Image, Time, and Photography
Based on Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics**

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Article Info	ABSTRACT
	In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (KPM), Heidegger shows how the initial image-making power of the imagination is pictorial in the pure image of time. He further clarifies the recognized link between the syntheses and the time-visualizing power of images which is pictorial formative power, which can visualize time. The three syntheses of imagination are replaced with the modes of existence of Dasein. Three kinds of photographs resemble the images produced when the transcendental imagination functions as Dasein. We can address the ways to visualize time by considering Dasein with a photographic preoccupation through 1. A possible look in the form of presentation (a photograph shows an immediate look of a house or person as intuitable this-here); 2. An immediate look of the thing, house, or deceased person, as well as a copy or its reproduction as a death mask; and, 3. The manner of contemplation of a likeness is an immediate look of a being present in the form of representation.

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Introduction

In this research, it is found that projection by Dasein and acts of imagination are identical when Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is used to describe the development of image(s). The major goal of this study is to make a connection between image and time while considering Dasein with a photographic interest. We accomplish this goal with the following 4 main sections: 1. Imagination: Laying the Ground for the Metaphysics, 2. Imagination and Synthesis, 3. Schema and the Schema-image, and 4. Dasein as a Photographer is all based on imagination`s operations. We divide the literature review into four sections based on these parts. In the beginning, several sources look for pertinent data about Heidegger's view of Kant and time. Both Golob (2013) and Muri (2019) have covered these topics. Second, in precritical treatises and Kant's first critique, Lennon (2017) and Matherne (2015) investigated the relationship between images and the function of imagination. Thirdly, some researchers have examined the function of imagination in Kant's philosophy in legitimate books. Authors in this stream include Makreel (1990), Banham (2005), Gibbons (1994), Kneller (2007), and Weatherston (2002). In the fourth section, some people have looked into the topic of time in photography. This preoccupation is covered in writing by Maynard (2008) and Baetens et al. (2010). In addition to this, it`s better to mention that There are different critical viewpoints on Heidegger's reading of Kant in general. Instead of adopting a Kantian epistemological point of view, Ernst Cassirer, as a pioneer, challenges Heidegger's ontological turn. With a negative point of view, some critical views have been expressed. Marjory Grene examines how Heidegger's understanding of Kantian concepts will contrast with their fundamental character (Weatherston, 2002, 1). Karl Lowith critiques the Kantian conception's nature as being misrepresented as well. In his work, Heidegger is charged by Lowith with self-interpretation in the text of another (Weatherston, 2002, 2). In our opinion, Heidegger bases his arguments on what Kant intended to say rather than what he had written. Something that is concealed in his text's unconscious.

1. Imagination: Laying the Ground for the Metaphysics

Heidegger begins in *KPM[1]* (§26) but ultimately argues that Kant in the first critique shows both the intuitive and spontaneous character of the imagination in its original sense. Heidegger discusses imagination, and in particular productive imagination, concerning (§28), of APPV[2]. Second, the pure image of time has original pictorial formative power in the transcendental imagination. Kant discusses the power of imagination has two aspects, namely "productive imagination" and

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[1] KPM is the abbreviation for *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*

[2] APPV is the abbreviation for *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*

"reproductive imagination", in his first criticism. He discusses the a priori and empirical aspects of the imagination in "On the Deduction of Pure Concepts of Knowing" (third section) (A115-116). Kant sees imagination as both empirical and transcendental in this way. Referring to the second edition and the following paragraph (B152), one can get concise and understandable dimensions of productive and reproductive imagination, according to the spontaneous character of imagination and with reference to the productive imagination, when is distinguishable from the reproductive one, its correlated synthesis is only governed by empirical kind of association`s principles (Kant, 1998, 257).

It seems that Heidegger's view on "productive imagination" focuses on the general pure look of objectivity. There are no traces of the formation or construction of objects here; instead, a pure look is due. Therefore, the question arises: Is there a connection between the power of the imagination to create and the formation of objects? Following are some guidelines drawn from Heidegger's interpretation of CPR[1]:

The constructive power of imagination never relates to the creation of objects; rather, it refers to objectivity's overall pure look. For the first time, experience is made conceivable by the pure, productive power of imagination, which is untethered from experience (Heidegger, 1997, 93).

Productive imagination has a crucial relationship to the pure look. The cornerstone of productive imagination can therefore be considered to be the pure look, although not all forms of productive imagination can be considered pure. This relationship leads to the productive imagination's formation of transcendence as a pure look. Heidegger refers to imagination's transcendental power as transcendence. A close study reveals that the PICPR[2] was derived from lectures delivered in 1927–1928 and covered the majority of KPM's problems.

