Shinakht
Year:2022 | Volume:14 | Issue:2|Papers Count:12

Emmanuel Kant holds multiple and sometimes contradictory views on political thought, so that in different periods of his thinking, we are faced with different political approaches. Since in the face of each of his different anthropological approaches we are confronted with a different political thought in relation to it, it seems that Kant changes the fate of his political thought with the idea he finds in each period about anthropology. In his first approach, he looks only at man as a species, and explains the history of his development on the basis of providential or natural history, in such a way that man does not rely on his own will in the formation of political society, but occurs naturally. However, his view of man in moral thought is accompanied by a complex dialectic of the law of reason, will, and freedom, and is essentially defined by autonomy. The last case goes back to the critique of the power of judgment, which relates to people who together benefit from common sense. For those who even need each other to think and judge, this will go back to the aesthetic judgment that is formed in the imagination and not in the intellect.

Epistemologists in various theories of epistemic justification attempt to respect the intuition that lies at the new evil demon problem. One of the most important problems that external theory has in justification is the conflict of these theories with the intuition that lies in the new evil demon problem. Recently, Moon has tried to raise this problem against moderate internalists by argument. If Moon’s argument is correct, most internalists face the same problem. In this article, I discuss and evaluate Moon’s argument and the answer given to it in defense of internalism. While examining this issue, I increase the accuracy of the internalists’ response to this problem. In addition, I show that Moon’s argument against internalists is not correct.

Parmenides and Xenon’s argument for denying motion turned this issue from its obvious form into a theoretical one for the first time. Aristotle showed the possibility of motion with the theory of force and action, but did not offer an argument for the existence of motion. Many philosophers after him, without mentioning the issue of acknowledging the external existence of motion, seem to have taken its externality for granted. Ibn Sina considered the argument for the external objectivity of motion to be metaphysical, yet he made no attempt to prove the external existence of motion. However, we can derive arguments from all of his works and ideas to prove the objectivity of motion. In this article, the theory of grace has been used as an argument for the objectivity of motion. Since grace is the permanence of the divine act, and hindering the series of causes is impossible, the occurrence of time is the same as motion. In other words, the continuity of divine grace is nothing but movement. This movement has manifested itself in material objects. His view of time and its relation to objects is also presented as another argument for proving the externality of motion. Ibn Sina considers the existence of time as a proof of the existence of objects.

e objects through the essential definition. Definition in Avicenna is based on the acceptance of the essences and the adaptation of the known in-itself to the known by accident, and this problem is also from ranches of the acquired knowledge. Ibn-e Sina, in some of his works, considers the truths of objects to be beyond human power, and say essential definition is not only difficult, but also impossible. The problem here is that the refusal of true knowledge of objects by insisting on mentioning the essence in the definition is incompatible. Because mentioning the essence in the definition is based on knowing them. Why this inconsistency in Ibn Sina’s view and finding the answer is the task of this article. The analytical conclusion of this article is that Ibn Sina is basically talking about two encounters with the truth of things in order to acquire knowledge, and therefore there is no contradiction between Ibn Sina’s two views. The first encounter is for a human being who is accustomed to the perception of the senses and is therefore deprived of receiving the truth of things and will not attain anything but some of the prerequisites of the truth of the objects. Ibn Sina considers this knowledge to be in accordance with acpects of objects. In contrast, he is a human being who, by passing through worldly and corporeal attachments, acquires the ability to receive the truth of objects. Ibn Sina considers this knowledge to be a complete correspondence.

The first philosophy or metaphysics is the most fundamental knowledge. All knowledge need it not only in their longitudinal series but also its concepts are introduced to them and it has made them internally dependent on itself. The main concepts of metaphysics are three: existence, nothing and quiddity. It is not possible to conceive or acknowledge any topics of metaphysics without the presence of these three concepts. Philosophies have usually focused more on existence and quiddity, ignoring nothingness. Hence, nothingness and its discussions are subordinate in philosophical books. In this article, I show the contribution of nothingness to the order of metaphysics and its discussions. After showing the position of recognizing nothingness in issues of epistemology, theology and cosmology, a plan for a metaphysics of nothingness is proposed that completes the metaphysic of existence and quiddity. The result of this research is the need to recognize nothingness and its properties in metaphysics and consequently in

