Archive of SID

Urban Governmentality in traditional Islamic-Iranian cities:the dialectic nexus between sovereignty, religion, and custom

Hossein Maroufi
Assistant Professor in Urban Planning
Department of Architecture, Planning and Islamic Art
University of Mashhad- Ferdowsi
maroufi@um.ac.ir

Abstract:

The paper investigates the traditional Islamic-Iranian cities and the institutions involved in urban governmentality. Three institutions are recognized: the institution of the sovereign (*nahad-e-saltanati*), the institution of shari'a (*nahad-e-shar'i*), and the institution of custom (*nahad-e-'urfi*) corresponding respectively to the state, religion (Islam), and communal affiliations. Each institution conforms to a form of power which is exercised directly or indirectly by that institution. These are, to borrow Foucault's terminology, the sovereign power of the state, the disciplinary power of the religion, and the bio-power of the '*urf*. The main argument of this paper is that in the absence of legal codes and municipal services in the traditional Iranian cities, the religion (Islam), through its disciplinary mechanism, played a fundamental role in production and maintenance of governmentality at different levels of public and private domain of urban life. Urban space of traditional Islamic-iranian cities was the medium through which different mechanism of power and social control took place.

Keywords: Iranian cities. Islam, *Urf*, urban governmentality

www.SID.ir

1-Introduction

This paper, written by an urban planner, targets those who are interested in urban history and socio-political aspects of space in the 19th century Iran. One can find a library of books dealing with state, society and religion during the Qajar dynasty in Iran. While many western, as well Iranian, scholars have adopted the Orientalist approach in understanding the state-society relation in traditional Iran[1], there are scholars who added more indigenous insights on this topic (Katouzian, 1983, 2000; Piran, 2005). When it comes to urban space again one notices that the study of traditional Iranian cities has been overshadowed by the generalized "Islamic City[2]" model developed by Orientalists at the beginning of the 20th century. The Orientalist doctrine of the Islamic city model started in 1928 by William Marcais's *L'Islamismeet la Vie Urbaine* and culminated in 1955 by Gustave von Grunebaum's article "The Structure of the Muslim Town." Three decades in which the Muslim urbanism and its constituent elements (physical and non-physical) were given a unitary character across the entire Islam's geography. Many Orientalist understandings of cities in the Muslim world have become obsolete[3] since the 1960s when scholars started to criticize and challenge the orientalist picture of the "Muslim city". The emerged piece of scholarships provided new insight on the topic by including voices from different disciplines such as architecture, history, anthropology, sociology, geography and legal science. Furthermore different methodologies have been adopted by scholars in order to understand the city and its inhabitants in the Middle East[4]. Many post-Orientalist scholars (many of them with Middle East origin have applied primary sources (archival documents, sharia law, Islamic court records, and different thoughts written by scholar from different Islamic schools of jurisprudence) to give a more realistic picture of life/space in traditional Muslim cities. They have applied their understanding of these primary sources to interpret the built environment of the Muslim cities[5] or to provide a more detailed account of social organization of the Muslim cities (Marcus 1989; Leeuwen1999). A group of scholars have investigated the cities in the Muslim world from institutional perspectives describing the Islamic essence of the institutions role whether they were explicitly religious, for instance *Waqf*, and *qadi* or non-religious. Despite the variation of techniques, tools, and methodologies adopted by the scholars we can still notice the problem

[1] Common theories in this field are Patrimonialism-sultanism, Asiatic mode of production, and Oriental Despotism.
[2] The fundamental doctrine of orientalism is that Islam is considered as the most relevant factor in social, political, economic, institutional, and spatial affairs of cities.
[3] For a complete description of Orientalist route in emergence of the Islamic City model and its critiques see Raymond 1994.
[4] For the comprehensive account of the development of different methodologies for reading the Muslim cities see Bonine 2005
[5] Hakim (1986) extracted some guidelines and principles for the built environment from Maliki law. Similarly Akbar (1988)

www.SID.ir

Archive of SID

of generalizing different cultures and experiences into a homogenous construction (i.e. the "Muslim City") which used to be very typical of Orientalist approach. The blame is mostly on selection of cases which cover few homogenous geographical area of the Middle East inhabited by Muslim population who share similar historical and cultural background (mostly North African and Syrian cities). This weakness has been emphasized by scholars like J. Abu-Lughod, Andre Raymond, Michael Bonine, and Nezar Alsayyad who criticized the dominancy of single case study in formation of knowledge regarding the Muslim cities. Their works suggest alternative way in which historical, cultural, geographical, and regional differences throughout the Islamic world are considered crucial in understanding the Islamic urbanism from the Atlantic to India.