Therefore, Heidegger's description of the transcendental imagination is profoundly tied to the role of time, just like in PICPR and KPM (Banham 2005, 118). Heidegger asserts that Kant never articulated precisely how primordial time and imagination relate, [...] (Kearney, 2003, 193). However, he emphasizes Kant through transcendental schematism, along with the pictorial power of imagination in the pure image of time, exhibits both its intuitive and spontaneous character in a more original way (Heidegger, 1997, 93). Heidegger contends that imagination is essential for Kant in doing thecomparison, *formation*, integration, discernment, and general interconnection (Heidegger, 1997, 91). Because the transcendental imagination's formative power is crucial in laying the foundation for *Metaphysica Generalis*, he thus concentrates on the power of the imagination as a formative one. Transcendence is "formed" by it. Holding the horizon of time open is what transcendence entails. Pure schemata allow us to understand the horizon of time

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[1] CPR is the abbreviation for *Critique of Pure Reason*

[2] PICPR is the abbreviation for *Phenomenological Interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason*

further. More significantly, according to Kant's emphasis, the horizon of time offers the possible ground for the unity of ontological knowledge.

2. Imagination and the Synthesis

Heidegger emphasizes the ground-laying that becomes more unique if it does not merely accept the already-laid ground but rather reveals how this ground is the root for both stems, according to the first edition of the first critique on sensibility and understanding. Gibbons writes: "As Heidegger notes, edition A of the Deduction attributes to imagination a unique and pivotal role, a role which is played down to some extent in the B edition" (Gibbons, 1999, 19).

Heidegger contends that the "finite knowledge" of man or finite intuition must allow objects to be given (Heidegger, 1997, 18). The finite knowledge encompasses essentially the base of the synthesis and unity of sensibility and understanding, is fundamentally comprised offinite knowledge. He bases this claim on (A15, B29) and (A50, B74), and argues that these two sources of knowledge are not merely juxtaposed; rather, their unity produces knowledge. He also argues that the aspect of sensibility and understanding "belonging together", coming nearer to the innermost pathway [Zuge] of the Kantian problematic shows not level off to a neutral correlation of content and form (Heidegger, 1997, 25).

In addition to Kant's own reference in (A15, B29), Heidegger also refers to the parts at the end of the first critique (A835, B863) and interprets them in such a way that Kant in the introduction with doubt but in the end shows that common stem of sensibility and understanding, and their correlation is rooted in our finite knowledge (Heidegger, 1997, 25-26). This shows the dual role of imagination. "This dual role of imagination indicates that imagination not only mediates between the two main faculties but at the same time, marks the distinctions as well as the coordination of their functions" (Gibbons, 1999, 29).

This essentially means the transcendental power of imagination guides pure intuition and pure thinking. Without any past intuition or associations, the transcendental power of imagination can imagine something first. This skill traces its roots to thepower of imagination, that is the transcendental which is the foundation of pure intuition and also, pure thinking. Therefore, both are not the result of the imagination.

 As a result, the root of the two faculties' structures is the transcendental ability of imagination. Along with Heidegger, Kearney also draws attention to the transcendental power of imagination. He claims that the ability to imagine is not one that serves as a bridge between the mind and the body; rather, it should be demonstrated as a producing power presupposed by both the sensation and the understanding instead of an intermediary function as a result of their cooperating (Kearney, 2003, 189). In order to accomplish this, imagination through the act of synthesis is uniting in itself.

According to Heidegger's account of the *CPR* of the representations of the senses, general-representing (Allgemein-Vorstellen) acts in both pure intuition and pure thinking as pure reflectiveness. The concept is brought to the general-representing (Allgemein-Vorstellen) of this unity that is expressed in pure synthesis. It is cohesive because of the idea itself. Additionally, there are three components that make up the total essence of pure knowledge:

    1) pure intuition`s manifold;
    2) this manifold's synthesis;
    3) the concepts that participate in this pure synthesis with giving coherence.

As a result, we must take a look at a priori knowledge of all objects that is diverse and based solely on intuition. This manifold's synthesis acts purely synoptically through the power of the imagination. At the same time, this necessary synthetic unity is represented by the concept of Purely Reflectively (Heidegger, 1997, 44-45). It provides the third requirement for knowledge of a suggested object [eines vorkommenden egenstandes], and they depend on understanding (Heidegger, 1997, 45).

