



## Some comparison on application of cryptology algorithms

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### Abstract

In this article we are going to compare useful cryptology algorithm in different area and explain them though application of alogrithms have very large area but doing some comparison reader can do decision of usage of introduced algorithm in right place. In this article first we mention important point of, digital signature and distribution key and then we compare tow cryptolgy algorithm ,PGP and Fortpza .

Keywords: cryptography,algorithms,keys

### ۱- Key Distribution and key Agreement

In comparisoin of Public key system and private key system we know that public key is better since public key does not need safe chanel and exchange of keys. But Public key system is acting slower than for that reason for long massage ususally use private key system like DES in the folwing we explaing methods which reduces these weekness .

#### ۱-۲- Key Distribution of BLOM

۱) We make prime  $P$  and for each user  $U$  let  $\tau_u \in Z_p$ ,  $\tau_u$  are separate

۲) TA(trusted authority) choose three number  $a, b, c$ , belong  $Z_p$  construct

$$f(x, y) = a + b(x + y) + cxy$$

۳) For each usre TA consider

$$g_u(x) = f(x, \tau_u) \bmod p$$

then trasfer  $g_u(x)$  to  $U$  on safe chanel note that  $g_u(x)$  is alinear form of  $x$  so we can write

$$g_u(x) = a_u + b_u x$$

$$a_u = a + b\tau_u \bmod p$$

$$b_u = b + c\tau_u \bmod p$$



ξ) If u,v decided to contact they use common key

$$k_{u,v} = k_{v,u} = f(\tau_u, \tau_v) = a + b(\tau_u + \tau_v) + c\tau_u\tau_v$$

U calculate  $k_{u,v}$  through  $f(\tau_u, \tau_v) = g_u(\tau_v)$  and

V calculate  $k_{u,v}$  through  $f(\tau_u, \tau_v) = g_v(\tau_u)$ .

### ۱-۳ -Diffe-Hellman Distribution key

We explain only algorithm

- ۱) We P is prime and  $\alpha \in Z_p^*$  will be made as public.
- ۲) V calculate  $k_{u,v} = \alpha^{a_u a_v} \bmod p = b^{a_v} \bmod p$  with use of public value  $b_u$  through verification of user U with secret value of  $a_v$ .
- ۳) U calculate  $k_{u,v} = \alpha^{a_u a_v} \bmod p = b^{a_u} \bmod p$  with public value of  $b_v$  from verification of user V with secret key  $a_u$ .

Signature of TA on verification of user will not allow any change of enemy on information of user. We must worry about passive attack so question is that whether

user w can calculate  $k_{u,v}$  if  $w \neq u, v$ . In other word with given value  $\alpha^{a_v} \bmod p, \alpha^{a_u} \bmod p$  can calculate  $\alpha^{a_u a_v} \bmod p$ ? This problem known as Diffe\_Hellman Problem.

Since problem of Disconnected logarithm is difficult in  $Z_p$  so this Distribution key of Diffe-Hellman is safe. The point is here that how much this system is safe? we can not say but we can do some comparison.

Theorem: Breaking of cryptology system of ELGamal is equal of Diffe-Hellman.

### ۱-ξ -Kerberos

Having a key for long time is dangerous so in this system on line will be produced by TA and time L will be considered after time L new key will be produced by TA. Follow the algorithm

- ۱) U ask a session key from TA for contact V.
- ۲) TA choose a random session key and also a time stamp T and a time line L.
- ۳) TA calculate following values:

$$m_1 = e_{k_u}(k, ID(v), T, L)$$

$$m_2 = e_{k_v}(k, ID(u), T, L)$$

then send  $m_1, m_2$  to U.

ξ) U calculate decryption function  $d_{k_u}$  for calculation of K, T, L, ID(v) from  $m_1$  then calculate  $m_3 = e_k(ID(u), T)$  and send  $m_2, m_3$  to V.



۵) V use decryption function  $d_{k_v}$  to calculate K,T,L,ID(U) from  $m_2$  then he use  $d_k$  for comparission T and ID(u) from  $m_3$ . Then he compare two value T and ID(u) are same or not If they are same then V calculate  $m_4 = e_k(T+2)$  and send it to U.

۶) U decryption  $m_4$  by  $d_k$  and varify that answer is T+۱.

