cannot be described. ... The ambition to put this into words is reaching for the impossible—like wanting to taste colors, expecting black as such to taste either sweet or sour. (149/121–22)

Again, it appears that Ibn Tufayl thinks the state of beatitude cannot be captured in language, and can only be accessed through a special faculty called (metaphorically) “the heart.” Statements like this might reasonably be taken to suggest that Ibn Tufayl never intends to deliver his considered theoretical stand on the matters he discusses. Instead, we might suppose, he intends to lead us along to the point where we, through some higher faculty than we currently possess or than language can convey, would be able to see clearly the solution to the puzzles I just set forth.

Calling this the “mystical solution” to the Beatitude Paradox isn’t, perhaps, quite right, since the strategy, as I see it, is essentially to acknowledge the impossibility of resolving the paradox. One might compare it profitably, I think, to the Colin McGinn’s “mysterian” position in the philosophy of mind.¹ Just as McGinn believes there is a good reason why we’ll never be able to solve the hard problem of consciousness, Ibn Tufayl may believe there’s a good reason why we cannot understand how Beatitude could involve both bodily duties and disembodied union with God. Ibn Tufayl appears to insist that many distinct individual humans, such as Hayy and Absal, are able simultaneously to become one with God. He acknowledges that this might appear to violate the “axiom of reason that a thing must be either one or many” (151/125). And he says no one can “know or fully understand” how his description could be so without “actually reaching [the divine world] and seeing for himself” (151/126). Perhaps, similarly, it might *appear* contradictory to say that human fulfillment involves both disembodiment and the fulfillment of bodily duties, but that this is merely owing to our limited present capacities for understanding such matters. Much has been written about Ibn Tufayl’s relationship to Sufi mysticism.² It may be that he indeed endorses the “mystical solution” to the Beatitude Paradox.

I tend, however, to suspect Ibn Tufayl favors a different solution. I suspect he resolves the paradox simply by dropping (3)—that is, the

1. See McGinn (1989).

2. See, for example, Cornell (1996) and Radtke (1996).

claim that happiness involves fulfilling bodily duties. When Hayy sees himself as "an ideally balanced animal," we might say, he is merely reflecting on the fact that he is currently conjoined to a body. After all, Hayy has already realized by this point that his "true self" is "non-corporeal and not qualifiable by any physical predicate" (136/92). From this interpretative standpoint, we might respond to (a)–(d) as follows:

(a) Hayy cannot simply kill himself because, as he recognizes, "[his] body had not been created for him idly. It had not been linked with him for nothing" (142/106). Indeed, it was linked with him for the purpose of training his true self to the point that it is able to apprehend God.

(b) Hayy's training period ends, however, when he achieves his ecstatic union, and henceforth he no longer has need for imitating the celestial bodies.

(c) Hayy's union with God isn't a matter of ontological identity, but rather of perfecting apprehending God's nature.

(d) The bodily descriptions are merely poetic contrivances. Hayy is accessing God with his mind, not his body, and after he and Absal have died, they will be perfectly united with God in a disembodied way.

Call this the "intellectualist solution" to the Beatitude Paradox. As an interpretation of *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*, it may not be perfectly satisfying. Regarding (c) in particular, there are certain passages that seem rather insistent on Hayy's union with God being ontological, rather than merely intellectual or spiritual. On the other hand, as a philosophical position, it is strong enough to have been adopted, not just by Ibn Tufayl, but by Thomas Aquinas as well.

I can provide here only a thumbnail sketch of Aquinas's overall position on beatitude. Salient for our purposes are his claims that "final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence," and that to see the divine essence, God himself must be "conjoined to our intellect as its form, so that it is both what is understood and that by which the understanding takes place" (Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* [ST] 1a2ae.3.8; *Scriptum super Sententiis* [In Sent.] 4.49.2.1).¹ Ordinarily, Aquinas thinks, we understand objects by means of a concept (or *species*, to use the Latin term) ontologically distinct from whatever it is that we are understanding.² In the case of the beatific vision, however, God himself becomes the concept whereby we are able to see his essence. Interestingly, Aquinas attributes the view he adopts here to Ibn Tufayl's philosophical successor at the Almohad Sultan Abu

1. All translations of Aquinas's works are my own, from the editions available online at www.corpusthomicum.org.

2. See ST 1a.85.2 for the details of Aquinas's view.

14 / *Religious Inquiries* 7

Ya'qub Yusuf's court: Ibn Rushd. Elsewhere Aquinas stands vehemently opposed to Ibn Rushd's views concerning, for instance, the temporal finitude of the created world or the unicity of the human intellect. Here, however, he adopts precisely Ibn Rushd's view concerning the relationship between the unified, separate intellect and individual human thinkers to describe how we are able to see God.¹ A further highly significant claim Aquinas makes concerning the beatific vision is what Christina Van Dyke has called "the all-sufficiency thesis"—namely, the view that seeing God satisfies us such that any and all of our natural desires are perfectly fulfilled, and any change from this state would represent a diminution in our happiness (Dyke 2015). As a by-product of the all-sufficiency thesis, Aquinas doesn't think we'll have any need for food or sex our beatified state, even though, as a Christian, he is committed to our regaining bodies at the day of resurrection.² We'll *have* bodies, to be sure. And indeed, following medieval tradition, Aquinas argues that resurrected bodies will possess marvelous qualities: agility, brightness, impassibility, and subtlety.³ Given the all-sufficiency thesis, however, our bodies won't be useful to us. We won't need bodily senses to see God or to provide for any of our needs, since beyond the vision of God, we'll have no needs. As Van Dyke aptly puts it, on this picture of beatitude, our bodies become "nothing more than glorious hood ornaments" (Dyke 2015, 290). As is the case with Ibn Tufayl, Aquinas's solution to the Beatitude Paradox is intellectualist. Ultimate human happiness will have nothing to do with bodily duties, or any sort of bodily activity at all.