Apprehension as the first aspect of synthesis, Reproduction as the second aspect of synthesis, and Recognition as the third aspect of it instead demonstrate that synthesis as a whole possesses either an apprehension- or a reproduction quality. There are equivalent pure apprehending, thus pure reproducing, and pure recognizing syntheses in pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure thinking. Additionally, these pure syntheses are constitutive (Heidegger, 1997, 125). So, what do these pure synthesis modes constitute? In the knowing relation to the being, Heidegger asserts that these modes of pure synthesis constitute the condition for making possible the synthesis as empirical (Heidegger, 1997, 125).

This presumption and probability make sense in a logical way. The modes of time are formed by the modes of pure synthesis. Furthermore, a pure synthesis rather than an empirical one creates the necessary conditions in the form of transcendental imagination, which keeps the horizon of time open. Heidegger makes reference to the idea of intuition as being both general-representing and simultaneously having pure reflectivity of pure thinking. These ultimately lead back to the common source, which serves as both a foundation for and a necessary condition for empirical synthesis in the relationship between knowing to the being. This shared foundation comes from Transcendental Schematism and the forming ability of imagination that is rooted in the pure image of time.

3. Pure Apprehension, the Images, and the Time

The aspect of synthesis that produces a manifold is the synthesis of apprehension, which Kant describes as directed instantly upon intuition (Gibbons, 1999, 21). It would be more accurate to state that the 'pure' synthesis of perception involves temporal-Spatio intuition [...]; this pure

synthesis of perception makes possible the representation of pure space and time-representations which are only formed through this synthesis (Gibbons, 1999, 23). There is a multiplicity or diversity of *this-here* in time and space and also manifold of impressions in time and space. Empirical intuition provides a *look* that encompasses manifoldness. The mind while revealing represented manifold, differentiates time and distinguishes between time and the order in which one impression follows another. To be able to face with this-here, and now this and now that and in particular, now all this, the mind must continuously be in step with this-here, now, now, and now. It is possible to run through the impressions just by differentiating the nows.

Taking something in stride is what intuition means. The offer of each look`s or image's impression is accepted by the horizon of the successive series of nows at this moment, and at the same time, the impressions are collectively taken up (Heidegger, 1997, 125-126).

In other words, however, pure intuition, only is able to shape the pure succession of nows as such if it is a likeness-forming, prefiguring, and reproducing power of imagination in itself (Heidegger, 1997, 123). Consequently, the formative power of imagination includes the ability to make likenesses, prefiguration, and reproduction. A series of nows on the horizon make up time as pure intuition. We "reckon with time" what is ahead of us. Time is properly defined by Heidegger as being pure intuition. The formation of what time intuits in *one* is what is called pure intuition. This introduces the concept of time for the first time completely. According to him, letting-spring-forth to the nows is original, not this time. Time can spring forth a sequence of nows thanks to the transcendental power of imagination (Heidegger, 1997, 123).

The pure synthesis of apprehension and the pure reproduction of what constitutes the present are correlated. The synthesis of apprehension is thus inextricably linked to the synthesis of reproduction, according to Kant's citation in (A102).

The synthesis gives the already-just-arrived presently in an image and must also be able to hold the present manifold at the same time. The transcendental imagination accurately visualizes the present and keeps the present manifold to run through. The "imagination's" ["Einbildung's"] formative [Bilden] power is in and of itself time-related. However, pure imagination—which is called pure due to the creation of its fabric (Gebilde), from outside of its domain—must first create time since it does so (Heidegger, 1997, 123).

The impure intuition of what manifests immediately itself asempirical has the quality of being seen as particular (*this-here*) and is done through the path of making a *look* and giving an image. It also includes the possibility of intuition of a multitude of such particulars which is the particular totality of the landscape. As a result, we understand that there is a correlation between pure synthesis of apprehension and reproduction as that which forms the present. The present means the empirical intuition provides a look that encompasses manifold. The image is the particular totality of this [landscape]," and is referred to as a *species* or look based on how it appears to us. Because

the image is always a this-here which is intuitable, every similarity, such as a photograph, is merely a transcription of what immediately manifests as an "image" (Heidegger, 1997, 65-66).

In calling "look" species[1], Jean-Luc Nancy provides another explanation of landscape as looking at us: Keep in mind that in Latin, species have the active or passive meaning of "look," as can aspectus. It will play a significant role in the background of scenes. (Nancy, 2005, 86).

On the one hand, it is able to compare the formative power of imagination to the photographer furnishing the condition of thinking, finding, and focusing on the subject matter for taking the photograph. In comparison to photographs, every likeness or photograph is a manifestation of itself immediately as an "image" (i.e, formation of the manifold). On the other hand, the photograph shows an immediate look of something as intuitable this-here which is attending another possible look to present a whole house or person or look in general (Heidegger, 1997, 67). The horizon of a succession of sequences of a look of house or person collectively looks perfectly in an image. Representation of time is formed by the forming character of pure intuition which stems from pure receptivity as giving look and looks in general (Heidegger, 1997, 67).

