

Imam Khomeini's Strategic Management in the Imposed War

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Abstract

One of the essential and fundamental issues as an effective management model for officials and managers of today's society is to identify and explain Imam Khomeini's strategic management and thinking during the imposed War. With descriptive-analytical and documentary and libraries methods, the present study aimed to answer the 'What are the critical management features in the Imam's manner and behavior during the imposed war?' And designing and explaining a practical model of Imam Khomeini's management strategies and modeling its behavior for the country's managers. According to the hypothesis, Imam Khomeini's management characteristics are based on his personal and organizational behavior and Islamic values. The results indicated that Imam Khomeini's leadership and management model in the imposed War was a combination model based on three levels of the individual (personality), behavior, and society's needs.

Keywords: Imam Khomeini, Imposed War, Strategic Management, Leadership, Command.

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Introduction

Management has a special place in human life, and human beings want optimal use of available facilities and resources with the help of management. Man's view of the universe determines his method and direction. According to thinkers, management has five principles: planning, decision-making, organizing, directing, supervising, and controlling. Leadership is the primary duty of managers and one of the essential discussions in management. They should use proper human resources to implement organizational plans and achieve organizational goals (Schermerhorn, 2001 AD/1380 SH: 45).

The Islamic Revolution of Iran and its rapid developments prompted researchers and thinkers to study this great event's dimensions and angles and explain and analyze why and how it occurred. According to scholars, the Islamic Revolution of Iran had three essential elements: ideology, leadership, and people; the leadership role was more prominent. For example, Michel Foucault, a witness of the Islamic Revolution, points to the essential role of Imam Khomeini's leadership in targeting the collective will of Iranians for the revolution (Foucault, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 57).

Imam Khomeini was one of the prominent leaders of contemporary history globally with unique characteristics in leading society. The Imam's religious and Islamic thought, dominant in his practice and behavior, distinguished his leadership style in other world revolutions. Today's society needs a proper management model to overcome the leading crises, so re-reading their leadership and management ideas and introducing them to today's generation is an undeniable necessity. Iraq's eight-year War with Iran was a vital historical moment that showed the importance and position of society's political management and leadership. During this period, as the leader, Imam Khomeini drew, explained, and supervised implementing the country's strategic policies.

Imam Khomeini's management and leadership at the individual, group, and organizational behavior with the indicators proposed in this study is a suitable model for managers. Given the above, understanding Imam Khomeini's leadership and management model and its influential components during the imposed War is the main issue of this research.

The present study aimed to create a behavioral model for the country's leaders based on Imam Khomeini's leadership model during the imposed War, which was based on Islamic beliefs and values. The characteristics of Imam's management are expediency-oriented, duty-based, constructability, faith in the battle continued until the victory of right over wrong, crisis management, populism, anti-arrogance, etc.

1. Research Background

A book about Imam Khomeini's leadership is "Fundamentals of Political Decision Making from Imam Khomeini's Perspective,"¹ written by Ebrahim Barzegar. The author refers to the basics of the Imam's political decision-making and the variables affecting the process of such decisions. The present study analyzed the leadership and management of the Imam based on the existing characteristics at three levels of individual, behavioral and organizational, especially during the imposed War.

The article "Imam Khomeini and Crisis Management"² by Sayyed Hossein Akhavan Alavi is another work that has been written in connection with Imam's management method. This article has examined eleven significant crises during the leadership of Imam Khomeini and managing them based on Quranic and Islamic views. Crisis management is the only topic that the author has considered in this article. However, in the future research, the author has studied the different aspects of Imam Khomeini's management during the War.

Another work is Azam Abdali Cheraghani's dissertation entitled "Inspiring Imam Khomeini's Uprising and Struggles from the Qur'an and Hadith."³ This work describes and narrates Imam Khomeini's struggles and political activities and attempts to prove the theological and religious roots of Imam Khomeini's thoughts, ideas, and actions.

The author has considered Imam Khomeini's management methods. In the present article, the writer focus on Imam Khomeini's management practices. In general, the explanation of Imam Khomeini's management and leadership model during the imposed War, which is one of the most essential and crucial periods in the history of the Islamic Revolution, shows the fundamental difference between this article and this article other works.

