Journal of Philosophical Investigations in Scopus
Year:2019 | Volume:13 | Issue:27 |Papers Count:20

Though thinking about culture returns to ancient Greece, "culture" as understood today is a modern concept influenced more by the speculations of the German thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries than ancient Greek thinkers. Despite the ideas of Rousseau, Diderot, Voltaire, Vico, Leibniz, and others, it can be shown that Johann Gottfried von Herder (1764-1803) was the first thinker that provided a metaphysical and philosophical grounding for culture. He portrayed the human being as essentially a cultural being. However, Herder does not have an independent book or treatise specifically about the "philosophy of culture" or even the meaning of culture. Consequently, the present paper tries to analyze how Herder's "philosophy of culture" implicitly emerges from his vast oeuvre by extracting his diverse and diffuse discussions about language, man, history, politics and culture; and, finally, its impact on the subsequent thinkers of this field, especially Hegel. Accordingly, this paper, regardless of its short introduction, has three main parts: First, the theoretical foundations of Herder's thoughts and his sources of inspiration; Second, Herder’ s philosophy of culture, extracted from a variety of his works and focusing on his critiques of Enlightenment; and third, examining Herder's influence on subsequent thinkers, focusing on the evolution of the concept of culture.

In this article, we have tried to show that subjectivism has emerged out of the ethics; it is intended to redeem the human from the fate of Gods and take him to autonomy. By Socrates, subjectivism as a war against the Gods starts with eliminating Dionysius and the dominance of Apollo. Plato develops subjectivism by resourcing to the Socratic equation of virtue and knowledge, and by declaring that knowledge just is of existent; but, inevitably, he admits a god who is single and transcendental. Subjectivism culminates in Neo-Platonist by transcending the being by God; but because of its alienation from the body, they have nothing to say but admitting embodying God, to acquire knowledge from the body. Descartes displaced subject with God; the rational element of body redeem as an extension. But the Cartesian subject is suspending between self-enslavement and the necessity of nature; Kant subjects the nature to the laws of understanding and redeems the subject by constructing him out of its autonomous style. He proposes the teleological aspect of the world, to ensure the freedom of subject in mechanical nature. Even though subjectivism culminates in Kant, but body, as the suppressed thing called noumenon to get lost from the outset: and Nietzsche’ s philosophy as the voice of this suppressed body, reduces the first and the second Critique to the third Critique and, thereby, denies the subjectivism which denies body and adopts the body-based perspectivism.

Transcendental ego is not only one of the essential elements in Kant’ s philosophical system, but also is the supreme principle in it. One way of deliberating the Problem of Transcendental is to investigate and analyze it from the negative point of view because a negative approach to some problems is an appropriate guide to the affirmative approach. In this article, first, we have compared the transcendental ego with the other cases such as metaphysical ego, empirical ego, mystical ego, physiological ego, and pragmatic ego. In this comparison, we showed that the transcendental ego is not similar to them. Second, we have pointed to some negative characteristics of transcendental ego as follows: 1-Transcendental ego is not an empirical subject. 2-It is not a concept. 3-It is not a representation. 4-It is not intuition. 5-It is not a category. 6-It has not any content. It lacks an ontological aspect.

There are two main sections in this paper. First, we will show that some of the chief 20th-century theories of science either have failed to demonstrate that value judgments do not influence the context of consolidation and determination of science or have accepted the role of value judgments in the context of consolidation and determination of science and theorized accordingly. For this purpose, the ideas of logical positivists, Willard Quine, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Roy Bhaskar on science are briefly reviewed. Finally, the validity of the following statement will be explored: if ‘ science is influenced by cognitive-normative foundations of A’ then ‘ the science based on cognitive-normative foundations of, say, B is possible. ’ Subsequently, the following question will be contemplated: is pluralism in Cognitive-normative foundations accepted methodologically? In this way, the final section includes ratification of the possibility of science associated with a particular worldview and goes on to explain the issues important in the argument in favor of such science.

