Avicennian Philosophy Journal
Year:2020 | Volume:24 | Issue:63 |Papers Count:19

In the second part of Science of logic, the logic of essence, Hegel discussed categories with common characters. In fact, some of them are explanatory of modes of essence that Avicenna has already paid attention to. Focusing on the truth of being as modes of quiddity or essence, how to unite them in the external world, as well as the negative and reflective mode of essence pave the way to compare the issue with Avicenna's thoughts. There is no doubt that Hegel was influenced by the Aristotelian – theological tradition. Topics such as attribution of existence to the essence and also plurality in essence are the consequences of the essence of negative and reflective mode. On the other hand, Hegel has transformed logic into metaphysics. Therefore, the significance of essence in metaphysics and their exclusion from the logic are common grounds in Avicenna and Hegel's thoughts.

Suhrawari’ s syllogistic is based upon the three reductions: (1) the reduction of the negative propositions to positive ones by obversion, (2) the reduction of the particular propositions to universal ones by exposition, and (3) the reduction of the contingent and impossible propositions to necessary ones by definite necessity. Thus, the four moods of the first figure may be reduced to one mood, the four moods of the second figure may be reduced to another one, and the six moods of the third figure may be reduced to a third mood. from these three moods, the first is self-evident in its validity. But Suhrawardi proves the validity of the other two moods by two illuminationistic rules. I will show in this article that Suhrawardi is indebted to Avicenna in all these respects. Obversion is borrowed from Avicenna’ s al-Mukhtasar al-Awsat; exposition is an Aristotelian method which Avicenna applies in all of his logical works; the definite necessity and one of the two illuminationistic rules are adopted from his al-Shifa’ : Kitab al-Qiyas; and the other illuminationistic rule is extracted from his al-Najat. So Ziai and Walbridge’ s opinion that Suhrawardi’ s Syllogistic is a sharp divergence from Avicenna’ s Syllogistic will be wrong.

The structure of justification is one of the important subjects of epistemology. There are various views, on this problem, in which infinitism is one of them. This view was known since Aristotle's time and was declined by philosophers constantly. Avicenna, too, opposes the view, although different from Aristotle. In this inquiry, we, with an analytical-critical approach, explain and criticize Avicenna's objections to infinitism and indicate that his arguments do not reach an end. Avicenna poses three main objections: first, infinitism implicates that no knowledge is obtained; second, its requisite is that the restricted some stands equal to restricting whole, which is impossible; third, its requisite is that some principles of demonstration be unknown. But Avicenna's arguments are based on three presuppositions which are at stake: first, justification is of concepts that have not degrees, rather it is univocal; second, arguments are transferor of justification and not a generator of it; third, if the regress of our arguments is to come about knowledge, its components must be disciplined one after another and be gathered in existence and be actual. In addition, his second argument apart from these presuppositions is still corrupted.

In various works of Ibn Sina, there are a number of scattered topics about the subject of pleasure. One of those topics is the definition of pleasure that needs to be thoroughly reviewed in order to achieve a coherent vision. In this paper, we will explore two ways to explore pleasure quiddity: One is through the classification of the six definitions based on the discussion of which each definition is expressed under it; another by examining the terms used in the definitions. These two methods bring us closer to the better understanding of Avicenna's vision. The first way leads us to the conclusion that the structure of definitions differs according to its subject. With regard to various structures, Ibn Sina has introduced various definitions for various purposes. However, we conclude from the second method that Ibn Sina's view of pleasure is a unitary and coherent viewpoint, because with the use of components such as "perception" and "proper" that constitute the core of all definitions, all the definitions They have a lexical and conceptual harmony

Maritain, a twentieth century Neo-Thomist philosopher, who criticizes modern philosophy and believes in returning to Thomas's views on all philosophical subjects, introduces the pillars of human knowledge as object (the mental form), external thing, and subject (the knower). He criticizes the views of some modern philosophers on knowledge, arguing that the knowledge of the self cannot be the basis for other human sciences, as Descartes puts it, or, as some existentialists believe, it is the main subject of philosophy. Maritain said this knowledge which is called "subjectivity", is later than other sciences due to its understanding as to the subject of other objects, and it is not basically through the object; In the sense that man, after knowing other things, realizes that he is the subject of all objects, and therefore has a different position and application from other human knowledge. This knowledge is equivalent to the knowledge of the self in Avicenna’ s views, and accordingly one can create a dialogue between him and Maritain about "knowing itself" in order to reveal its points, as well as to show that the Avicennian views are up-to-date. On the other hand, Maritain regards the place and application of this knowledge as a basis for esoteric contemplation and mystical knowledge, in which he goes beyond the views of Thomas and enters the mystical tradition. In this position, Maritain seems to be strongly influenced by Avicenna’ s mystical views, in addition to the mystical Christian tradition.