2. Concepts Definition

2.1. Imposed War

Klausutis believes that War uses the highest level of violence in the service of the state or country. (Bouthoul, 1995 AD/1374 SH, 21). However, all wars' aims are not the service of the government and the nation. Tard says: "War is a tragic and eternal method of social controversy. War is the product of two collective conflicting

1. Barzegar, Ibrahim (1994 AD/1373 SH); Fundamentals of Political Decision Making from Imam Khomeini's Perspective, First Edition, Tehran: Islamic Propaganda Organization.

2. Akhavan Alavi, Sayyed Hossein (2012 AD/1391 SH). Investigating and Explaining the Crisis Management Model from Imam Khomeini's Perspective, Management Quarterly, No. 4, Tehran: Islamic Azad University.

3. Abdali Cheraghani, Azam (2008 AD/1387 SH). *Inspiration of Imam Khomeini's Uprising and Struggles from Quran and Hadith*. Thesis in Quranic Sciences. Supervisor: Ali Muhammad Fallahi, Shahid Ashrafi University of Isfahan.

analogies, the will of the two nations caused the fight against each other” (Ibid, 24).

2.2. Command

The term command has four military uses in English: individual authority, the issued order, dominated organization or region, and implications of weapons on the superior position. The Pentagon's defines command: “The power of senior commander in the military legally exercises over his subordinates by rank or position” (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 45).

According to the Islamic Republic Army, Command is an option by which the commander acts on the subordinates (Habibi, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 101).

2.3. Strategy

Strategy is derived from the Greek word "Strategos," meaning "Army Commander" and is defined as "the art of commanders, tactics and military tactics." (Randall, J. 2002 AD/1381 SH: 14; Solhjoo, 2007 AD/1386 SH: 22). It is usually classified into four levels: national, military, operational, and tactical, which are used to achieve national, military, functional, and tactical goals. Today, strategy is defined as: “The science and technology of using the nation's political, economic, cultural and military power during war and peace. It aims to provide maximum support for national policies and increase the achieving results for maximum victory and minimum defeat” (Ibid, 23). By “strategy” in this research, we mean Imam Khomeini's strategies and tactics to achieve the War's goals.

2.4. Leadership

2.5. A leader Influences the behavior of one or more people, who consciously tries to force his followers to do what they want (Fidler and Shamers, 1998 AD/1377 SH: 18).

3. A Brief Look at the Background to the Formation of the Imposed War

The causes of wars are variables generally involved in the national environment of two countries and appear in the international arena and arise from conflict or opposition of interest or the decrease and increase of power. Thus, the reduction of national violence, political instability, global power reduction, competition for more appeals, etc., are the reasons for the War (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 57). Regarding the reasons for the Iraqi government to begin the War, some points are considerable:

- 1) Saddam came to power in a situation where he regarded the national crisis in Iraq, Iran, and the international system as favorable for achieving his goals;
- 2) The historical and structural contexts between Iran and Iraq caused the military invasion of Iraq;

3) In a press conference with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Saddam accused Iran of violating the Algerian agreement and interfering in the country's internal affairs (State Department Documents, Document No. 18534, Code s-1986);

4) In invading Iran, Iraq had long-term and comprehensive goals, the most obvious of which was to fill the power vacuum in the region. By upsetting the balance of power in the vital area of the Persian Gulf, Saddam tried to play an essential role in power relations in the future and take the position of the regional gendarmerie. Therefore, achieving some sensitive and strategic regions of Iran, such Arvand River, was his goal (Rezaei, 2011 AD/1390 SH: 71).

Regarding Iraq's military and political goals at the beginning of the War, Saddam Hussein said: "War is the will to achieve specific goals using the means of struggle. In the military phase, the main goal in the first phase is to remove Iranian artillery from their positions in the border areas that hit our villages and cities on September 4, 1980. The second was to withdraw the Iranian army from strategically border essential parts to prevent the Iraqis from Iran militarily. But in the political phase, our goal is to recognize Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatta al-Arab region and adjacent territories that Iran had forcibly usurped under the 1975 Algerian agreement. Iran must also acknowledge the rights of Iraq to the three islands of Tonb-e Bozorg, Tonb-e-Kuchak, and Abu Musa, and not interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq" (State Department Documents, Document No. 3865, Code S-1986).

Thus, to achieve these goals, the Iraqi government, by adopting a strategy of rapid and short-term War, began its offensive against Iran on September 22, 1980 (Cordesman, 2010 AD/1389 SH: 178).