4. Pure Reproduction, the Images, and Time

The reproduction of actually sensible representations is based on the synthesis of reproduction, which is related to empirical representing (Gibbons, 1999, 23-24). In the synthesis of reproduction, there is a greater sense of original unity that is immediately sensed in the differentiation of time. This mode of synthesis is, therefore, something perceptible. The past is making into view the horizon preserved earlier through the pure synthesis of reproduction (Heidegger, 1997, 127). This synthesis makes this after as such and opens out, generally, the horizon of the possible attending-to, the having-been-ness" (Heidegger, 1997, 128).

The second synthesis shows similarities with some types of photographs. As such, as we explained earlier in comparison to the photographs, the image in the second instant means likeness. The image is an immediate look at the thing. It also wishes to clearly identify the sources from which it borrowed its likeness. A copy is only possible if the sources of likeness are identified. Heidegger offers an extremely intriguing explanation of death masks. He uses a death mask as a photograph for using images as copies or as media to make duplicates that are similar to the sources of references. The death mask photo, as a copy of a likeness, is an image itself but only because it presents the "image" of the dead person, demonstrates how the dead person appears, or more specifically how it appears (Heidegger, 1997, 66). Thus, the pure synthesis of reproduction-related to an immediate look of the thing, the house, the deceased person, and also a copy or reproduction of it, seems as a death mask.

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[1] Means sight and vision

Figure 1. *Death mask of Lorenzo du Medici*[1]

5. Pure Recognition and the Images

This is the conceptual representing that gives unity to the manifold of impressions and also gives unity to the reproduction and copies of what is immediately intuited. This involves the possibility of a perception of the unity of synthesis, according to Kant (Gibbons, 1999, 26).

This synthesis focuses on how the concepts are represented in a way that demonstrates their similarity and sameness, or how unity is depicted in a way that is universally applicable to many. Heidegger with references to the first critique A 103, says:

The manifold, which is repeatedly intuited and then reproduced, is united into one representation by one consciousness reflecting this unity just like conceptual representing (Kant, 1998, 230–23, Also see Heidegger, 1997, 130). To put it another way, this synthesis comes first. Heidegger underlines that this synthesis serves reproduction as the first basis for both the comprehension of what immediately manifests itself and the representating of what is intuitively understood.

What was formerly classified as the third synthesis in the empirical genesis of conceptual expansion is actually the first synthesis, i.e., the synthesis that initially governs the other two characterized syntheses (Heidegger, 1997, 130). The empirical genesis of conceptual growth is what takes place right now. Heidegger sees the foundation for two additional syntheses in the

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[1] URL: https://www.wga.hu/html_m/b/beninten/deadmask.html.

conceptual development of pure recognition. It is described by him as the premise of pure identification. Pure recognition can also present the prospect of identification, which gives sameness and self-sameness, while pure reproduction creates the possibility of a bringing-forth-again.

Self-sameness explores the realm of holding something before us [Vorhaltbarkeit] generally. As pure, its exploration is this preliminary attaching's [Vorhaften] first formation, or the future, (Heidegger, 1997, 130). Therefore, the third synthesis mode is also fundamentally time-forming. The creation of the initial attaching as such, which is the act of pure preparation, is a feat of pure imagination. According to its inner structure, this method of pure preparation even shows precedence over the other two, at the same time (Heidegger, 1997, 131).

According to Heidegger, the transcendental power of imagination can create original time and is therefore tied to time. Two further kinds of pure apprehension and reproduction have been discovered to have their roots in the transcendental power of imagination as pure recognition.[1] In the third synthesis of images, we can argue that in addition to showing how something seems in general, a photograph also demonstrates how a photograph is. But the photograph can also show how something like a death mask[2] looks in general. In turn, the death mask can demonstrate how the general appearance of something like a death mask appears. However, a certain corpse can also demonstrate this. Likewise, the photograph depicts not only what is photographed but also how the appearance of the photograph seems in general (Heidegger, 1997, 66).

In this way, one photograph or death mask applies to many. One death mask of Lorenzo du Medici (Fig.1) In addition to an immediate copy of the dead Lorenzo's face, shows how the death mask in general appears. Others, know how the death mask generally appears. However, what representation expresses in the form of the concepts is this unity applicable to many (Heidegger, 1997, 66). These looks, photographs, or death masks demonstrate the making-sensible of concepts. Since the concept, as the represented universal, cannot be definitively represented in an intuition, this making-sensible can no longer imply that the death mask is an instantaneous look or intuition from a concept. For that reason, in the case of the concept, there is also essential no matter of taken likeness.