Despite high number of researches by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars on this topic, there is no scholarly consensus over the influence of Islam on cities in the Muslim world. While many researches focus on the influence of Islam on physical fabric of cities, its role on the process of urban management (governmentality) has not been investigated properly. This paper investigates the 19th century Islamic-Iranian cities through the lens of governmentality and power relation between different institutions involved in the process of governmentality. The aim is to add the urban experience of the traditional Islamic-Iranian cities to the scholarships dealing with traditional cities in the Islamic world.

2-Iranian cities and their conformity to the Islamic city Model

Pre-modern cities in Iran have been described by most Iranian and non-Iranian scholars to be identical with the Islamic City model (General description of the Islamic City model has been shown in Figure 1). For instance Ehlers and Floor, drawing from Dettman (1969) model of traditional Islamic city, conclude that "[p]re-1920 cities in Iran were characterized by a number of features that are considered to be typical for the "traditional" city of the Islamic Middle East."(Ehler& Floor, 1993: 251) .There are very few studies about the social and physical structure of cities in Pre-modern Iran. This might be due to the fact that unlike other Middle Eastern cities, Iran has never been a colonial state. Furthermore being obsessed with the Islamic City model, scholars did not bother to expand their sphere of investigation outside cities in North Africa where most of the European colonies were located.

Michael. E. Bonine is among the first scholars who questioned the applicability of Islamic City model to cities in Iran and particularly those in the central plateau. In a paper named 'The Morphogenesis of Iranian Cities' he argued that Islam had some effects in formation and development of cities in Iran but it did not play a major role in the "grid system" of cities. Rather it was the irrigation

www.SID.ir

system, direction of underground waters (*Qantas)*, and land slopewhich had impacts on street patterns and organization of units within them. Drawing from the case of cities in central plateau he concludes:

> Traditional Iranian cities have an orthogonal network of streets which does not conform to the maze of irregular, twisting lanes postulated for the ideal Islamic city. The grid system did not develop from an outgrowth of streets around rectangular religious buildings or from the orientation of Iranian houses to maximize seasonal usage, but rather it is due to irrigation systems. The orthogonal network of water channels corresponds to the slope of the land. Passageways follow these channels to reach various plots of cultivated land. Cities have expanded along the existing streets and water channels. The basic morphology of traditional Iranian cities was created by housing filling in adjacent rectangular fields and orchards. (Bonine, 1979: 208)

In his research Bonine established a link between cities' gird and pre-industrial economy and agricultural practices. He adopted this two dimensional approach in order to confront the prevailing description of Islamic cities "as a maze and jumble of twisting, narrow alleyways, a disordered array of dark streets and blind alleys." (ibid: 210)
In another article named "Islam and commerce: Waqf and the bazar of Yazd, Iran" Bonine examins the role and impact of Islamic religious endownments, *Waqf*, on spatial structure of Yazd. He investigates the socio-economic function of *waqf* system at three categories: *waqf* as a mean to support and maintain religious as well as public institutions (Mosque and Madraseh); *Waqf* as a mean to boost local traditional economy by supporting local artisans, retailers and craftsmen; and*Waqf* as a planning tool that regulates the use of land by associating the religious and commercial functions in the central core of the traditional Iranian cities. Finally he suggests that the lack of municipal institution and public services in traditional Middle Eastern cities were partially met by the the benefits of the *Islamic endowment*moved by a desire to help the poor and support the religious and socio-cultural infrastructures.
The most comprehensive study of traditional Iranian cities comes from the work of Kheirabadi. In *Iranian Cities: formation and development*helooks for the rationale behind the spatial pattern and physical morphology of pre-modern Iranian cities. Criticizing the Islamic City model he reminds readers that there are other factors of equal importance to religion in formation and development of traditional Iranian cities. He introduces these major factors as: the physical environment (topography, climate, water distribution), economy (trade and being located in ancient trade routes), and the religion and culture (public ceremonies, historical events, and institutions). Going beyond the Islamic city model and by adopting a historical approach, Kheirabadi suggests that "[w]hile the social configuration of the Iranian city is in conformity with the requirements of Islam, its physical morphology, to a great extent, is a rational