These goals are as follow:


- 1) Solving the geopolitical problem of access to the Persian Gulf by occupying large parts of Khuzestan;
- 2) Cancellation of the 1975 Algerian agreement with the occupation of Khorramshahr and Abadan and the rule of the Arvand River;
- 3) Consolidation of the obtained results and adoption of a defense strategy in the occupied areas (Study Center, 2001AD/1380 SH: 4; 2001AD/1380 SH: 22).

Thus, the Iraqi army launched its military offensive against Iran in September 1980, and in the first quarter of the War, achieved almost most of its intended objectives (Babaei Abarquei, 2011 AD/1390 SH, 54). Of course, Sardar Hussein Alaei believes that "Iraq did not commit any of its goals, except for the unfinished occupation of Khorramshahr and several border cities, which included 15,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory. Because the morale management of the Imam at that time caused unity and harmony among the Iranian warriors and thus prevented the fulfillment of Iraq's goals in attacking

Iran” (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Sardar Hossein Alaei, 8/16/2013).

4. Model of Imam Khomeini's Management in the Imposed War

As the commander-in-chief of the forces during the imposed War, Imam Khomeini was able to resolve the fundamental issues of the War by using his unique management methods and measures and aroused the astonishment and surprise of politicians. Imam's management model is a combination of personality, behavioral and contingent attitudes that has essential indicators. These indicators are not limited to a specific time and place; instead, they can use by today's officials and managers of society. We see Imam Khomeini's management model at the interpersonal, individual, and organizational levels in the following.



According to Imam Khomeini, noticeable issues about War are as follow: Crisis management, duty-oriented, expediency-oriented, unity-oriented, law-oriented, Islam-oriented, populism, anti-arrogance, enemyology, strategic thinking, giving delegation, belief in consultation, the principle of punishment and encouragement, peace of mind, supervision, Controlling and directing affairs (Khomeini, 2007 AD/1386 SH, Several Pages).

5. Critical Management Indicators of Imam Khomeini

5.1. Foresight and Strategic Thinking

Due to the current situation in the country and the study of Iran's military situation before the War, officials did not predict the occurrence of War. They expected one series of border clashes from Iraq. As Hashemi Rafsanjani writes in his memoirs about the War: "Simultaneously with Tehran's Mehrabad airport bombing, we immediately sent a group of delegates there, although it was against our expectations that Iraq would attack Tehran. We considered this event very unlikely" (Bashiri, 2014 AD/1393 SH: 220).

Yaghoub Zohdi⁴ says: "About two weeks before the War, the Supreme Defense Council was formed at the headquarters of the 81st Armored Division of Kermanshah with the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the IRGC Commander, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Commander and the IRGC Commander of the west. At that meeting, Muhammad Boroujerdi announced in a report that Iraq intended to attack Iran.

According to Boroujerdi's report, a mechanized armored division had been deployed by the Iraqi army in the border areas of Qasr Shirin. The president analyzed no war would begin to start a fight in the region until the balance of power between the Soviets and the United States was upset during the Cold War. Army commanders also did not believe at the beginning of such a war. Zahirnejad, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that Iraq did not dare to attack Iran and that the Revolutionary Guards wanted to seize army equipment under the pretext of war" (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Sayyed Yaghoub Zohdi, 9/17/2017).

Such statements show the ignorance and surprise of the Iranian army at the beginning of the War. Few officials notice these reports, so they have no evaluation about a possible war. Only at that time did Imam Khomeini react in protest of the Iraqi border actions on 1358/3/24: "We don't expect of Iraqi government officials on the border would behave contrary to good neighborliness" (Khomeini, 12/246).

When Iraq's border movements on Iran's borders increased purposefully, Imam Khomeini this time implicitly stated the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of Iran in a speech on 1359/1/28: "This army, which has now prepared bayonets, artillery, and tanks and is opposed to the people, wants to fight the Islamic State of Iran, which is a war against Islam, the Qur'an and Prophet" (Ibid, 246).

This prediction by the Imam at a time when the War had not officially begun reflects the Imam's strategic thinking. Because, he as

4. One of the military commanders of Iran during the imposed war.

an intelligent manager, recognized and planned for opportunities and environmental threats.