One of the interpretive tendencies of commentators to understand the Qur'an is philosophical interpretation. The most important feature of philosophical commentary is the reliance on general philosophical principles and the use of definite arguments. As we read through the course of philosophical thought, Ibn Sina was the first Muslim philosopher to write commentary on some verses and suras of the Qur'an in the sense of the exegesis. Considering the epistemological nature of the revelation, relying on the position of the Qur'an as the source of knowledge and the esoteric explanation of the verses are the most important foundations of Ibn Sina in the interpretation of the Qur'an. The presence of Qur'anic verses in Ibn Sina's philosophical system is sometimes adapted as a reason, sometimes as a confession and sometimes as a reason. By delving into Ibn Sina's exegetical works, we find that his explanations of the Qur'an can not be termed as interpretations in the absolute sense, nor in the whole of comparative interpretation. In interpreting the Word of Revelation, he sometimes interprets the Qur'an in a rational way, using the correct rules and interpretative sources. Sometimes he uses a comparative interpretation to impose his philosophical views on the Qur'anic verses, which in some cases constitute an exegesis of the interpretation of the vote. In the present study, after explaining the dual approaches in evaluating philosophical commentaries, while extracting Ibn Sina's interpretive foundations, we will study the methodology of his interpretive works based on the interpretation criteria of the study.

For the first time in Farabi's work, the subject of "the excess of existence over nature" has entered into the field of metaphysical discussions and has found a high position in Ibn Sina's philosophy. Ibn Sina's interpretation of the "prosody of existence" was first used to explain this relationship, and philosophers after him became ambiguous, prompting some to consider existence to be an external transcendence. This is the relationship between existence and nature, which we have called the "mental metaphor of cargo. " The relationship between existence and nature, like other common compounds in Aristotelian philosophy, is similar to the relation between subject and image. In contrast, critics of this view, given the constraints posed by this type of attitude, believe in the mental excess of existence over nature. From the point of view of a mental exaggeration, rational second existence is logical, and outside has no meaning. But in the meantime, and as a result of the innovations created by Sheikh Ishraq in philosophy, Mulla Sadra has expressed another attitude about existence and the relationship between it and nature. Mulla Sadra describes the descriptions that Sheikh Ishraq had written in real light through tangible light. Therefore, from his point of view, existence and nature are similar to "limits and limitations" and again the theory of external excess is introduced in a new form in which the problems of external excess of peripatetic are eliminated.

There has always been a deep link between the possibility of self-experience and the proof of "self" existence. Some philosophers, like Hume, have inferred that "self" cannot exist because it cannot be experienced. Now, in this paper we review Searle''''s "formal self" theory and state that in spite of his denial of experimentable self, he believes in some kind of formal and linguistic self to provide the meaning of some philosophical statements. Then, by probing Avicenna''''s writings, it turns out he believes that self-awareness is evident, non-obtainable, ipso facto, and can be used to prove self. Besides, he accepts that it is possible to ignore this evident thing and only real cogitators are able to appreciate themselves in colorless and formless scheme. On the other hand, Avicenna gives many language founding proofs to support the idea of experimentability of "self" which can be regarded as common line of him and Searle and can present his role in contemporary philosophy. Finally, we try to adapt affirmative and privative statements of Avicenna about experimentability of self. The main aim of this paper is to relate two philosophers of two schools – one denies self-awareness explicitly and the other suppose it evident.

The issues of Avicenna's philosophy begin with the topicality of being qua being; in the works of Avicenna, the human mind can draw the actualized external existence away into two distinct concepts of existence and whatness. Later this basic question was raised: Which one of the two concepts mentioned in the work of Sheikh is objective and which one is ideational. The following analytical-critical research, while explaining the conceptual principles, is looking for an answer to the question; is the distinction between the existence and the quiddity (whatness) an ontological question or is it merely an epistemological argument? Thus, by analyzing and critiquing recent articles on the field of Avicenna's belief about the question that what is the reality: the primacy of existence or primacy of quiddity is concluded that this argument-the question of the primacy of existence or quiddity-has no place here; Because these two have an identity with each other in the objective world; So with no external changes, talking about the fundamentality of existence and ontological fundamentality of quiddity is merely an epistemological problem. So in Avicenna's work, actualized external existent is a reality and in that sense it is authentic; so, it is separated into existence and quiddity in the mind of the perceiver.