and cultural response to the natural environment, particularly to the topography and the climate of the Iranian Plateau." (Kheirabadi, 1991: 5)

Few scholars have implicitly subordinated the religion to wider political scope of the state in formation of spatial structure of traditional Iranian cities. MahvashAlemi has done an extensive historical research on the relationship between royal gardens and urban layout of cities during the Safavids. She has used the archival resources and travelers' reports and drawings of the 17th century to describe the way religion, culture, and sovereignty have been realized in urban-gardens of the Safavid capitals. She described *Maidan* and *Khiaban* (square and street) as "two urban spaces closely related to the complex of the royal garden [whose] functions … affected their morphological and typological features, thereby defining their situations." (Alemi, 1991) She then describes *Maidan* and *Khiaban*as a public theatre for feasts (in particular the Persian game of *chowgan*, *qabagandazi*, and *Ab pashan*) which has introduced certain architectural types such as *talar*and*naqarkhaneh*(ibid). She mentions the ceremonies of *Moharram*(*Ta'ziyeh*) as the only religious function of the *Maidan*by referring to its civic virtue. Alemi illustrates that Safavid Kings used *Maidan*as theatrical representation of their power though public ceremonies (*Nowrouz, Ashura, Chowgan, Parade, …*). In this manner the religious and ceremonial function of the *Maidan*is a tool for affirming the Shah's legitimacy and sovereignty on his subjects (Alemi, 2007).

3-The Institutions of urban management in traditional Islamic-Iranian cities

The mechanism of power and socio-spatial control in the 19th century iranian cities can be analyzed from two perspectives: 1. the sovereign power of the Shah, and 2. the infra-power of the *'Urf* and religion. These two aspects constituted the De facto urban regime in pre-modern Iranian cities. This mechanism of power was polarized in different political, social, and religious institutions corresponding to: the institution of the sovereign (*nahad-e-saltanat*), the institution of shari'a (*nahad-e-shar'*), and institution of custom (*nahad-e-'urf*). In urban scale each institution used to have its own sphere of influence and certain level of autonomy (though limited) and self-sufficiency. For instance the institution of the sovereign used to control the governmental space of the citadel (*arg*) and public space of bazaar. Theresponsibility of the latter was often delegated to other institutes like *muhtasib*, and later to *darougheh*, who were responsible for the public order and execution of the sovereign's orders.

Furthermore, the power of sovereign extended beyond the court and covered the area of religion and custom mostly through appointing officials who were the link between their own communities and the state. In a similar way the institution of Shari'a was responsible for the promotion of shari'a principles

through controlling the educational and juridical institutions. Institution of custom ('urf) was a non-governmental institution based on informal agreements and customary laws. Although in practice they had to conform to the shari'a principles, they could arbitrate in particular cases when the public interest was at stake.
In the 19th century Iran the power relation between the state, religion, and communal affiliation (extended family network) corresponded to Foucault genealogy of power identified as "sovereign power", "disciplinary power", and "bio-power". The state was represented by sovereign power and its concern for territorial security and maintenance of principality. The religion (sometimes affiliated with the state apparatus) was concerned with the moral well-being of the *Ummah* (community of Muslims) through its disciplinary principles. And finally, in the absence of municipal services, the network of extended family was concerned with biological well-being of its members through provision of urban supplies and amenities. The interaction between these institutions created a system which was sustained through a series of bargaining and negotiating between the institution of state, the institution of religion, and the institution of custom (*'urf*). This was the most effective mechanism of social control in the 19th century Iran.