Environmental degradation has become one of the biggest challenges of the contemporary world because of the bad consequences of mankind and it is nothing more important for the survival of the whole system of nature, including man. The first crisis started in the west, followed by modernity to the east at a global level. In Nasr's belief, this is a gradual nature. Scholars have developed solutions to solve the environmental crisis, often from environmental engineering. Without denying these solutions, he does not know the scientific method by itself as a problem solver, as it is believed that empirical science itself is responsible for this crisis. His post approach can be saved from these problems only by restoring the divine knowledge of nature. Some Muslim thinkers, however, have traditionally seen the tradition of use in contemporary times, believing that the Islamic tradition is a rich resource to explain the philosophy of science. The present study using descriptive-analytical method has been used to collect library data and this view is presented. The purpose of this study is to investigate the crisis in this research; however, the ethical principles on nature are strengthened and the need of a modern human to create a spiritual connection with nature is met. Accordingly, the theory can serve as a-valued solution.

Beauty is a metaphysical concept in Thomas. Such an attitude about beauty necessarily will relate it to the other philosophical concepts. It can be said that the understanding of beauty – which separated from Good-is impossible in the Hellenistic and middle ages thoughts-which are a kind of metaphysical one-because Beauty and Good are often enumerated as the objective properties of Beings in these thoughts. Thomas as other predecessors accepts the same idea about Beauty too and connects it with the Being. So we can enumerate beauty as one of the Transcendentals; one of which necessarily connect with Goodness; because the Transcendentals not only have connected with the Being but also with each other. Beauty, in Aquinas' philosophy, is an objective property and at the same time has connected with apprehension and with the soul too. Because of this, the appetitive power of the soul will owe the beauty by the mediation of the intelligence.

Cancer is one of the leading causes of death in the world. The characteristics of resistance to treatment and its rapid progress are the high mortality rate reasons. Patients who have been diagnosed with the disease are losing their selfawareness, which itself has a negative effect on the treatment process. However, it seems that such patients need to be considered on depressive disorders even after complete treatment of cancer. After receiving the bad news of cancer; patient, his/her family, be anxious. They initiate the patient's support until the end of the treatment period, without attention to such sudden support's adverse effects. The aim of the present study is to survey of cancer treatment and care's phenomenological and descriptive situations of the philosophy of medicine and psychology point of view. Post-disease disorder has a fundamental relationship with this fundamental situation.

This article is about the dispute between existentialism and physicalism concerning the in/authenticity of the human being's thought and freedom. It deals with the impossibility of reducing human thought, practice, choice, and decision to their physical, biological, brain-based or neurological aspects. In other words, the way of thinking which can be called naturalism, materialism, or physicalism based on different criteria (from seventeenth-century until twentieth century) tries to interpret human existence (“ soul” in the mythological language of Plato, “ transcendental imagination” in Kant’ s philosophy, “ existence” in Kierkegaard’ s thought and existentialism and “ Dasein” in Heidegger’ s view) as a product of physical, natural or material processes and does not regard human freedom of choice as authentic (or irreducible) but as a secondary product of biological natural phenomena. This article claims that the main matter of the dispute is not specifically determined in the debate between physicalism or reductionism on the one hand and the philosophers believing in existence or Dasein on the other hand. This vagueness has caused the discussion about the theoretical challenge not to undergo a smooth path. In order to make clear the exact parameters of the central matter of dispute, I try to challenge the fundamentals of physicalism.

The absence of a separate entry or section on “ truth” in the Critique of Pure Reason, the presence of some ambiguous, complicated and problematic-interpretable expressions and utterances in some parts of that work, and the formation of some extreme contradictory interpretations concerning these utterances on the part of some of Kant’ s commentators, are the most important obstacles encountered by contemporary Kantian scholars in presenting a unitary, coherent and transparent view of Kant’ s theory of truth. Hence, the question about the nature of truth in Critique of Pure Reason has become a fundamental problem among Kantian scholars. The present paper, without undue adhering to one of the two extreme common interpretations on Kant’ s theory of truth (which one of them has considered Kant to be advocate of traditional correspondence theory of truth and the other has taken him as the founder of coherence theory of truth), and only by analyzing Kant’ s new conception of “ judgment” as an epistemic (and not logical) relation between representations emphasizes this important point that the general structure of Critique of Pure Reason requires that the traditional correspondence theory of truth not be entirely abandoned and not completely preserved in its traditional form. In other words, by revising and completing the traditional correspondence theory of truth, the Critique established the foundations of a new conception of truth that can be called “ transcendental correspondence theory of truth” . According to this new conception, truth is a condition without which a judgment or cognition cannot correspond with its object and consequently cannot have objective validity; The constituent representations of a judgment could become true knowledge or objective empirical judgment only when they are synthesized in accordance with possible experience (i. e. universal a priori rules or principles of experience).