[1] In the first edition, the power of imagination was termed the faculty of "synthesis in general." If the inner, temporal character of the power of imagination is now to be emphasized, then we must investigate where Kant expressed the role of synthesis (Heidegger). This occurs in the section which prepares the way for the carrying-out of the Transcendental Deduction according to the two ways previously presented, a section entitled: "On the a priori Grounds for the Possibility of Experience.

[2] Death mask is a wax or plaster cast taken from the face of a dead person (URL: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/death%20mask (access date: 22/4/2021), it usually made by taking a cast or impression from the corpse. Death masks may be used for creation the portraits in painting. Also, they were used for scientific purposes in physiognomy. Today, photographs have replaced the death mask.

In order to make sensible the death mask more understandable, Heidegger also gives the example of a house. This perceived house, for instance, demonstrates how a house appears generally and, as a result, illustrates what we represent in the concept of a house. How does the appearance of the house illustrate the "how" of a house's appearance in general? (Heidegger, 1997,67).

The house itself provides this determined look, however, we are not engaged with this to examine how exactly this house appears, Heidegger continues (Heidegger, 1997, 67). It shows how it does houseness in an analogous process of making-sensible. We concentrate on it after some explanation about the source of this kind of Heidegger`s idea in the relation between the functions of imagination in *LM* [1] and *CPR*.

As a result of comparing images in the syntheses to the photographs, Heidegger discusses Kant's analysis of the *forming power* [Bildende Kraft] in his LM, namely in Rational Psychology. Heidegger is able to draw the conclusion that "this faculty" creates representations of the present, past, or even future times. So, the three faculties that make up the formative faculty [Bildungsvermogen] are 1. The making-likeness faculty [Abbildung], which represents the present time: *facultas formandi*; 2. The reproducing faculty, the ability to make reproduction [Nachbildung], which represents the past time: *facultas imaginandi*; and 3. The prefiguration faculty has the ability of prefiguration [Vorbildung], which represents the future time: *facultas praevidendi* (Heidegger, 1997, 122 see also Makkreel, 1999, 15-16).

In the *LM,* Kant emphasizes the three modes of image formation (See: Kant, 1997, 47-56) that foreshadow the three syntheses in the "Subjective Deduction" of the *CPR.* Heidegger, by relying on the images, the time, and the three syntheses, shows that Dasein has three transcendences which are like the transcendental power of imagination. The future forms the ground or transcendence can be prior to other modes of time. So, Dasein projects on the possibilities and exists being–in-the-world based on time-relations.

6. Schema and the Schema-Image

We should explain more precisely about making-sensible of concepts. What makes the relation between concepts and images in the third synthesis? It is obvious, in the schematism, there is a different type of image which is the exclusion of other types of images that we mentioned so far. The challenge of how it is feasible to apply the categories to material that is merely intuited is where the schematism shifts our attention from the nature and function of the categories as forms of unity in judgment (Gibbons, 1999, 53).

Something like schemas related to the understanding`s categories can never be brought to an image at all, according to Kant A142, B181, (Kant, 1998, 274). Heidegger defines the term schema-

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[1] LM is the abbreviation for *Lectures on Metaphysics*

image. The term "image" in the previous phrase, however, can only refer to a certain type of image that is excluded from others and related to the nature of the schema when to be brought into an image (Heidegger 1997, 72). The Schema-image is the pure representation of conceptual understanding. Therefore, if "image" is now interpreted to mean "pure image," schema related to the understanding`s categories can also be extremely well translated into an image (Heidegger, 1997, 73).

Therefore, the pure image has no connection to the intuitional form that opposes the pure ideas, but the schema of conceptions has a unique quality. Schema-image represents unities or concepts as laws that can organize a possible look. These guidelines provide a possible glimpse at a portion of themselves. Time is referred to in the unities through rules. Heidegger argues that time is not just a pure image related to the schemata of pure notions, but also the one and only possible way that something may seem by a specific look. The schema-image Shows in itself to be nothing other than always only time and the temporal (Heidegger, 1997, 74).

Transcendental Deduction and Transcendental Aesthetics appear to be combined by Heidegger within the guidelines of Kant's writings. Time is a representation of a "unique object" on the one hand, and the unities are represented in notions with reference to time on the other (Heidegger, 1997, 73) (A31f, B47). When we encounter something present-at-hand, we simultaneously look, use our intuition, and understand that.