3-1The institution of the sovereign (*nahad-e- saltanat*)

The court had an important role in stability and prosperity of traditional cities in Iran.For instance upon becoming the capital, Tehran was a small town with no tradition of centrality, industry, or commerce. Agha Mohammad khan, the founder of Qajar dynasty, attempted to populate his capital by establishing the court and giving incentives to merchants, manufacturers, and foreigners to establish themselves in Tehran. The stability of Tehran due to the court's presence and its strategic location for trades attracted many merchants, local and foreigners. This is a typical picture of almost all traditional cities in Iran. In absence of urban communities, the life of cities was dependent on the institution of the sovereign. Iranian cities did not possess the autonomy and self-management of the medieval European cities. They were the seat of the government and dependent on the power of the sovereign for security and prosperity. Therefore, any description of cities without considering the seat of the government (arg) is incomplete.
As mentioned before, the power of the sovereign extended beyond the administration of the territory to other areas in particular the trade[1]. In traditional Iranian cities trade was highly dependent on the central and local government.

[1]The capital cities were often located along important trade routes which were the most important cause for flourishing and growth of bazaars.

The Shah and the feudal,[1] in order to exchange the lavish with money and gold, had to cooperate with merchants and tradesmen who were involved in export and international trades. Furthermore the importance of foreign trade for the court was to the degree that the shah took the responsibility of securing the roads and providing the facilities (e.g. caravanserai) and neccesssary infrastructures. In the 19th century the bazaar was the economic, social, and to some extent political pulse of the city and its organization and orderliness had been always one of the main concerns of the Shahs. Till the sixteenth century there was an institution of *muhtasib* who was the inspector of public places and behaviour in towns (Stilt & Roy, 2003). The fundamental responsibility of *muhtasib* was "promoting good and to repressing evil by concerning himself with all questions of public morals… and the rules of professional ethics" in particular the manner in which commercial transaction were carried out in bazar (Cahen, 1970 cited in Madanipour 1998, 4). From the 16th and the 17th century onward the responsibility of *mushtasib* was transferred to *kalantar* whose charge was supervising the quality of products in bazaar as well as the fairness of prices. The institution of *kalantar* was substituted by *darugheh*, a police system dealing specially with settlement disputes in bazaar, law enforcement, and ensuring the orderliness (Lambton 1980). These institutions were in charge of both material and moral order of society corresponding to the state and the religious concern.

As a matter of fact sovereignty, security, and territory were the main concerns of the Shah and, in Foucault term, were the "ultimate end of sovereignty." What constituted the Shah's justice (*edalat*) was indeed his ability to put everything/one in their own place according to their merits which was again based on the arbitrary decision and interpretation of the Shah. Therefore, the sovereign did not have as his purpose the welfare and prosperity of population, its health, wealth, etc.

3-2The institution of Shar' (*nahad-e-shar'i*)

"Islam is derived from the Arabic root *salaama* peace, purity, submission and obedience. In religious sense Islam means submission to the will of the God and obedience to his law[2]." From this perspective Islam is a religion of order and self-discipline. One implication is the precise daily time of praying (*ibadat*) that should be respected by each individual Muslim. The same thing happens in Ramadan, the month when Muslims go fasting which requires them to stop drinking and eating from dawn to sunset. Islam's disciplinary rules penetrate into very details of individual's conducts as indicated in the principles of *halal* (lawful) and *haram* (unlawful). These principles apply to any kind of activity,

[1]The meaning of feudal in Iran was different from the one in the Europe. While in Europe the feudal had good amount of autonomy and power, in Iran they owed their possession to the favor of the Shah which meant that the Shah at any time could confiscate their properties without notice.