The issues of Avicenna's philosophy begin with the topicality of being qua being; in the works of Avicenna, the human mind can draw the actualized external existence away into two distinct concepts of existence and whatness. Later this basic question was raised: Which one of the two concepts mentioned in the work of Sheikh is objective and which one is ideational. The following analytical-critical research, while explaining the conceptual principles, is looking for an answer to the question; is the distinction between the existence and the quiddity (whatness) an ontological question or is it merely an epistemological argument? Thus, by analyzing and critiquing recent articles on the field of Avicenna's belief about the question that what is the reality: the primacy of existence or primacy of quiddity is concluded that this argument-the question of the primacy of existence or quiddity-has no place here; Because these two have an identity with each other in the objective world; So with no external changes, talking about the fundamentality of existence and ontological fundamentality of quiddity is merely an epistemological problem. So in Avicenna's work, actualized external existent is a reality and in that sense it is authentic; so, it is separated into existence and quiddity in the mind of the perceiver.

Understanding Quranic verses from a philosophical perspective is one of the conventional methods among Muslim commentators. The method's main features consist of relying on the general metaphysical principles and employing argumentative reasoning to disclose the verses. Studying various philosophical thoughts reveals that Ibn Sina is the first philosopher who presents philosophical interpretation on a variety of verses and chapters of the Holy Quran in the true sense of the word. Understanding the epistemic nature of divine revelation and certainty in perception of revelation as well as addressing the holy Quran as the ultimate source of knowledge and esoteric interpretation of the verses are his main basic thoughts in interpreting the Holy Quran. Also, in his philosophical works, Ibn Sina refers to the Quranic verses as examples, causes, or adaptations. Reviewing Ibn Sina's interpretive works indicates that his interpretation would be considered as neither Tafsī r (conventional exegesis) nor entirely Ta’ wī l (esoteric interpretation). In his commentaries, he employs argumentative reasoning based on accurate principles and valid sources of Quranic commentaries. However, he sometimes imposes his philosophical views through his esoteric interpretation to disclose the verses and this would be an example of arbitrary interpretation. Thus, in the current inquiry, first I review the recent approaches of studying philosophical interpretations. Then, extracting his interpretive basis of disclosing Quranic verses, I would discuss Ibn Sina's method in his Quranic exegetical works according to the principles of scientific investigation in this field.

In the second part of Science of logic, the logic of essence, Hegel discussed categories with common characters. In fact, some of them are explanatory of modes of essence that Avicenna has already paid attention to. Focusing on the truth of being as modes of quiddity or essence, how to unite them in the external world, as well as the negative and reflective mode of essence pave the way to compare the issue with Avicenna's thoughts. There is no doubt that Hegel was influenced by the Aristotelian – theological tradition. Topics such as attribution of existence to the essence and also plurality in essence are the consequences of the essence of negative and reflective mode. On the other hand, Hegel has transformed logic into metaphysics. Therefore, the significance of essence in metaphysics and their exclusion from the logic are common grounds in Avicenna and Hegel's thoughts.

The structure of justification is one of the important subjects of epistemology. There are various views, on this problem, in which infinitism is one of them. This view was known since Aristotle's time and was declined by philosophers constantly. Avicenna, too, opposes the view, although different from Aristotle. In this inquiry, we, with an analytical-critical approach, explain and criticize Avicenna's objections to infinitism and indicate that his arguments do not reach an end. Avicenna poses three main objections: first, infinitism implicates that no knowledge is obtained; second, its requisite is that the restricted some stands equal to restricting whole, which is impossible; third, its requisite is that some principles of demonstration be unknown. But Avicenna's arguments are based on three presuppositions which are at stake: first, justification is of concepts that have not degrees, rather it is univocal; second, arguments are transferor of justification and not a generator of it; third, if the regress of our arguments is to come about knowledge, its components must be disciplined one after another and be gathered in existence and be actual. In addition, his second argument apart from these presuppositions is still corrupted.

Human beings experience every kind of emotion in their everyday lives. Traditionally, emotions are categorized as negative or positive. People, however, tend to escape, disengage from, or avoid the latter type. Emotions are studied from philosophical, biological, and psychological perspectives. On the other hand, al-Rā zī and Ibn Sina are two Muslim scholars who discussed the grief and sorrow disorders in their philosophy. Comparing their works reveals that al-Rā zī applies Plato's moral philosophy, therefore his main focus is on health and well-being. He considers both physical and psychological aspects. In his view, grief and sorrow are unpleasant. Also, the lack of balance in humors and stability of thoughts are the direct causes of raising such strong emotions. Keeping the balance in humors, anti-negativity, and restoration of stability of thoughts are the treatments al-Rā zī suggests in Kitā b al-Ṭ ibb al-rū ḥ ā nī (Book of Spiritual Medicine). Inspired by Aristotle's moral philosophy, Ibn Sina follows the approach of perfectionism. Treating the disorder of grief and sorrow, he goes beyond bodily health issues and admits that moral and psychological treatments are more effective. Apart from the restoration of stability of thoughts and emotions, he is of the opinion that prayers and pilgrimage play a significant role in coping with grief and sorrow.