The possibility of making concepts sensible in the manner of schematism is the only basis for the immediate, empirical looking at things and the creation of likeness (Heidegger, 1997, 71). The relationship between schematism, time, and transcendence is, therefore, the fundamental one. The schematism creates a priori discernibility of the transcendental affinity of the unity of the rule in the image of time and therewith makes it capable of being accepted. The transcendental schema necessarily has an a priori character that corresponds through its pure schema-image (Heidegger, 1997, 74). The analogous forming character exists in the schema. The schemata of the notions express the distinct pure possibility of having a specific look into a variety of pure images by internally self-regulating in time as pure look passes their image off from this.

Time is an apriori form. It gives in advance the attribute of perceivable to the horizon of transcendence. Transcendental Schematism forms the singular pure ontological horizon of transcendence. Transcendental Schematism, as the pure and universal image, gives the horizon of transcendence an initial sense of enclosure. Time provides transcendence a first-order, comprehensive coherence. It makes the "Being-in-opposition-to" of objectivity, which is belonged to the finitude of the transcending turning-toward, perceptible to a finite being (Heidegger, 1997, 76-77). Time thus provides the preliminary, unified coherence to transcendence, while transcendental schematism implements the preliminary enclosedness to the image of transcendence.

We know according to Kant that all appearances are nothing but representations. Transcendental Schematism through the relation to appearances as representations of the nonempirical, i.e., transcendental object=X, gives organization to our understanding. It gives only a mutual relation of the unification in apperception. The X is prominent in ontological knowledge which is we know according to Kant that all appearances are nothing but representations (See. A109; Kant, 1998, 233). Transcendental Schematism through the relation to appearances as representations of the nonempirical, i.e., transcendental object=X, gives organization to our understanding. It just correlates (*correlatum*) the unity of apperception. The X is known as the knowledge that is ontological as the horizon. Holding open is the special character of the horizon. The human being is a finite creature and from an ontological standpoint encompasses a certain infinite dimension in the ontological direction. But the infinity and absoluteness of human being in the making of the being itself is also challenging, except just in the understanding of Being (Heidegger, 1997, 197).

   Photographs are produced by different looks. From this viewpoint, the three modes of time succession, coexistence, and duration are the representation of pure time or the horizon of time. Three syntheses can be compared to the photographs and the process of their formation. When light rays from outside and through the lens-and consequently the aperture and shutter- invade the camera, they leave their mark of the possible look on the sensitive surface (negative/sensor) as a trace of a face for making the portraits. Through the two first syntheses, the photographer isolates something "hand-at-present" from the background which has unity, totality, and reality. The photographer has an unclear understanding from one general look when he regulates his lived body with a camera and scenes to take a photo of something. The order of how to take a photo comes from the lived body. Heidegger didn`t explain lived body in *KPM*, but it is the condition of the apparition. The photographer acts upon the order of the lived body. The photographer gives unity to a possible look among different and many possible looks. Here, the photographer conceptualizes through the images of notions simultaneously.

   Also, pressing a shutter-release button to take a photo is like applying the form of representation defined by the power of understanding to form the presentation or Spatio-temporal determination in our perception. So, it changes to the form of representation (Vorstellung) as arranging the time of the artist`s lived body is in harmony with the time of recorded objects.

   It seems that Heidegger's account has influenced Barthes' interpretation of photography. In his concentration on the images, he highlights the past rather than the future or the present: "A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from what it represents), or at least it is not immediately or generally distinguished from its referent […]" (Barthes, 1981, 5). The realists—of which I am one and who I already was when I said that the photograph was an image without code—do not view the image as a "copy" of reality but rather as an emanation of a previous reality: a magic rather than an artistic endeavor. It is not a useful method of analysis to inquire as

to whether the image is analogical or codified. The photograph's evidential power and its testimony bearing on time rather than the object itself are what matter most. The power of verification in the photograph outweighs the power of representation from a phenomenological viewpoint (Barthes, 1981, 88-89). In contrast to Barthes' explanation of photography, Sontag asserts that what photography gives is not merely a record of the past but a new means of coping with the present, as the impacts of the endless billions of modern photograph-documents demonstrate (Sontag, 2005, 130). As was just mentioned, the forms of pure time are interwoven with the ways of appearance in images. Heidegger's understanding of the image and the temporal nature of imagination, when compared to Kant, highlights the significance of the relationship between time and the condition of the apparition in modern philosophy.