[2]Ref. http://www.missionislam.com/discover/introduction.htm

food and diet, and policies. All these principles aim at disciplining individuals and regulate their actions, sayings, conducts, and behaviours. Islam is also concerned with health and material well-being of Muslims as much as their moral well-being. Many Quranic teachings are concerned with spiritual, mental, and physical well-being of the man. Cleanliness, exercise, and nutrition are among the advices that target the physical body. Furthermore, the tenets of Islam encouraged not only the material well-being of believers but also their moral well-being through the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice. Outer cleanliness and inner purity are interconnected in Islam; therefore, it is an imperative for a man to keep clean within and without. Maintaining cleanliness, order, and purity- the principles of Islamic teaching- is the responsibility of each individual Muslim. Moreover, each individual is not only responsible for his own conducts, but they also have to observe and control others' behaviour. Amongst the greatest obligations are *amr-bel-maroof*(command the right) and *nahi-anel-munkar*(forbidding the wrong) as recommended in the Quran.

In the 19th century Iran *olama* were the main interpreter of sharia law. It is important to mention that in Iran during the 17th century the institution of religion and state were totally integrated. Toward the end of the 18th century and through the entire 19th century the institution of shari'a obtained a good extent of autonomy. The *olama* had achieved the control of endowments (*Waqf*), legal, and educational institutions. They were also financially independent as collectors of special religious tithe named *zakat* (is an Islamic obligation of giving a fixed portion of one's wealth to charity) to be used for social welfare and support of clergy and religious students. Since the 19th century the Shi'a *olama* became the only authoritative interpreters of Shari'a Laws and had gained independent control of the religious function of the government. Furthermore, *olama* were widely respected among the mass to the extent that they heard the complaints of the people against injustice and misrule of the Shah and, on occasions, took up their cause (Amir Arjomand, 1981). One of the privileges of the *olama* was their asylum right which meant that the state's agents could not violate those who had taken refuge to *olama*'s house or the sanctuaries. However unlike the medieval Europe the clerics did not form a clear administrative hierarchy independent of the state. Instead, as Skocpol noted: "they were tied in many complex ways to the Qajar establishment of landed aristocrats, tribal chiefs, and patrimonial officials." [1](Skocpol, 1982: 273). Again unlike the medieval Catholic Church, *olama* in Iran did not transform their hierarchy into a feudalism structure.

[1]However, toward the end of Qajar dynasty as a result of power vacuum and weakness of Qajar Shahs the religious institution got coercive power of its own able to mobilize mass against the institution of monarchy.

3-3The institution of custom (*nahad-e-'urfi*)

What has been described so far depicts the picture of public life in pre-modern Iranian cities. Who managed the private life/space in pre-modern cities? Private life took place in residential quarters in pre-industrial Muslim cities. However for some reasons quarters have remained unknown entities in the social history and ethnography of the Middle East. European travellers mostly described the public life of Middle Eastern cities and their descriptions for neighbourhoods do not go beyond the general physical elements and services provided by the neighbourhoods. This might be due to the difficulty of penetrating into people's private life and space. There have been less empirical studies about the social structure of neighbourhoods in traditional Iranian cities. Therefore, any account of life in traditional Iranian cities is based on travellers' descriptions whose accuracy is sometimes questionable. The neighbourhood in traditional Iranian cities represented a distinct community with its own social and religious institutes. Furthermore in each neighbourhood one could find a good amount of public services and facilities directed for the use of inhabitants. From spatial point of view, a neighbourhood was divided into sub-districts and eventually family complexes of two or more families in smaller scale. Each neighbourhood had its name and apparently a boundary to be recognized and respected by other proximate neighbourhood. It is not still clear whether the boundaries were just a matter of social convention or they presented a physical demarcation. Marefat(1988) put forward the hypothesis that a neighbourhood boundary may have originally been determined and followed by underground aqueducts (qanat) built to conduct water from the foothills of mountain to city. Thus this is based on an assumption and in the absence of in-depth study on pre-modern neighbourhoods of Tehran it is difficult to argue about the rationale behind these boundaries. Many studies have documented the physical pattern of neighbourhoods in Tehran and other traditional cities in Iran. These studies focus on hierarchy of streets and circulation from purely public to exclusively private streets dividing a neighbourhood into different sub-zones recognized and respected by inhabitants. However less work has been done on social and administrative patterns of neighbourhoods.