5.2. Invite to Keep Calm and Message to the People

The Iraqi government attacked Iran when Iran was under its revolution and had several crises. Under such circumstances, fighting with a country with strong military power and supported by world superpowers intensified the problems of the post-revolutionary and put the revolution in grave danger. But all the military and political equations of Iraq collapsed in the first days of the War.

The Islamic Republic was able to maintain and stabilize the revolution despite the foreign War. Undoubtedly, the management and leadership of Imam Khomeini breaking the equations and predictions of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. One of his management characteristics was to keep the people calm and cheer. For example, when Iraqi fighters first bombed Iranian cities, including Tehran, Imam Khomeini calmed them down in a meeting with the country's commanders and officials and said, "A thief came, threw a stone and fled" (Khomeini, 2/58).

He inspired the officials and the people. Also, with the beginning of the invasion of the Iraqis forces on the borders of Iran, Imam Khomeini, in numerous radio and television messages addressed to the Iranian nation. At the same time, warning of the Iraqi military aggression called on everyone to remain vigilant and calm (Khomeini, 13/212-226).

5.3. The Principle of Giving Authority

The breadth and specialization of war affairs caused the Imam to delegate some executive and expert experiences to the country's officials and draw and manage the strategic policy of the War. To this end, he commissioned some responsibilities to the persons concerned with the start of the imposed War.

The political sphere caused to done giving authority. In this regard, Imam selected Bani Sadr as Commander-in-Chief was, but some time later, Imam removed Bani Sadr due to his weak management in command of the War. The crucial positions of authority and councils that were delegated or formed by order of the Imam were:

- 1) Supreme Council of Defense and Khatam al-Anbiya base and replacement of the General Command of the Armed Forces in military plans;
- 2) Establishment of the High Council for War Support to recruit and provide facilities;
- 3) Formation of the headquarters of the bombed areas;
- 4) Determining the country's foreign policy and electing a foreign minister to pursue diplomatic issues in international forums;
- 5) Establishment of the Supreme Council for the reconstruction of War zones;

6) Elected Commander of the Armed Forces at the beginning of the War (Bani Sadr and then Commander Fallahi, Mohsen Rezaei and Sayyad Shirazi and then Hashemi Rafsanjani) and also appointed (Ayatollah Khamenei and Mustafa Chamran) as their representatives in the War (Cf. Sahifa Imam Khomeini, Documents and National Library of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Document No. 25/340).

5.4. Anti- arrogance

One of the managerial characteristics of Imam was anti-arrogance that was documented with verse "قُلْ إِنَّمَا أَعِظُكُمْ بِوَاحِدَةٍ أَنْ تَقُومُوا لِلَّهِ مِثْلِي وَفُرَادِي" (Al-Saba/46).

Therefore, the Imam's arrogant view had a long history, and he always emphasized it as an essential principle in his struggles. With the slogan of returning to pure Muhammadan Islam (PBUH) and re-reading the Islamic-Iranian identity, he tried to gradually restore the lost "Dignity" of the Iranian nation. And in this way, in the first phase in the 1340s, they resisted the American "White Revolution" and the discriminatory "Capitulation." The Imam referred to the capture of the US embassy in Tehran as the Second Revolution, and it implies the anti-arrogance feature of the leadership. But we want to examine the Imam's anti-arrogance during the imposed War.

Regarding resistance against the superpowers during the War, he said: "Stand against the superpowers that want to rule and oppress you" (Khomeini, 16/38). Another point was the attention and trust in the power of internal forces. Imam was aware of the role and position of the internal troops and always encouraged the officials and people to rely on their ability and distrust of foreign forces. According to Imam, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union's policies during the War were the same. He always asked the people and the warriors to hope in God and not fear the superpowers (Khomeini, 1/420).

Another fundamental principle was the "Continuity and Permanence" of the struggle. Imam Khomeini's view of War was religious and Islamic. He believed that the battle of belief and truth against false impressions is a constant battle and always continues. According to Imam Khomeini, "Our war with the global arrogance is a war of ideas and does not know geography and borders" (Khomeini, 21/88).