7. Dasein and photography, Dasein as Photographer

It seems that there are common discussions of *Being and Time* with the view of *CPR* in *KPM*, in which Heidegger focuses on Kant's contents in the *LM,* Lectures L.1, especially his examples in critical texts like the *CPR* in order to explain the syntheses of imagination and classify three types of images. The image can be the form given to a manifold or diversity of senses by the imagination. The horizon of transcendence gives rise and unity to relationships; that is imagery and makes something appear like this and like that. Since time is considered as a condition of the apparition which is interconnected to the images, in Heidegger's view the problem of reference instead of the rigid reality of objects or reality as a category of pure understanding[1] goes back to the condition of the apparition, modes of pure time which are modes of Being. The problem of reference is replaced with the condition which is the horizon of transcendence or time instead of a reference to the reality of objects. Hence, it is this reference and this new reality that changes the perspective on both objective and external images, and the way it is discussed. That is to say, the issue of reference in the image (or photographs) changes to the reality of appearing through the condition, i.e., time.

The new approach to photography based on the look of appearing and time as the condition of apparition relies on the new conception of Dasein as the being-in-there based on the horizon of time. Pure time is the ground of the apparition of Dasein according to time relations in the world.

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[1] Kant cites reality as a category. He determines it as the 'pure concept of the understanding' reality is defined as 'that which corresponds to a sensation in general' or that 'the concept of which points to being (in time)' (CPRA 143/B 182). […] In considering the reality as possessing degree Kant used this quality of reality to underwrite the claim for the existence of a continuum between reality and negation, one 'which makes every reality representable as a quantum' (CPR A 143/B 183). This quality is then extended to sensation or the representation of objects in intuition. Reality is a degree, a quantum which represented in sensation Despite in the Kant`s context reality is an idea of reason, a 'transcendental substrate' of 'the reality of everything (*omnitudo realitatas)'* (A 575/B 604). With this view of reality, Kant extends the concept far beyond its categorical bounds, while yet keeping it, as an idea of reason, within the wider critical project (Caygill, 2009, 345-346).

Being (*Sein*) is pure time as the condition of the apparition of Dasein to her/ himself and others. The Man as being is between other beings in a way that the being he is her/ himself or he is not both are always already obvious (manifest). That is called the existence of a human being. Only, the understanding of Being makes the grounds possible for Existence (Heidegger, 1997,159). Thus, the photographers know that being–in-the-world does not mean preliminary relation between objects and subjects. Being-in-the-world has made a relationship between object and subject possible in advance. Being-in–the-world as transcendence in the way of projection on relations. Dasein is a temporal and finite being but its openness to others makes its relation infinite. Apperception is self-affection. As Heidegger said: self-affection fundamentally is in unification with pure apperception, and in this circumstance, the totality of pure reason that is sensible becomes possible (Heidegger, 1997,170). For understanding Being, Dasein should be projected out of the ground of the finitude. Heidegger interprets that Dasein has replaced the transcendental imagination. The metaphysical basis of Being is the pure image of time that is, Daseins' unclosedness in the horizon of time.

A human being that holds her/himself in the unclosedness of beings is called Dasein. The structure of transcendence implies Daseins' unclosedness according to time-relation in the world. Dasein`s structure is based on Pure time as its inner core. Pure time makes possible transcendence and also has in itself horizonal character (Heidegger,1997,198). According to Helfer: "The modern conception of the subject is problematic, Heidegger contends, because it has no special relation to humankind and none at all to the I […] Through *Besinnung*, (reflection) literally, a turning of sensible thought back on itself, the modern subject can escape the objectifying process of representation that occludes a true definition of humankind as belonging to Being" (Helfer,1996, 1-2). Thus, for understanding time, the horizon of time, and pure time, we should concentrate on the structure of Dasein and his projection on time-relations for being–in–the–world. Thus, designating time as the ground for making transcendence possible means that time with horizonal character is a central point for discussion about the artist as a photographer. Instead of thinking about the relation between the referent and its subject matter, photographers should concentrate on the way of being–in-the-world. they should pay attention to the way they are appearing on the horizon of time.

We consider Dasein as a *photographer* who replaces the imagination. Time-relations are conditions of the apparition. The syntheses of the imagination, based on time-relation, provide the possibility for a new approach to evaluating the nature of photography and photographs. It seems that such an approach can be examined when we consider the photographic action and the process of photographing when the photographer starts to take a photo.

On the other hand, the Photographer as a Dasein acts as the faculty of imagination (facultas imaginandi). Dasein acts as a photographer according to time-relations, which interpret as the past,

present, and future. S/he faces a new relation as present, does a performed relation as past, and expects a new and inexperienced relation as future. S/he acts as imagination and does some different operations like comparison, shaping, combination, distinguishing, and, in general, binding-together, copying, or reproduction. The photographer despite the documentation of the present may even produce what s/he has already seen by arranging the stage in the referent's absence. S/he also reconstructs the past event and recombines it with the present event. With the advantages of this research, we can suggest guidelines for future research. So, the varieties of sensory-motor schemas of the lived body determine and regulate the photographers how to see and what to see. The photographer through them leaves behind the lack of an essentialist approach in photography, in which there is not enough attention to the artist's intentions. Intentionality here means Dasein, as the photographer's lived body's sensory-motor schemas. So, the intentions of the photographer will intervene in her/his modes of photograhies and photographs.