The administration of neighbourhoods was delegated to *kadkhuda* who was appointed by *kalantar*. The main duty of *kadkhuda* was the allocation of taxes among city quarters a subject which often generated resentment and disputes (Martin, 2005: 17). Thus it is clear that without any legal framework and in the absence of municipality, each neighbourhood maintained order and responded effectively to the needs of inhabitants through cooperative and voluntary informal associations.The wealthy residents on different occasions implemented public works to benefit the community like construction of Ab-anbar, Saqakhaneh, Tekiyeh as well as endowing their properties in a way to spend the

revenues on welfare of the neighbourhood. Beside these benevolent residents there were agents who took charge of the social and moral policing of the neighbourhood. One of these agents was local *Lutis,* de facto leaders of community. Originally associated with organized bandits and robbery gangs, in the 19th century the *luti* ethos was developed on the course of faithfulness to one's promise and word, assisting those in need, and honouring the debts. *Luti* groups were associated with different quarters of a city who voluntarily assumed protection of neighbourhoods. According to Martin "ties of family, tribe, religion, local origin, and occupation no doubt gave the *lutis* of a particular quarter a degree of fellow feeling, and they considered themselves bound to help one another in time of need, whether for welfare or protection." (ibid: 118) They also were in charge of social order such as preserving public morality, defending their quarters against abuse, education of poor, collection of donations from poor, protection and policing of neighbourhoods, equal distribution of resources, and organizing religious ceremonies whether celebration or mourning. There were cases in which *lutis*were involved in distribution of wealth within community by informally supporting and protecting the thieves. *Lutis* could also play a significant role at times of political chaos by securing the quarters against crime or plunder. At times they formed a coalition with olama and urban poor in order to challenge the state and in other occasions they cooperated with the state in order to suppress the rebellions. In all cases *lutis often* acted according to their own sagacity rather than conformity to Quran or *Hadith*[1].

The different social fabric of neighbourhoods established different codes and rules that required the inhabitants to be accountable to those specific rules. The rules were mostly informal agreements between the inhabitants, the head of neighbourhood, and the agent of state. This is again due to tribal nature of the state and different communities which brought people under the patronage of few executives. As Costello argues "the loyalties of city people were attached less to the city than to their immediate neighbourhood community." (Costello, 1977:16)

As a matter of fact a neighbourhood was a basic unit of urban administration with its own hierarchy of leadership and protection. In this system rights and obligations were practiced in moral and ethical terms. Disputes among residents were often solved through elder mediation without intervention of official authorities. The mechanism of social control in neighbourhoods was different from what was exercised in a more broad sense by the state in public sphere of life.

[1] Martin's (2005) account of the role of *lutis* in popular protest is worth of attention.

4-Spatial governmentality in pre-modern Islamic-Iranian cities

In the absence of law and politics (Katouzian 2000) the monarch was the only agent who "had critical impacts on other social institution, one of which is the management and spatial arrangement of the urban environment." (Madanipour, 1998: 218).Therefore, it is easy to conclude that it was the Shah who undertook spatial changes due to the huge amount of power and wealth concentrated on the court. The Shah had also complete supervision on the way the money was supposed to be spent on public works. However, as we noticed in the previous parts, in pre-modern Iranian cities different regimes governed different spaces as indicated by three institutions of urban management in the previous part. This led to the division of the city into different interrelated and integrated zones. Three spatial zones characterized the traditional cities in Iran: the space of the sovereign (citadel or *arg*), the space of *shar'*, and the space of *'urf*. The location of these three zones vis-à-vis each other reflected the power structure between the institution of the sovereign, shar', and 'urf. For instance Madanipour traces the link between the institution of the sovereign and the urban space of Tehran by focusing on urban axiality i.e. axis of bazar leading to royal quarter. The axial urban structure in history of Iranian cities, Madanipour argues, "signifies the power relations focused on the Shah, as the highest authority who was far above any member of the administration and played a personal key role in most important affairs of the country." (Madanipour 1998: 226) This structure resulted in monopoly of centre by the citadel and bazaar both dominated by the autocratic ruler (state) as indicated for instance in the map of Tehran (Figure 2).