Important point is here that Different function which will be used for massages ,  $m_1, m_2$  prepare safe area for transformation of session key K and  $m_3, m_4$  doing varyfication that U,V have same session key.

### ۱-۴- Exchange of key (Diffe-Hellamn)

If we van not use on line production of key we use this method .

- ۱) U choose value  $a_u$  random as such  $0 \leq a_u \leq p-2$ .
- ۲) U calculate value  $\alpha^{a_u} \bmod p$  and send it to V .
- ۳) V choose value  $a_v$  random as such  $0 \leq a_v \leq p-2$ .
- ۴) V calculate value  $\alpha^{a_v} \bmod p$  and send to U.
- ۵) U calculate  $k = (\alpha^{a_v})^{a_u} \bmod p$  and V calculate  $k = (\alpha^{a_u})^{a_v} \bmod p$ ..

In the end U,V can same key  $k = \alpha^{a_u a_v} \bmod p$  .

### ۱-۵-۱ The sattion to station protocol

In this system U send massage to V in the middle W takes the massage and change it . For doing correction of this system(Diffe-Helman) we can use Authenticated key agreement which called station to station protcol .

- ۱) U choose random  $a_u$  such as  $0 \leq a_u \leq p-2$ .
- ۲) U calculate  $\alpha^{a_u} \bmod p$  and send to V.
- ۳) V choose random  $a_v$  such as  $0 \leq a_v \leq p-2$ .
- ۴) V evaluate  $\alpha^{a_u} \bmod p$  and  $k = (\alpha^{a_u})^{a_v} \bmod p$  and send  $(C(V), \alpha^{a_v}, y_v)$  to U.  
 $y_v = \text{Sig}_v(\alpha^{a_v}, \alpha^{a_u})$
- ۵) U evaluate  $k = (\alpha^{a_v})^{a_u} \bmod p$ .

Then he varify  $y_v$  with  $Ver_v$  C(V) varify by  $Ver_{TA}$ .

۶) U evaluate  $y_u = \text{Sig}_v(\alpha^{a_u}, \alpha^{a_v})$  and send  $C(U, y_u)$  to V.

۷) V varify  $y_u$  by  $Ver_v$  and varify C(u) by  $Ver_{TA}$ .

### ۱-۵-۲ - MIT key Arrangment protocl)( Mastumoto, Takadhima, Imai)

Important point of the this protocol is that verification of key is not required .

۱) U choose  $\tau_u$  random in such a way that  $0 \leq \tau_u \leq p-2$  and calculate  $s_u = \alpha^{\tau_u} \bmod p$  .

۲) U send  $(C(u), S_u)$  to V.

۳) V choose random  $\tau_v$  in such a way that  $0 \leq \tau_v \leq p-2$  and evaluate  $S_v = \alpha^{\tau_v}$  .



ξ) V send value of  $C(v), S_v$  to U.

ο) U calculate  $k = S_v^a b_v^{r_v} \bmod p$  which value of  $b_v$  from  $C(v)$  and V evaluate  $k = S_u^a b_u^{r_u} \bmod p$ . which he calculate  $b_u$  from  $C(u)$ .

## ۲-Digital signature

Another application of cryptology algorithm is to use in digital signature in this section we explain different system of cryptology which will be use in digital signature. First of all we explain a general procedure for signature then in other sections we explain different use of algorithm in signature system.

A system of signature is a quinary  $(P, A, K, S, V)$  which satisfy following conditions.

۱) P a finite set of possible message.

۲) A a finite set of signature.

۳) K a finite set of keys.

ξ) For  $k \in K$  there exist a signature algorithm  $Sig_k \in S$  which there exist a verify algorithm  $Ver_k \in V$  such as

$$Sig_k : P \rightarrow A$$

$$Ver_k : P \times A \rightarrow \{true, false\}$$

they are functions which following equations for each signature  $y \in A$

$$Ver(x, y) = \begin{cases} true & \text{if } y = Sig(x) \\ false & \text{if } y \neq Sig(x) \end{cases}$$

pair  $(x, y)$   $x \in P, y \in A$  is called message signature.

Now we consider different system of signature.