Conclusion

Heidegger presents the relationship between thinking and time as a new problem. This issue necessitates its requirement. Dasien has taken the position of the imagination, and existence has taken the place of the soul in Kant's philosophical system. The distinction between categories and schemas is abolished by Heidegger. The being's modes of Being in time and space are represented by the schemas. The horizon of time has taken the place of transcendental I, which includes the pure forms of time and place as well as the categories. The categories define being-in-the-world as well as the world and its potential. Dasein is viewed by us as a photographer who replaces the imagination.

Time-relations are prerequisites for anything emerging in a certain way. In the three syntheses, it appears that the actions of the photographer can also be compared to the operations of the imagination. On the one hand, in order to take a photo of something, the photographer controls the lived body using a camera and settings. The lived body is where the order for taking a photo originates from. In *KPM*, Heidegger did not exactly explain the lived body, but it is the onconditi of the apparition. The photographer works with the order of the lived body rather than conformity with the relationship between the body and the mind. The dimensions of transcendence are the ways in which the photographer projects possibilities based on the lived body. It is said that "thinking is a projection on the horizon of time."

The three modes of time, on the other hand, can be compared to photos and the process of formation since they show pure time or the horizon of time through three syntheses. When light from the outside and through the lens—and as a result of the aperture and shutter—invade the camera, they leave their trace of the look on the sensitive surface (negative or sensor). It is a trace of the look of the face for creating the portraits that are used in the present.

As in the past, we are able to offer a copy from the negative that serves as a death mask. The photographer separates the object at-hand which has unity, totality, and reality from the background using the first two syntheses. Images include pictures in photojournalism and other documentary photography captures a look of nows when the photographer performs more improvised. It can be done in such a way that the photographer can first recognize a possible horizon of appearing (for recording).

Thus, the phrase "taking a likeness" is used to describe the type of photography ("Abbildung"), it refers to a look that was taken directly from the presenting (present) object. The photograph represents a death mask from a dead person, while the photographer represents a "distinguishing" ["Auszeichnen"] of the whole, which shows the look of appearing in general. For example, the death mask of Lorenzo du Medici, in addition to the individual character of the dead face of Lorenzo like known portraits, represents how a death mask appears in general. Also, the dead person itself offers this look. It shows us "only" the "as ..." in terms of what a dead person can appear. The photographer first perceived what cultivates this range, which regulates and marks out how something, in general, must appear to be able, like a dead person, to offer the appropriate look like some scientific photographs.

Heidegger's view highlights the future dimension of time. The recognition, as the future prior to already a possible look on the horizon of time is more important. Prior to tracing lights and forming the negative and the reproduction of the negative, we know how a dead corpse appears in general. The representation of object=X gives unity to the horizon of appearing different looks of a dead corpse. So, at present, there are some other aspects of time, but one (like present) is dominant.

Additionally, pressing a shutter-release button to take a photo is equivalent to applying the form of representation established by realizing how our perception's spatiotemporal determination is made. As a result, when the form of presentation (Darstellung) is developed, the form of representation (Vorstellung) emerges with a clear and distinguished look. The appearance of the images can clearly reveal time, such as the past, present, or future, while they depict a particular probable appearance of something based on the pure image.

The conclusion and suggestion of the research for photography is that thinking as like acting upon the order of a lived body on the horizon of time will expand approaches to photography.

The photographer faces a new relationship as present, does a performed relationship as past, and expects an inexperienced relationship as the future. S/he acts as imagination and does the different operations like comparison, shaping, combination, distinguishing, and, in general, of binding-together, copying, or reproduction. Despite the documentation of "the present" may even produce what s/he has already seen by arranging the stage in the referent's absence. S/he also reconstructs the past event and recombines it with the present. According to these, we can suggest these research

guidelines for future research. The varieties of sensory-motor schemas of the lived body determine and regulate the photographers how to see and what to see. The photographer through them leaves behind the lack of an essentialist approach in photography, in which there is not enough attention to the artist's intentions. Intentionality here means as the photographer's lived body's sensory-motor schemas, and her/his projection which determine the modes of existence. So, the intentions of the photographer will intervene in her/his modes of photography and her/his photographs.

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