The centrality of public life in spatial term emphasized the intermediary role of religion and political agencies in city's affairs (Madanipour 1998). In spatial term the centrality of public life and the balance of power between state's politics and religion shaped the urban fabric sustained by institutions whose role was to guarantee the Islamic principle of corpus and moral wellbeing. Example are *Hammam* (public bath), *Madraseh* (religious school), mosques, *Tekiyeh*, etc…Therefore, Islam had an influential role in social control and management of cities' public affairs through institutions and agents directly assigned by the ruler and in fact parallel and subservient to ruler's idea for the city. Slugllet (2005) subdues the institution of religion to the monarchy by stating that "the relationship between 'Islam' and 'the state' was generally limited to the notion that it was the function or duty of the state to create the political and social backdrop against which the good Islamic life should be lived, rather than promulgating, let alone advocating, anything which might be called Islamic government." (Slugllet, 2005: 261)

In the absence of law, the religion had strong impact on all matters except *lutis* and sometimes the institution of sovereign. According to Martin "the shari'a extended little beyond civil matters, except in the form of principles and

precepts, and government administration and customary law were not coded or regularised." (Martin, 2005: 127) Therefore, the shah informally had to bargain with influential members of society especially with *ulama* (religious class) and head of tribes both in national and local scale. This was a part of national politics in Qajar dynasty in which Shah delegated (informally) administration of regions to head of tribes in exchange of political patronage and support for the dynasty. In absence of centralized army this was the most efficient way of maintaining tranquillity and territorial control against internal and external threats. This national politics was realized identically in urban politics in which the ruler had to enter in negotiation with *ulama*, heads of neighbourhoods, and *lutis* in exchange of patronage and support.

5-Conclusion

To conclude we can argue that in traditional Iranian cities we face three different modes of governmentality. The first mode of government is the government of the state which indicates the sovereign's relation to his territory and the subjects within this territory. Within this framework maintaining sovereignty, security, and order was the main concern of the government. The second mode of government related to Islam principles of moral and bodily well-being or the Islam's principle of self-government. This mode of governmentality concerns with maintaining individual and social order through self-discipline, preserving public morality, and provision of social infrastructure (education, health care, poverty reduction, etc…). The third mode of government is exercised through informal (often voluntarily) associations and institutions that are bound by shared-value and sense of commonality between their members. I call it the government of *'urf*or custom.

Each mode of governmentality corresponds to a form of power which is exercised directly or indirectly by that institution. These are, to borrow Foucault's terminology, the sovereign power of the state, the disciplinary power of the religion, and the bio-power of the *'urf*. The mechanism of power in pre-modern Tehran conforms to Foucault's understanding of power: "power is everywhere not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere." (Foucault, 1978:63) Accordingly, the produced space in traditional Iranian cities was a result of collective interaction between the Shah's authority, customs ('urf), and religious culture with Shah's hegemony at the top of the hierarchy. These interactions created a system in which, according to Madanipour, "the ability to control is more crucial than the form which this ability has derived its legitimacy." (Madanipour 1998: 230) In other words religious culture was not a source of legitimacy for the goal of socio-spatial control. Rather it was one of (many) tools in achieving this goal.



Figure 1: Islamic city model adapted from Dettmann (1969)

Figure 2 : Map of Tehran 1857 consist of fortification wall, 6 gates, *Arg* (citadel), Bazar, and four residential districts.
Source: Tehran's municipality

6-References

[1] Abu-Lughod, J. (1987). "The Islamic City--Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Volume 1, Issue 19, Page 155-176.

[2] Abrahamian, E. (1974), "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Volume 5, Number 1, page 3-31.

[3] Alemi, M. (1991), "Urban Spaces as the Scene for the Ceremonies and Pastimes of the Safavid Court" in E.D. Roma n.1-2

[4] Alemi, M. (2007), "Princely Safavid Gardens: Stage for Rituals of Imperial Display and Political Legitimacy", in *Middle East Garden Traditions: Unity and Diversity Questions, Methods and Resources in a Multicultural Perspective*. Edited by Michel Conan. Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks.