One of the most famous criticisms for Avicenna's criticizers is about his opinion for the general acceptance of ethical propositions. On the other hand, he emphasizes that they are intelligible. They say that if they are generally accepted by persons, so they will be relative and conventional. But based on the principle of peripatetic philosophy his opinion will be a self-contradiction. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers emphasis that general acceptance of them in his view has belonged to the logical status of them. And the intelligibility of them has belonged to the epistemological position of them. But in this essay, it will be shown that the epistemological situation of the ethical proposition has a necessary relation to the logical position of them. On the other hand, if they will be intelligible so they can't be relativistic, but they were achieved from the social convention. So the sharp conflict could be recognized in Avicenna's ethical opinions.

Fictional objects like “ Hamlet” or “ Rostam” pose many problems for Logicians and thinkers theorizing about perception. The problem lies in the fact that, on the one hand, we think and speak about these objects and, on the other hand, we can’ t find them in our world. Two groups are theorizing this issue. Proponents of the first group think that there are not any fictional object; they are just words. The others find these objects indispensable and they work on the ontology of them. The latter thinkers offer different views on the ‘ mode of being’ of fictional objects. But these two groups have faced some problems. However, Roman Ingarden sees the main problem in ignoring one of the possible modes of being. He shows that fictional objects are “ purely intentional objects” depending first and foremost on conscious acts and also on some physical or ideal object. In this paper, we offer the ideas of the abovementioned groups and then propose Ingarden’ s views.

By separating the semiotic and the symbolic, Kristeva seeks to bring the semiotic chora back to the realm of politics. Chora includes the libidinal force belonging to the mother-child relationship, which at the same time that it has propagated the components of the symbolic realm, has always been suppressed. Kristeva regards this repression as the basis of all the repressions and wants to restrain the authority by returning to this suppressed affair. Here, the repressed affair itself does not return, but it should be backed up by profound psychoanalysis. Kristeva calls this a revolt and thus revealing the deep relationship between macropolitics and micropolitics by giving a political character to it. We will introduce this psychoanalytic understanding of the political affair as corpopolitics. As we will show, corpopolitics seeks to prevent matricide, and this is the most original political act; because, according to us, matricide is the root of all violence and repression. So we shall propose a new reading of Kristeva’ s political thoughts.

One of the logical requirements of welcoming to rational dialogue between religious traditions is, at least, avoiding of exclusivism towards own religious tradition. Since the logical requirement regarding confronting with other religions’ facts and realities is to desacralize own religious teachings, accept the possibility of some realities in other religious traditions and some mistakes in our religious tradition. Religious exclusivism, but, is as the most significant obstacle concerning such rational impetuously action. Because the crucial religious presupposition of exclusivism is restricting of truthness and salvation in our religious tradition, and other religious tradition were/are deviated from them. Such thinking has trained its followers needless to recognize rationally other religions and independence of listening to their realities and has persuaded its believers to invite others, as unbelievers, to own religion through using some software methods, like religious missionaries or hardware methods like sacred war. So religious exclusivist has no ear to listen and no eye to see other religions realities. Hence, based on religious exclusivism, logical and rational dialogue between religious traditions is impossible. The strategy for exiting of this crises is leaving exclusivism and to desacralize of our religious teachings and welcoming to some truths that maybe exist in other religions, as well as our religious tradition.