5.5. Duty-oriented

Imam was duty-oriented during the eight-year War. It did not mean seeking apparent victory, but he believed the primary triumph is to perform a task, and the divine duty is the "Happiness Key" that reached us ideal goals. In this regard, Ayatollah Khamenei said: "Imam word that "we act for the task, not for victory" did not mean that he did not want to win. Undoubtedly, victory in all great goals was the will of the Imam. However, the Imam preferred to achieve the

goals through acting on the divine task over the result." (Khamenei, 2009 AD/1388 SH: 237)

Another characteristic that had historical and doctrinal roots in the society was the concern for the principle of duty-oriented and the model of "Ashura War." Imam's doctrinal-political teachings during the imposed War had some framework such as: "Blood Is Victorious Over the Sword," "War of Islam and Infidelity," and "War of Truth and Falsehood." He called victory or martyrdom "One of the Two Goodness" in that achieving either was desirable.

This view of War was, was the central core of task-oriented thinking and its precedence over consequentialism. Therefore, based on Imam Khomeini, the result is connected with the task, but the result is a subset of the duty. Imam Khomeini considered this duty a divine and religious matter and believed that: "Sayyed Al-Shohada determine our responsibility" (Khomeini, 19/271).

Accordingly, after the liberation of most of the country's occupied areas and introduced the conquest of Khorramshahr in June 1982, the concept of the Ashura war. In comparison, there was no clear vision for victory over Iraq and the end of the War. In such circumstances, the emphasis on the Ashura war was raised under the concept of Imam's duty-oriented, focusing on the war continuation, regardless of any consequences.

After the conquest of Khorramshahr, the great powers, to maintain the rule of Iraq and put pressure on the Islamic Republic, sought to impose the terms of their negotiations on Iran, regardless of Iran's demands. But Iran continued the War by following the example of the Ashura school and acting on the divine duty, irrespective of any outcome (Ardestani, 2000 AD/1379 SH: 26).

5.6. Punish the Aggressor and Encourage the Warriors

During the War, one of the Imam's management principles was the punishment of the aggressor and encouraged the warriors on the fronts. Before its defeat in 1980, the Iraqi government sought to achieve outstanding achievements such as capturing Khuzestan and access to the open waters of the Persian Gulf. Still, after several consecutive defeats by Iranian forces in 1981 and 1982, the Iraqi strategy changed.

On June 20, 1980, Saddam Hussein announced in a radio and television speech in Baghdad: "The Iraqi government will withdraw all its forces from Iran within ten days from June 20, 1982, to show its goodwill in ending the War. He also declared its readiness to fight Israel" (Center for War Studies and Research, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 6/20/1982).

Saddam Hussein's goal in adopting a defense strategy and retreat tactics was the inability to maintain military superiority and impose new political conditions on Iran. On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, given his historical background and knowledge of Saddam Hussein's

character, did not accept peace without a guarantee because he had no confidence in the Iraqi government.

Iranian political decision-makers and military commanders were also reluctant to sign the end-of-war agreement without achieving the minimum concession to punish the aggressor and receive reparations. They feared that public opinion and the future would interpret their decision as irrational (Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 34).

Therefore, decision-making had become very complex and challenging for officials. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, announced: "We have no territorial ambitions, but we are determined to fulfill our rights. Iran will not relinquish any of its rights, we will get all of our rights, and our greatest right is the fall of Saddam" (War Documents and Research Center, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 5/26/1982).

Mir Hossein Mousavi, the then Prime Minister of Iran, stated: "The war will end when all our conditions are accepted" (War Documentation and Research Center, Islamic Republic News Agency, Special Reports, 5/11/1982).

Given these considerations, Iran had three solutions:

- 1) Regardless of its demands and only under international pressure, it accepted the ceasefire as a precondition for any other action and pursued its needs through political negotiation;
- 2) Leaving the conflict without ending the War. It means that Iran will not accept the ceasefire but at the same time refuse to enter Iraqi territory and settle on its borders;
- 3) The military effort to ensure a dignified peace (Droudian, 2012 AD/1391 SH, 250).

Iran had no choice but the third solution. Imam, who was in charge of managing the War, explained the intention of this solution as follows: "If we release the culprit today, that we have power, it is not a ceasefire and peace" (Khomeini, 16/235).

5.7. The Principle of Belief in Consultation

The opinions of political and military advisers had great importance to Imam Khomeini. In critical military decisions, while paying attention to the requirements and conditions of the country, he paid attention to the opinions of political experts and military commanders. One of the turning points in the war was the negotiations on the adoption of Resolution 598. It determined the war and the years of struggle and self-sacrifice fate.