[5] Amir Arjomand, S. (1981), "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran" in *Government and Opposition*, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 293-316.

[6] Bennison, A. K. and A. L. Gascoigne (ed) (2007), *Cities in the Pre-Modern Islamic World- The Urban Impact of Religion, State and Society*, Routledge: Abingdon.

[7] Bonine, M. (1979), "The Morphogenesis of Iranian Cities" in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Volume 69, Number 2, Page 208-224.

[8] Bonine, M. (1987), "Waqf and the Bazaar of Yazd, Iran" in *Erdkunde*, Volume 41, Issue 3, page 182-196.

[7] Brown, J. A. (1965), *A geographical study of the evolution of the cities of Tehran and Isfahan*. Doctoral Dissertation, Durham University: Durham, UK.

[8] Costello, V.F. (1977), *Urbanization in the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

[9] Curzon, G. (1892), *Persia and the Persian Question*, Longmans Green: London.

[10] Dettmann, K. (1969), "Islamische und westliche Elemente im heutigen Damaskus" in *Geographische Rundschau*, Number 21, Page 64-68.

[11] Eickelman D.F. (1974), "Is There an Islamic City? The Making of a Quarter in a Moroccan Town" *in International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Volume 5, Issue 3, Page 274-294.

[12] Elbabour, M. (1980), "Systems of Cities: An Alternative Approach to Medieval Islamic Urbanism" paper presented in annual meeting of the *Association of American Geographers*. Louisville, Kentucky.

[13] Foucault, M. (1978), *The History of Sexuality: Volume one*, Penguin: London.

[14] Foucault, M. (1991), 'Governmentality', in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in* Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf: London.

[15] Katouzian, H. (2000), *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*. I.B. Tauris Publication, London.

[..] Kheirabadi, M. (2000), *Iranian Cities: Formation and Development*. University of Texas Press: Texas.

[16] Lambton, A. (1980), "Islamic Society in Persia" in A. Lambton, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*, Variorum Reprints: London.

[17] Lapidus, I. M (1967), *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

[18] Madanipour, A. (1998), *Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis*, John Wiley & Sons Ltd: New York.

[19] Marçais, W. (1928) "L'Islamisme et la vie urbaine," *L'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, Comptes Rendus: Paris.

[20] Marefat, M. (1988), *Building to Power: Architecture of Tehran. 1921-1941*, P.h.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Cambridge.

[21] Martin, V. (2005), *The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest, and the State in Nineteenth Century Persia*, I.B.Tauris: London.

[22] Said, E. W (1978), *Orientalism*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.

[23] Sauvaget, J. (1941), *Alep: Essai sur le developpement d'une grande ville Syrienne, des origines au milieu du XIXe siecle*, P. Geuthner: Paris.

www.SID.ir

Archive of SID

[24] Semsar, M. (1986), "Shahr-e Tehran" in M. Y. Kiani (ed.) *Nazari Ejmali beh Shahrneshini va Shahrsazi dar iran (A General Study on Urbanization and Urban Planning in iran),* Homa: Tehran.
[25] Skocpol, T. (1982), "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in Iranian Revolution" in *Theory and Society*, Volume 11, Number 3, Page 265-283.
[26] Sluglett, P. (2005), "Colonialism, the Ottomans, the Qajars, and the Struggle for Independence: The Arab World, Turkey, and Iran" in Choueiri, Y.M. (ed) *A Comparison to the History of the Middle East*, Blackwell Publishing: Malden, Oxford, and Carlton.
[27] Stilt, K. and M. Roy (2003), "Public and Private as Viewed Through the Work of Muhtasib" in *Social Research*, Volume 70, Number 3, 735-838.
[28] Zaka, Y, (1970), *Tarikhche-ye Sakhtemanha-ye Arg-e Saltanati-ye Tehran,* The Institute of National heritage: Tehran.
[29] Weber, M. (1958), *The City*, The Free Press: New York.

www.SID.ir