Wisdom and Philosophy
Year:2017 | Volume:13 | Issue:1 |Papers Count:6

In “White Mythology”, Derrida deals with the role of metaphors in philosophy, and how philosophy defines metaphor. He believes that when philosophers define metaphor, they reduce it to the nominal metaphor, and this shows that they try to subject it under the concept. This is for Derrida an example of philosophy’s reductionist confrontation with its others. But Derrida deconstruct the distinction between the concept as the element of philosophy and the metaphor as the element of literature. For him, the concept and all philosophical concepts are basically metaphors, and the movement of metaphor is the movement of genesis of philosophical concepts. Riceour in “Metaphor and Philosophical Discourse” criticizes Derrida fiercely, and claims that the distinction between the discourses is what our tradition gave us, and Derrida neglects the important distinction between philosophical discourse and poetic discourse. The so called deconstruction of binary oppositions in Derrida mélanges the distinct discourses. Riceour himself tries to show the origin of the distinction between philosophical and poetic discourses in the work of Aristotle, especially about the concept of analogy. He finally concludes that an excact distinction takes form in the point of closeness of two discourses.

In the lecture History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena Heidegger levels an immanent phenomenological criticism at Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In the lecture, Heidegger accuses Husserl that he neglects to raise two fundamental questions for the phenomenology: the question concerning the specific manner of being of the intentional acts in particular and the manner of being as such in general. By his criticism, Heidegger returns to the starting point of Husserl‘s phenomenology, i.e. the shift from natural attitude to transcendental attitude, and thereby reaching his own understanding of the matter of phenomenology. As is well known, Heidegger substitutes the Dasein for the transcendental consciousness and refuses the Husserl’s epoché and his transcendental reduction. In the following paper, on the contrary, we attempt to interpret Heidegger’s criticism in another way, which is that Heidegger adopts not only the transcendental reduction but also the absolute transcendental subjectivity. To put it more precisely, Heidegger radicalizes the absoluteness of the absolute transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s Philosophy so much that he will be able to eliminate the Husserl’s natural attitude as a non-phenomenological and dogmatic starting point for the phenomenology. Accordingly, we claim that Heidegger’s Dasein is substituted for the absoluteness of subjectivity and the finitude of human existence simultaneously.

The parts I & III of Kitab al-Horuf deals with explaining the role of particles in expressing the philosophical notions. This, it seems, is a meta-ontological program that al-Farabi is developing. First, he puts a meta-ontological problem concerning the insufficiency of natural language to express the metaphysical thought especially the being, then he devises a specific logic for being and existents. It is clear that we do need a particular language for metaphysics. He develops this logic, i.e. a special syntax and semantics for metaphysics. He thinks metaphysics deals with meta-categories and if these are to be expressed adequately they must be expressed as particles.

Rejecting metaphysical realism (MR) is a basic element in Putnam's Philosophy. He introduces two arguments against MR: Model-theoretic (MT) and brain-in-vat (BIV). However, according to some scholars and commentators who work on Putnam's Philosophy, the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, as introduced by Putnam in some of his books, is another argument by which MR is rejected. This Phenomenon is a state in which two sentences that are at face value incompatible could be consistently true. However, there is not any explicit and complete formulation of this argument in the writings of Putnam and his commentators. In this paper, first we will formulate a version of conceptual relativity against MR. According to our version, Putnam ask the metaphysical realist to explain this phenomenon. Then we will show that this argument is not independent of MT and BIV. Therefore, the phenomenon of conceptual relativity could be an argument against MR only of we accept either MT or BIV. Furthermore, any objection to MT and BIV will weaken the argument from conceptual relativity against MR.

In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of ' burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, moral or religious judgments. Then, I describe the ' Asymmetry Objection' to Rawls's political philosophy and mention some contemporary political reactions to it briefly. I' ll then take Quong's solution for this objection. This solution is based on a distinction between two different kinds of disagreements which are called foundational and justificatory disagreements respectively. Quong claims that the mentioned distinction corresponds the distinction between the disagreements concerning the matters of justice and disagreements concerning the matters of good. After describing Quong' s solution, I' ll criticize it and through some points concerning the epistemology of disagreement show what revisions it should have if it supposed to work and solve the problem.

Saul. A. Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language reads Wittgenstein’s private language argument as an inference from the idea of rule following. He presents a sceptical paradox about rule- following, which purports to show all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible. In this paper we will examine one of the most important outcomes of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution, namely “The Community view” according to which, the concept of a private language is inconsistent, because using language entails following rules, and following rules entails being a member of community. This view believes that solitary or private rule-following is impossible and language is essentially social; hence it’s impossible for someone isolated from birth to follow a rule or use language. At the end we will attempt to settle this longstanding and significant dispute, by shedding some lights on the terms used by these antagonists such as Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language, essence and Crusoe.