Is this a problem? Perhaps not. Perhaps whatever repugnance we might feel towards the notion of a purely intellectual or spiritual characterization of beatitude is a product of our limited perspective. In the story with which I began, I hated going to church as a child, but don't mind it so much any more.

Still, by way of conclusion, let me briefly suggest what I take to be a better solution to the beatitude paradox than the intellectualist route favored by Ibn Tufayl and Aquinas alike. It stems, in fact, from a comment Aquinas makes late in his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, where the question is, given the "agility" of resurrected bodies, will resurrected human beings actually move around? (In Sent. 4.44.2.3 qc. 2) Aquinas lists various reasons one might have for supposing the answer to be no. For instance, every motion is undertaken on account of some need, but given the all-sufficiency thesis, resurrected humans will no longer have any needs. Interestingly,

1. See, for more on this interesting and somewhat ironic case of borrowing, Taylor (2012).

2. Cf. Aquinas (Summa contra gentiles [SCG], 4.83) for the claim about food and sex.

3. See SCG 4.86 and In Sent 4.49.4.5 qc. 3.

Aquinas says, they will move around nevertheless. They will do so

as they please, so that by actually exercising what is in their power, they may demonstrate the excellence of the divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence. For sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will in no way diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them. (In Sent. 4.44.2.3 qc. 2)

This is an interesting account indeed. Aquinas acknowledges still that happiness consists in an intellectual vision of God. Yet he argues that resurrected humans will nonetheless engage in certain bodily activities for at least two reasons: to demonstrate the excellence of God's wisdom, and, frankly, because it's enjoyable to do so: it "refreshes their vision." The picture we get here is of resurrected humans beings zooming around a renewed creation employing their gifts of agility to investigate the beauty of all the things God has made. Will it be a *duty* to perform this sort of bodily activity? Perhaps not. It will be a "refreshing" experience, Thomas thinks. Yet for monotheists who believe in a resurrection state, such as Aquinas, this last approach to the Beatitude Paradox that I have sketched comes much closer to salvaging claim (3) than the Intellectualist Solution. Ibn Tufayl, for his part, seems somewhat ambivalent about the resurrection. He criticizes al-Ghazali for anathematizing the philosophers, on the one hand, for their denial of the resurrection of the flesh, but praising the Sufi masters, on the other hand, to whom he likewise attributes this view. But this is simply a charge of inconsistency in al-Ghazali's thinking. Ibn Tufayl doesn't make clear where he stands on the issue. What should be clear, I think, is that *if* he endorses the resurrection of the flesh, a more satisfying solution to the Beatitude Paradox may be available to him than the one he appears in fact to endorse.

References

The Qur'an. Translated by A. J. Arberry.

Aquinas, Thomas. *Scriptum super Sententiis*[InSent]. < www.corpusthomicum.org >.

———. *Summa Theologiae* [ST]. < www.corpusthomicum.org >.

———. *Summa contra gentiles* [SCG]. < www.corpusthomicum.org >.

Cornell, Vincent. 1996. "Hayy in the Land of Absal: Ibn Tufayl and Sufism in the Western Maghrib during the Muwahhid Era." In *The World of Ibn Tufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hayy ibn Yaqzan*, edited by Lawrence Conrad, 133-164. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

16 / Religious Inquiries 7

- Dyke, Christina Van. 2015. "Shiny Happy People: Perfect Happiness and the Limits of Human Nature." *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion* 6: 269-92.
- Gauthier, León. 1936. *Hayy bin Yaqzan: roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofaïl*. 2nd. Beirut: Imprimerie catholique.
- Hawi, Sami S. 1974. *Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophic Study of Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Bin Yaqṣān*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Ibn Ṭufayl, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, and Lenn Evan Goodman. 2009. *Ibn Ṭufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqṣān: A Philosophical Tale*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- McGinn, Collin. 1989. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" *Mind* 98 (391): 349–66.
- Radtke, Bernd. 1996. "How Can Many Reach the Mystical Union? Ibn Tufayl and the Divine Spark." In *The World of Ibn Tufayl: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hayy ibn Yaqzan*, edited by Lawrence Conrad, 165-194. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Taylor, Richard Taylor. 2012. "Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas's Conception of the Beatific Vision in IV Sent., D. 49, Q. 2, A. 1." *The Thomist* 76 (4): 509–50.

پارادوکس برکت برای گروهی از یکتاپرستان؟

آدام وود*

این مقاله درباره تناقض آشکار بین ماهیت جسمانی انسان (که برای شادمانی به ماهیت جسمانی او اشاره دارد) و اعتقاد بسیاری از یکتاپرستان است که شادی در حالت غیرجسمانی است که انسان با خداوند متحد می شود. این مقاله بر روی آثار دو متفکر مهم مسلمان و مسیحی تمرکز می کند، ابن طفیل و توماس آکویناس؛ و راه حل های آنها در این زمینه را ارائه می دهد.

واژگان کلیدی: اتحاد با خداوند، شادی، ابن طفیل، آکویناس، رستاخیز.

* استادیار کالج ویتان، ایالات متحده آمریکا