Ayeneh Ma‘refat
Year:2008 | Volume:- | Issue:15|Papers Count:7

In dealing with the two different ascriptions of copulative existence, Mulla Sadra assumes a specific difference between one of the ascriptions of copulative existence and non-copulative existence. As his assumption seems incompatible with the unity of the concept of existence, commentators on his views have tried to justify the inconsistency and remove the ambiguity. Some of these commentators have expressed surprise and some others have confirmed Mulla Sadra's view by rejecting the value common between copulative and non-copulative existence. Still third groups have proposed the ultimate distance between the circumstances of existence based on the analogicity of existence. The diversity in concept is another justification for this claim. Allameh Tabatabai's view is different from Mulla Sadra's in the sense that he rejects the difference between copulative and non-copulative existence.In fact, copulative non-copulative existence as a distinction in the field of logics is different from the same distinction in philosophy. What Mulla Sadra has intended is the former distinction not the later.

'Divine will' is one of the most complicated philosophical and theological issues. Almost all Muslim philosophers and theologians are unanimous in attributing the property of will to God but their views differ on the ontological and conceptual features of this property. Some of them see divine will as an eternal and essential attribute which is ontologically identical to God, while for others it is a contingent attribute which lies somewhere out of God's essence. According to Mulla Sadra in Alhekmat Almotealiah (transcendental theosophy), God has will both as an essential and as an accidental property. In analyzing this concept, he, however, adopts a reductionist approach in the sense that his interpretation reduces God's essential will to the level of other essential properties such as His knowledge of the best possible order of the universe or love. Allamah Tabatabai challenges this reductionist view concluding that we are justified in believing in will as just an accidental and not an essential property. In this paper, the philosophical, theological and semantic grounds of Allamah Tabatabai's challenge are examined. The conclusion is that his view has created a substantial challenge for the reductionist view.

In a comparative study of ancient and modem logics, one of the most difficult issues is the existential import. Rejecting this assumption, modem logics has analyzed the quarter quantifieds in such a way that many of the propositions of ancient logics have lost their validity. In dealing with this issue, some have rejected the existential import of universals and some have blamed modem logic for its ignoring of this principle. With justifications or suggestions, third groups have tried to establish reconciliation between the two camps. The first groups, the followers of modem logic, have nothing to say about the intuitive force of existential import and the second groups have come empty-handed in dealing with the formal analysis and formulation of quarter quantifieds. The third groups who have made valuable efforts in both fields constitute the focus of the present article in which it is demonstrated that all efforts of this third group have also doomed to failure. Each suggestion made by this group has failed to solve all the problems and created new issues instead. The article concludes that the old dispute between the two camps is still open because logicians in Iran have not been able to provide satisfactory analyses of the quarter quantifieds consistent with the existential import and the language of modem logic.

From the Peripatetic philosophy perspective, imagination is a faculty dwelling in the vaporous spirit which has a materialistic but intangible nature. Accordingly, imaginal forms are material things and initiated somewhere in the brain. Arguing that it is impossible for something accessible to accommodate something inaccessible, Sohravardi opposes this statement stating that imaginal forms dwell in the world of images in suspense' which is somewhere between the material world and the world of Platonic ideas. He also considers imagination a material faculty which is just a condition for viewing the imaginal forms and not a location for those forms. In speculative Sufism, the world of 'images in suspense' that is imagination is called the 'connected or limited archetypal world' in the human body which is the shadow of the 'disconnected or absolute archetypal world' that is the world of Platonic Ideas. On the basis of the foundations of transcendent theosophy, the theory of 'transsubstantial motion' and the 'union of the knower and the known', Mulla Sadra for the first time argued for the immateriality of imagination and used this notion to explain issues such as the corporeal resurrection, the nature of revelation, and dream vision. In the present article we first refer to the views expressed in the Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminative philosophy and Speculative Mysticism on the immateriality of imagination. We next explain the ontological and psychogenetic bases of transcendental theosophy of Mulla Sadra so far as they are deemed necessary for understanding the immateriality of imagination. The classification and discussion of Mulla Sadra's arguments will follow. We then conclude the article with the implications of this notion for explaining a number of concepts such as the soul creativity, corporeal resurrection, imaginal world, revelation, dream vision, transcendent esoteric commentary, and the relation between the body and soul. Our view is that the notion of the immateriality of imagination, with its solid foundation and strong arguments is potentially capable of dealing with very important philosophical issues.

Some Muslim scholars have argued that the hereafter torment will come to an end and nobody will remain in endless torment, though they may be left in the hell forever. The reasons put forward by these scholars include the unlimited divine mercy, the monotheistic innate nature of human beings, and the possibility of the violation of the threat of punishment. In the present article, these arguments are presented and critically examined for their degree of validity.

The present article examines the principle of Adle (justice) from the Shiite's point of view. Compared with the other principles, justice is given a unique central position and an argument for unity and infallibility is inferred and put forward. The article then uses the prophet Mohammad's (PBUH) sayings as evidence for justice and as support for the answer to the basic questions of 'the man's expectations from religion' and concludes that the most justifiable expectation of a Shiite Muslim from religion is the very promise that religion has made and that is the realization of comprehensive justice, an interpretation which incorporates the other principles.

The holy Quran and the Old Testament have reported the occurrence of miracles concordant with the appearance of the prophets. A lot of experts in both religions have attempted to explain how this phenomenon occurred and how it is related to the system of the natural world. Some have considered miracle as the breach of the laws of nature by God while some others have interpreted it as the predominance of one law over another. Some theologians who have been sympathetic to mystic ideas have considered miracle as an internal experience by those claiming to have brought it including prophets and non-prophets, whereas some who have been affected by the recent scientific developments in the western world have identified it with normal events. The present article intends to present and discuss the views of one jewish scholar, Ibn Maymoon, and one Muslim scholar, Allameh Tababtabi, on the assumption that the views expressed by these two scholars on this issue are more valid ones.