Avicenna and Suhrawardi have brief and scattered discussions about the issue of pleasure in their various works. One of those topics is the views of the two thinkers on the quiddity of pleasure. Thus, the purpose of this paper is a comparative study of pleasure from viewpoints of the heads of the two schools of Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy and according to their epistemological and ontological bases. The problem of pleasure is a small part of the epistemic network of the two schools of Peripateticism and Illuminationism. Therefore, to get a better understanding and a deeper perception of the issue, it is necessary to review other aspects of the network, such as the basis of their philosophy. One of the implications of this study is to understand the reason that Ibn Sina distinct between transcendent and human pleasure, while there is no such distinction in Suhrawardi's philosophy, due to their difference in the issue of existence and perception of quiddity in their philosophical systems. Another implication is that although 'perception' and 'appropriate'(agreeable to one's nature) are consistent and repetitive terms in definitions of pleasure, given the epistemological and ontological differences of the two schools in their explanation, we come to a different understanding of pleasure. The most important of these differences are: from the epistemological perspective in Peripateticism, the emphasis is on knowledge by acquaintance. According to Illuminationism, however, the perception is based on the knowledge by presence. Also, the basis of ontology in Peripatetic philosophy is existence, but in the philosophy of illumination, the basis is light.

There has always been a deep link between the possibility of self-experience and the proof of "self" existence. Some philosophers, like Hume, have inferred that "self" cannot exist because it cannot be experienced. Now, in this paper, we review Searle's "formal self" theory and state that in spite of his denial of experimentable self, he believes in some kind of formal and linguistic self to provide the meaning of some philosophical statements. Then, by probing Avicenna's writings, it turns out he believes that self-awareness is evident, non-obtainable, ipso facto, and can be used to prove self. Besides, he accepts that it is possible to ignore this evident thing and only real cogitators are able to appreciate themselves in the colorless and formless scheme. On the other hand, Avicenna gives many language founding proofs to support the idea of experimentability of "self" which can be regarded as a common line of him and Searle and can present his role in contemporary philosophy. The main aim of this paper is to relate two philosophers of two schools-one denies self-awareness explicitly and the other suppose it evident.

According to Avicenna's philosophy, it is the type of our conceptions that leads to the assent of the nature of the world in the way we understand it. Avicenna states two types of conceptions: those whose source is the cognition of the intelligible, and those whose source is all the levels of human's cognition other than the intellectual faculty. These two types of conception pave the way for the construction of two types of worlds: rational and imaginative. Man acts in the world based on his cognition of it. The action based on rational cognition of the world is rational and forms a moral world for us. But the action based on irrational cognition of the world forms an immoral world for Avicenna's audience. This article seeks to clarify how these two moral and immoral worlds are formed in front of Avicenna's audiences and show that their formation depends on their cognition of the world. The development of various imaginations in mind and how they are formed are different in different people due to their level of cognition. This leads to the formation of two types of the moral and immoral world in different people.

In logic, Avicenna recognizes a set of words-such as priority and posteriority-that have differences in being predicated on their individuals and are graded concepts. He calls such words" absolute graded" and introduces another set as "relative graded". From his examples and statements that he applied in the discussions, we concluded that: relative graded is a set of words whose individuals are common in relation to a source or end, but differ in terms of proximity and distance from that source or end. Despite absolute graded that is in existence, this type belongs to quiddities. In this study, we would explain and analyze the absolute and relative gradation in Avicenna's view and their role in Islamic philosophy and logic. Also, we would examine the criteria and principles of these two types of gradation.

Avicenna has provided a solution to the problem of abstraction plurality of the unit. In order to eliminate problems such as plurality in the divine essence and abstraction plurality from the unit, he must first solve the problem of plurality in Properties. Unlike theologians, he believes in the identity of essence with Properties and the identity of Properties with Properties. And he believes that the divine essence, in terms of example and concept, is the same as his knowledge, and his knowledge is the same as his power, and his power is the same as his will. And this approach is based on the Assumption that it is impossible to abstract plural concepts from an example that is simple in all respects. With the analytical-rational method based on comments, it is concluded that Avicenna for run away from the problem of abstraction plurality from the unit, tries to eliminate the plurality in essence by preserving the attribution of Properties to the God by believing in the semantic synonymy of Properties with essence and Properties with Properties. Despite the belief in the innovativeness and importance of Avicenna's view, this view faces criticism That One of them is the neglect of emphasizing the conceptual differences between Properties due to the importance of diversity and multiplicity and function of divine attributes.