Ethics is one of the main concerns of Wittgenstein in his writings from 1916 to the time of publication of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. He explicates the notion of “ good” in terms of “ happiness” and defines the latter as “ accepting the world as it is. ” Obviously, this reductionistic philosophical program could not get off the ground unless there is a pretty clear conception of the notion of “ acceptance of/being in agreement with the world. ” In this paper, I shall explore two alternative accounts of this concept. According to the first account, which I dub “ the actual world hypothesis, ” Wittgenstein had meant accepting the actual world by the term “ being good. ” The alternative account, “ the substance of the world hypothesis, ” suggests accepting the substance of the world as the best reading of the Tractatus. Morris and Graver have endorsed the actual world hypothesis, as opposed to the substance of the world hypothesis. In this paper, I try to show that they fail to provide good arguments for the former and against the latter. Additionally, I borrow ideas from McGuinness to illustrate “ accepting the substance of the world” in a way that it avoids Graver’ s objections. I argue that acceptance of the world ought to be interpreted as “ acceptance of/being in agreement with the fact that the world exists. ” Finally, I shall point out that despite his insight about the acceptance of the world, McGuinness misrepresents the relation between accepting the actual world and accepting its substance.

The scientific explanation is usually defined as finding the cause. For some reasons, this has been a subject of doubt, however, it seems that, both in common sense as well as in philosophical approach, the mainstream still support the very Idea of explanation something as introducing its cause. But cause searching and cause finding are not so easy tasks. This Article is for corroborating the idea according to which the essential tension in scientific research is derived from the practical difficulty of distinguishing a complex netting of causes, not from the theoretical disfunction of causality. Multiplicity, variety, interaction, and dynamism of causes and factors intervening in a causal process constitute oftentimes a perplexing netting in which it is difficult, sometimes practically impossible, to distinguish, dissociate, evaluate, and calculate vectors effective on final resultant and explain or predict the output or the effect the process in question has. Not paying enough attention to it leads mistakenly to doubt about causality itself. The problem is pragmatic, not paradigmatic.

This essay considers the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’ s pre-critical thinking doesn’ t have a systematic philosophical form. The reasons can be sought out in these two things are: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’ t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and it is a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’ s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in the critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom.

Sina's philosophy after Farabi's philosophy, with an accurate search of the views of the ancient Greek scholars, is the basis of Islamic philosophy and one of the foundations of transcendental wisdom. The relation between Sina and Sadra's philosophy is still susceptible to numerous thematic studies. In this research, the views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra have been studied comparatively regarding octet vertices. Among the octet vertices, there is an emphasis on the importance of four subjects: "the definition of philosophy and its importance", "fundamentals and problems of philosophy", "the position of philosophy among other sciences", and "the benefit and place of philosophy ". The views of these two philosophers on the octet vertices of philosophy (as an introduction to philosophy and some of the outside looking into philosophy) are largely linear and compatible, although there are some disagreements. In many cases, Sadra had a viewpoint about Ibn Sina's opinions and was largely criticized and analyzed from Sina's viewpoint. and in spite of Sina's supreme power of philosophy, he has sometimes been forced to use transcendental wisdom because of its conceptual failure; therefore, it can be said that not only at the entrance of philosophy but also in philosophical opinions, if the prophetic power of Sina's philosophy is combined with the conceptual richness of transcendental wisdom, we will have a more powerful and effective philosophical heritage for the contemporary philosophical dialogue.

or the establishment of the fundamental ontology, early Heidegger disregards the vulgar understanding of time and analyzes temporality. He believes that the vulgar understanding of time is the degeneration of the world-time, and the world-time itself is the degeneration of temporality. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets temporality as the ontological sense of care. Here, this three-part phrase is relied on to interpret temporality in the thought of Heidegger. The ontological counteracts the ontic. The ontic investigation is one that considers the entity present-at-hand and determined. But the ontological investigation focuses on the how-being of an entity that is always anticipating itself by projecting itself upon its possibilities. The sense is not what is revealed at the end of the understanding act; but is what wherein the understandability of something maintains itself, namely, the condition for the possibility of understandability of a thing. Care implies what gives totality and unity to the structural aspects of Dasein. Care, which is the sense of Dasein’ s being, is constituted through three items including existence, facticity, and fallenness. Temporality is the ontological sense of care; namely, the condition for the possibility of its understandability. Heidegger analyzes authentic existence to explain this word. The ontological structure of authentic existence is the anticipatory resoluteness towards death. The resolute existence that anticipates to death shows itself in the three ecstasies futurity, having-been, and making-present. Each of these three ecstasies is respectively the sense of one of the items of care. Hence, temporality in its unity is the ontological sense of care.