Ma`rifat Falsafi
Year:2011 | Volume:8 | Issue:3 (31)|Papers Count:9

The problem of the relation between subject and object, and the criterion for truth, has been discussed in different philosophical schools. Plato explained realism on the basis of the world of ideas, the preexistence of soul, and knowledge as remembering. Aristotle sought the unification of subject and object in “immaterial forms”. In the world of Islamic philosophy, a belief in the separation between existence and quiddity led to an emphasis on quiddity and the problem become more pressing. Ibn Sina solved the problem by putting the burden of guarantying the truth of knowledge on the shoulders of God and the Active Intellect.The authors of is article try to show that Mulla Sadra has dealt with this issue is a different and more efficient way. He unifies subject and object of knowledge by a series of principles such as: principality of existence, gradation in the essence of existence, mental forms’ issuing subsistence to the soul, and intensifying movement of the soul. On the basis of these principles, he unites subject and object in the unitary objective reality of existence.

The concept of “existence”, and the way it is abstracted, is of great import for the theory of existential gradation in Hikmat Muta‘alyah. Since “existence” is one of secondary intelligibles, it becomes important to know how it occurs and how it is predicated. The main question, then is: what it means to occur and being predicated? What is the situation of the concept of existence as a secondary intelligible? What difference it makes in the discussion of existential gradation if one considered its occurrence as subjective vis-a-vis objective?This article reviews answers by Ayatollah Mesbah and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli to these questions, and examines how they put their marks on their approaches to the issue of existential gradation. The authors prefer arguing for the occurrence of secondary intelligibles by “the existence of the predicate” axiom, and believe that the argument from the concept of existence suffices for establishing gradation, and in this way, some disputes will end.

This article is an explanatory and analytic review on Ibn Sina’s philosophical view of religious experience. It is an attempt to answer some important epistemological questions about religious experience from Ibn Sina’s viewpoint. The main reference in this inquiry is his al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, in which he explains some of his distinctive ideas.The most notable points in this article include the following: the root of hallucinations on the one hand, and that of true visions on the other, the reason why (and how) some true intuitions need interpretation, the process of such occasions while one is asleep or awake, the role of illness and artificial tricks, the role of piety and moral regeneration, and the gradation and hierarchical levels of such experiences, as well as the cause for the contextuality of some (and not all) pseudo-sensory experiences.

One version of theological fatalism argues from God’s infallible foreknowledge in favor of fatalism. Its proponents believe that since God infallibly knows, beforehand, all that a person will do; therefore, one cannot do anything other than the one that God already knows. They conclude that human actions are not intentional.The authors in this article begin by explaining presumptions that almost all fatalists agree upon. Based on such assumptions, they try to come up with an argument as a basic argument for theological fatalism. And finally, they review the most important solutions and critiques of theological fatalism to map their places regarding the premises of such an argument.

Differentiating primary consciousness from superior one, Edelman explains the first by perceptual categorization and value-category memory, while explaining the latter by language. He explicates the connection between perceptions and the subject’s function by brain map as a phenomenological informational space. His idea leads to the rejection of modularity theory, the denial of the subject as a metaphysical entity, an instrumental approach to popular psychology, and a defense of scientific psychology. Edelman considers property dualism and explanatory gap to be pseudo-problems in the philosophy of mind without having right understanding of them.The authors criticize him on his explanation of primary consciousness by memory, because memory has nothing for representing without mental experiences. Furthermore, a subject cannot be explained merely by brain map, because any mental space is in need of a meta-space, and the brain map will never exist.

It is common place to consider feelings as private; but Wittgenstein disagrees. He believes such an idea leads to agnosticism and solipsism. According to the common understanding, feelings are private in two senses: 1. in an epistemological sense, which has two aspects: a) only an individual can know one’s own feelings; b) no one can know others’ feelings (Wittgenstein believes that the first aspect is meaningless and the second one is wrong). 2. The second sense is related to “having”, that is, each person has one’s own feelings; therefore, there are no similar feelings in two different persons (Wittgenstein insists that this sense is wrong too).This article tries to show that Wittgenstein considers the privacy of feelings a merely grammatical subject, without designating a private matter. Of course, he thinks that feelings can be private as far as they remain secrete and have no external expression.

The foundations of the human sciences play an important role in the theoretical as well as the practical life of the human being. The way a scholar views the human being determines many aspects of the human sciences, such as its subject matter, its methodology, and its functions. On the other hand, one’s behavior, beliefs, and even attitudes are influenced and strengthened by such a view. This is why it is vital to appraise those foundations in any critique of theories in the human sciences.This article tries to bring to light the anthropological foundations upon which Eric Fromm’s psychoanalytical theories are based. They are discussed in terms of humanism, the essence of humanity, alienation, human common nature, human and religion, and the perfect human being. These topics are finally compared and criticized on the basis of Islamic teachings.