### ۲-۱- System of RSA signature

Consider  $n=pq$  which p and q are prime such that  $P = A = Z_n$ . We define set of space key as follow:

$K = \{(n, p, q, a, b) : n = pq \text{ p, q are prime, } ab \equiv 1 \pmod{n}\}$  values of n, b are public key and p, q, a

$$Sig_k(x) = x^a \bmod p$$

are private key and we define  $Ver_k(x, y) = true \Leftrightarrow x \equiv y^b \pmod{n}$

$$x, y \in Z_n$$

For protect from duplicate signature we can use Hash function.

Different attack for this system are as follow:

۱) key-only attack ۲) Known message attack ۳) chosen message attack ۴) Total break

ο) selective forgery ۶) existential forgery

### ۲-۲- System of Hash function signature :

Usually in systems of signatures there is fast hash function of public cryptology. System signature with hash function is as follow:

$$\text{Message } x \quad x \in \{0, 1\}^*$$



Short message  $z=h(x)$   $z \in Z$   
Signature  $y = Sig_k(z)$   $y \in Y$ .

You can see that hash function and use of short message make safe system system.

۲-۳ - ElGamal system of signature :

ElGamal introduced on ۱۹۸۵ for first time and is improved version of DSA both signature and public key of ElGamal are non-deterministic, Its algorithm are as follow

$P$  is prime  $\in Z_p$ ,  $\alpha \in Z_p^*$ . and consider  $P = Z_p^*$ ,  $A = Z_p^* \times Z_{p-1}^*$  and define  
 $\alpha = \{(p, \alpha, \beta, a) : \beta \equiv \alpha^a \pmod{p}\}$ ,  $\alpha, \beta, P$  are public key,  $a$  private key.

For  $K = (P, \alpha, a, \beta)$  and for secret random number  $k \in Z_{p-1}^*$  we define

$$\begin{aligned} Sig_k(x, k) &= (\gamma, \delta) \\ \gamma &= \alpha^k \pmod{p} \\ \delta &= (\alpha^k \pmod{p}) \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

for  $x, \gamma \in Z_p^*$ ,  $\delta \in Z_{p-1}$ .

Define  $Ver_k(x, (\gamma, \delta)) = true \Leftrightarrow \beta^\gamma \gamma^\delta \equiv \alpha^x \pmod{p}$ .

۳-۲ - DSA system of signature:

Main idea of this algorithm is from ElGamal. DSA use a ordered subgroup  $q$  from  $Z_q^*$ ,  $q$  is a prime number  $160$  bit,  $p$  a prime of  $L$  bit since  $L \equiv 0 \pmod{64}$ ,  $512 \leq L \leq 1024$  Message before signature use HASH-1 algorithm.

Consider  $\alpha \in Z_p^*$  a  $q$ th root of one module  $p$ .  $A = Z_p^* \times Z_q^*$ ,  $P = \{0, 1\}^*$ . Define

$$\alpha = \{(p, q, \alpha, a, \beta) : \beta \equiv \alpha^a \pmod{p}\} \text{ since } 0 \leq a \leq q-1.$$

Value  $P, \alpha, \beta$  are public key and a private key for  $K = (p, q, \alpha, \beta, a)$  and for A random number  $k$ ,  $1 \leq k \leq q-1$  we define

$$\begin{aligned} Sig_k(x, k) &= (\gamma, \delta) \\ \gamma &= (\alpha^k \pmod{p}) \pmod{q} \\ \delta &= (SHA-1(x) + a\lambda)k^{-1} \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

If  $\lambda = 0$  or  $\delta = 0$  we must choose a new random from  $k$ . For  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ,  $\gamma, \delta \in Z_p^*$  verification will be done by:

$$\begin{aligned} e_1 &= SHA-1(x)\delta^{-1} \pmod{p} \\ e_2 &= \gamma\delta^{-1} \pmod{q} \\ Ver(x, (\lambda, \delta)) &= true \Leftrightarrow (\alpha^{e_1} \beta^{e_2} \pmod{p}) \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$



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In October ۲۰۰۱ NIST offered  $P$  be a prime number of ۱۰۲۴ bit. Consider that if  $\delta \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$  algorithm reject signature of sendr and do new signature with arandom number  $k$ . Note that the case  $\delta \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$  is with probability of  $2^{-160}$  which is impossible.

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