He accepted the Resolution based on the principle of consultation and awareness of warlords' and advisers' opinions. Perhaps one of the most important reasons for adopting this Resolution, which he refers to as "Drinking the Cup of Poison," was the opinion of the commanders and the reports of economic and military experts that disagreed with the continuation of the war. Imam Khomeini

recognized the adoption of Resolution 598 in favor of the regime and the revolution.

5.8. Enemyology

One of the managerial features of Imam Khomeini during the war was his enemyology. During the imposed war, Imam repeatedly advised the Iranian nation to be vigilant against the enemies' conspiracies (Khomeini, 18/187).

He assessed the occurrence of the imposed war as an American conspiracy and believed that "This war is a war with the United States" (Khomeini, 13/212).

Imam's revelation of the conspiracies of the gangs in the imposed war, and warnings to the countries that participated in the Taif Conference showed the Imam's high vision in recognizing the Islamic Revolution enemies (Khomeini, 14/163).

According to Imam last will, his concerns were about the conspiracies and plans of the enemies, that done after the revolution victory to disappoint the nations and especially the Iranian government from Islam (Khomeini's political-divine will, 2014 AD/1393 SH, 9).

5.9. Populism

According to Imam Khomeini, people had no preference for each other in class and social affairs. Simultaneously with the revolution, he always advised the authorities to serve the people and with the people. While the ratification ceremony of President Raja'i and Ayatollah Khamenei, asked them to be with people.

The Imam himself avoided anything that caused him to distance himself from ordinary and weak people. Fatemeh Tabatabai, the Imam's bride, quotes the Imam's reaction to the possible bombing of Jamaran in the book "Imam Khomeini and Political Behavior" as follows:

In those days when there was bombing, Mr. Ansari came one day and told the Imam that a letter had come from Mr. Rey Shahri that we had reliable information that here (Jamaran) wanted to be bombed tonight, so please change your place tonight. The Imam said to him, laughing, 'What are these words?' with bombing possibility, I am in my chair and room unless everyone is in the shelter or guard standing in our alley, he is standing there, and I am going to the ceiling! I never go there, I want a rocket to hit me, and I become a martyr (Tabatabai, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 316).

5.10. Command and Decision-Making Power

Ethnicity and separatism were critical issues in the early revolution, with the support of hegemonic countries. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan crisis was the most acute and dangerous.

The reason was the lack of control of the central government over the Kurdistan region. Hashem Sabbaghian, the then Minister of Interior, said: "We had the same dangers in other parts of the country,

such as Sistan and Baluchestan and Khuzestan, but we did not feel threatened in any of these places, such as Kurdistan. Because the central government had power in other places, but the central government did not have power” (Perspective, interview with Sabbaghian, 2008 AD/1387 SH: 19).

Unfortunately, from the very beginning of the revolution's victory, war and bloodshed began in the Kurdistan region. The first significant example was the attack on the Mahabad garrison. In this invasion, weapons were looted, and the regiment was set on fire. Hundreds of conspirators surrounded the Sanandaj garrison on 1357/12/27 with weapons stolen from Mahabad.

They entered the barracks without firing a shot from inside the barracks, killing 21 soldiers and capturing several inside buildings. Then they went to Naqadeh and Marivan and from there to Paveh, and for a few weeks, they prepared their equipment and personnel for the great war in Paveh.

When Imam heard the news of the riots in Paveh, ordered to resolve the uproar Paveh quickly, the army sent. On the morning of 1358/5/27, Imam Khomeini issued a historic and decisive statement that changed the fate of Kurdistan and Iran. The army must reach Paveh within 24 hours and suppress the counter-revolution (Khomeini, 9/379).

Also, another case that the Imam dealt with decisively and asked the commanders to resolve the matter quickly was breaking the siege of Abadan. After the military invasion of Iraq and the capture of Khorramshahr, which was the most important port city of Iran, the enemy tried to occupy Abadan through the east of Karun and north of Bahmanshir, which put Abadan under a 330-degree siege. In those circumstances, Imam Khomeini, on October 27, 1960, said to army forces: "The siege of Abadan must be broken." I am waiting. I [warn] the guards, the police, and the commanders of the police must break the siege. Do not neglect it. Do not let these people come to Abadan. Take them out of Khorramshahr. Get aggressive (Khomeini, 13/333).

Based on the Imam message, one of the four primary and prominent operations in the history of the war, which is mentioned as a turning point in the transfer of the war strategy, was carried out. Also, following his order, the IRGC and the army formed joint plans to defeat the Abadan siege.

It should be noted that after Fallahi's martyrdom, the level of war command changed, and did the control of the operational status of the war jointly. During this war period, Mohsen Rezaei was appointed commander of the IRGC, and Ali Sayyad Shirazi was appointed commander of the army's ground forces.

One of the crucial features of the Joint Command, which is known as the golden age of war, was the establishment of regular coordination and acceptance of joint responsibility for managing the

battle at the strategic level (Museum of the Islamic Revolution and Holy Defense, interview with Abdolhossein Mofid, 1395/8/25 SH)

5.11. The Principle of Expediency-oriented

There are many examples regarding the Imam's belief in the principle of expediency-oriented during his leadership. The story of the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the position of deputy leader, accepting the resignation of Bazargan at a particular stage of the revolution, agreeing to the removal of Bani Sadr, or most importantly, the adoption of Resolution 598 to end the war in 1988. The focus here is on the imposed war, the acceptance of Resolution 598 by the Imam.

In 1988, Imam Khomeini finally accepted the Resolution to end the war and referred to it as drinking the cup of poison. An interpretation that later caused the adoption of Resolution 598 was regarded as imposed. However, this view did not correspond to reality because the Imams decided to accept the Resolution based on the reports received from the situation on the battlefields and the principle of expediency in maintaining order.

It should be noted that Mohsen Rezaei, in that period, in a report on the operational status of war zones and the number of necessary facilities and equipment, expressed his views on the continuation of the war. He states that if provided the required military conditions and facilities during a 5-year plan, we will wone; otherwise, in the absence of sufficient facilities, more costs on the nation and the country (Rezaei, 2012 AD/1391 SH: 231).

Therefore, given the current situation, Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the commander of the war, concludes that it is not possible to achieve a decisive military victory in the short term with the current situation in the country. Due to these factors, the Imam evaluated the country's capacity and facilities as insufficient to change the war significantly. According to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "What convinced the Imam the most to end the war was to explain the tragedy of the chemical bombing of Halabche and Sardasht.

It was predicted Ba'athist regime in the future use the mass destruction weapons with the green light of the superpowers and even its repetition in cities such as Tabriz, Isfahan, Qom, and Tehran. We certainly are not involved in such crimes and counterattack against the Iraqi people" (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 2011 AD/1390 SH, 18).

Imam Khomeini also said in a letter to the officials of the time: "Now our military officials, including the army and the IRGC, who are experts in the war, explicitly acknowledge that the Islamic Army will not achieve any victory soon. Considering that the sympathetic military and political officials of the Islamic Republic do not consider the war is not to the country's interest, and firmly say that they have given one-tenth of the weapons given to Saddam by the arrogance of the East and the West.

It can not be produced in the world in any way and at any price. According to the shocking letter of the Revolutionary Guards commander, which is one of the dozens of reports that have reached me after the recent defeats, and due to the widespread use of chemical weapons by the enemy and the lack of neutralizing equipment. I agree with the ceasefire” (Khomeini, 21 and 74).

Therefore, given the country's internal situation and the reports related to the last year of the war and international support, the ambiguity of the imposition of the adoption of Resolution 598 is not relevant. This issue shows the practicality of Imam Khomeini regarding the preservation of the system and the lives of the Iranian people in that sensitive historical period.

5.12. Crisis Management

One of the managerial characteristics of Imam Khomeini during the eight-year war was managing crises and making strategic decisions to overcome those crises. For example, at the beginning of the war and in Bani Sadr's removal from the General Forces command and then his removal from the presidency, the Imam managed society well (Khomeini, 14/480).

During that period, due to the escalation of the dispute between Bani Sadr and Rajai's government, the Imam introduced a three-member committee⁵ to reduce tensions between the parties to the conflict (Khomeini, 14/248).

The Imam's purpose in forming such a committee, known as the Arbitration Council, want to end Rajai and Bani Sadr dispute. At that time, regarding the sensitive situation in the country and the imposition of war by Iraq, the Imam did not want the government to face a new crisis. Hence, they still wanted peaceful coexistence between regime officials (Khomeini, 8/384).

It seems that Imam Khomeini did not want the experience of the revolution's first president to fail. However, after the removal of Bani Sadr in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, which had a tactical alliance with Bani Sadr, entered the military phase against the Islamic Republic, creating a new crisis in the country.

They aimed to strike at the main parts of the revolution figure and form an alternative government. Imam, realizing the recent internal turmoil in the country, while warning about the organization's actions, sent a message to their leaders that if the Mojahedin lay down their weapons, he is ready to talk to them as a student (Mojahedin Organization from emergence to end, 2006 AD/1385 SH; 526).

5. This Committee Consisted of Muhammad Reza Mahdavi Kani as the Representative of the Imam, Shahab al-Din Ashraqi as the Representative of Bani Sadr and Mohammad Yazdi as the Representative of Hashemi Rafsanjani (The Speaker of the Parliament).

Regarding the Imam's reaction, Massoud Rajavi, a leader of the organization, says: "When the Imam responded, we were in a state of passivity. Our idea and prediction were that the Imam would either allow us to march or would tell us not to come and would not accept us. But it was unpredictable for him when he said drop your weapons. I will come" (Ibid: 538).

Also, the decision to adopt Resolution 598 and the possible consequences could threaten the existence of the system and the essence of the revolution; the country needed a solid administration to save it. In other words, the Imam decision could once again rescue the system existence from the crisis. A strategic decision such as the adoption of Resolution 598 could have caused severe instability for the Islamic Republic.

Still, the correct and comprehensive management of the Imam could protect the system from these dangers. At that time, the Imam was able to minimize the negative consequences of that decision by profoundly understanding the possible implications of the adoption of Resolution 598 and establishing an emotional connection with the people, and refraining from adopting a dictatorial policy. In this regard, the Imam's management was not in a supreme jurist status who issued an enforceable decree, and people were obliged to accompany him. Instead, Imam knew himself as the companion and sympathizer of the people.

Therefore, he interpreted the Resolution's adoption as a poison cup that he drank for the system and Islam expediency. The people knew Imam as a companion leader, not as a person who sacrificed all the material and spiritual resources of the country for the war. They believe he managed the country well based on existing situations in contrast with the crisis. Therefore, we should note that the Imam's decision to accept Resolution 598 was not the end of the struggle but a change of strategy and the adoption of a new method of battle on the political front to prevent a major crisis.

Conclusion

The present study aimed to analyze Imam Khomeini's strategic management in the imposed war based on his personality, behavioral and contingency characteristics. Insight and vigilance, courage, determination in decision-making, responsibility, peace of mind, and self-confidence were the most important personality traits of the Imam that made him an irreplaceable leader and manager. Also, determination in decision-making and the practical expression and words of Imam effectively strengthened his charismatic personality.

Accordingly, the first phase of Imam Khomeini after the invasion of Iran by Iraq was to manage public opinion and prevent the anxiety and psychological anxiety of the people. Imam Khomeini's morals and

personality traits had also spread to the people and fighters during the imposed war, making them brave, courageous, and martyrdom-seeking fighters.

After examining the personality traits and paying attention to the individual characteristics and behaviors, considered the group and organizational behavior of the Imam. The results of studies on the behavioral aspects of Imam Khomeini show that the Imam paid particular attention to the protection of public interests, the principle of serving the people, accepting consultation, and being duty-oriented. With the imposed war, the Imam tried to inform the people about the enemy's threats and their responsibility against these threats. Historical evidence indicates that the Imam was aware of and consulted with political and military experts and advisers during the war and emphasized it.

He believed in the consultation principle evident in critical war periods, such as the Khorramshahr conquest in 1361 and the adoption of Resolution 598. Another issue emphasized regarding the Imam's behavioral management in this study was the Imam's task-oriented approach to the imposed war. As a result, different people became the front-line fighters with all their hearts and souls and considered their struggle a battle between right and wrong.

The third part of Imam Khomeini's leadership model was paying particular attention to the conditions and requirements of society. Imam Khomeini emphasized the centrality of Islam in his management style and considered the interests of Islam and the preservation of the revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic. Imam Khomeini's expediency can be seen during the adoption of Resolution 598. Given the economic and military conditions, he assessed the expediency of the revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic in accepting this Resolution.

The adoption of the Resolution at the end of the war was contrary to their previous practice and views. Therefore, Imam Khomeini's model and management style in the imposed war was the crystallization of his individual, behavioral and policy-making abilities to maintain the system of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolution.

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