n most of his writings about the influence of Husserl’s views on his thought and his indebtedness to his works. He considers the clarification of his philosophical meaning to be the main problem of Phenomenology and characterized his work in terms of Phenomenology in the style of “thinking with Husserl against him”. On the other hand, intentionality doctrine, which is Brentano’s great and important legacy, is the main part of Husserl’s Phenomenology. Intentionality means that consciousness is focused on something and every thought or idea is directed towards something. By transcending the issues of consciousness, Heidegger’s intentionality ties it to lived experience and transforms it into “life toward something”. This article is an analytical account of Heidegger’s critique and rethinking of Husserl’s intentionality,and discusses how Heidegger, according to the works of his master in his lectures and writings about intentionality, extends his ontological circle, and also thinks against him while his progress is in line with Husserl’s plan. The result of Heidegger’s rethinking is to replacement the Dasein by consciousness and intentionality, the path to understanding Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Accordingly, in order to develop Heidegger’s method, intentionality explains Husserl’s narrative as “being-with”, and emphasizes the understanding of intentionality based on the transcendence of Dasein’s role.

Problematization is an important concept in Foucault’s thoughts and one that plays a fundamental role throughout his historical analyzes. He sees problematization as a special interpretation of signs. On the other hand, in his analyzes, he equates the importance of art in interpreting history with other fields. The main issue of the present study is how the problematization in his thoughts is related to art. To address this issue, first the place of this concept in Foucault’s thought was examined and then with the help of the sections by which he has analyzed works of art, the relationship between art and this concept was examined. The result was that Foucault used the concept of problematization in two senses, In the first sense, it refers to a historical matter that has been problematized by knowledge and power, In the second sense for him, it is the problematization of a philosophical-historical activity by which “the history of present” is analyzed. Studies have shown that in his historical analysis, art as a strategy of knowledge or technique of power problematizes various issues. For Foucault, on the other hand, the analysis of some works of art is a philosophical activity to problematize the history of present. Accordingly, art has a direct and internal relationship with the two meaning of problematization.

The possibility of the system and its will as a way of rediscovering human the being is characteristic of the modern age. In Schelling’s Treaties on the Essence of Human Freedom (1936), Heidegger, by asking what the system is and comparing it to German idealism, considers the conditions necessary for the formation of the system in order to understand the intellectual foundation of the modern age. Through the concept of the system, the jointure of which is determined on the basis of mathematical order and subjective foundations, Heidegger uses the concept of the system as the jointure of the order of being. Research on the formation of the system and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom is also the main issue of Schelling in his treatise on The Philosophical Studies of the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). The purpose of this research is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of system by emphasizing the principle of identity in Schelling’s system of freedom. The present article considers two questions: How does Schelling’s attempt to eliminate the existing misinterpretations of this principle in the various interpretations of the pantheism provide the possibility of the compatibility of the freedom system? In Heidegger’s interpretation, how does Schelling’s reading of the necessity of paying attention to “is” lead to an ontological question of the meaning and truth of being in German idealism, how does the question of the system changes in the way the structure of beings is connected in general?

In the third part of his magnificent work, On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis strives to argue against what he takes to be three seemingly possible versions of abstractionist accounts of possible worlds. As always, Lewis’s critical assessments are much clear and highly sophisticated. However, there are some complications in his discussion of the third kind of abstractionism, that is, what he calls the magical ersatzism. In this paper, I will attempt to clarify and defend Lewis’s objections against this third kind of abstractionism. As I will argue, the core of Lewis’s arguments against magical abstractionism (ersatzism) recognizes a sort of theoretical and methodological deficiency in such theories. Magical abstractionism does not fulfil our expectations about a sufficient account of possible worlds and modality. Unlike linguistic and pictorial abstractionism, magical abstractionism does not provide us with a clear and explanatorily sufficient account of how possible worlds represent the possibilities that we are inclined to accept. Magical abstractionists have a wrong conception of what is a sufficient metaphysical theory about modality. A true metaphysical theory about possible worlds must have something positive to say about the nature of the abstract entities that are going to play the metaphysical role of those possible worlds.

the question of whether the existence of such disagreements reduces the justification and rationality of belief in God. Reductionists (or Conciliationists) in the epistemology of disagreement, argue that the awareness of disagreement among epistemic peers, which indicates the possibility of relevant and serious error, will lead to the reduction of justification and rationality of beliefs. Thus, examining whether disputants who disagree about God’s existence are epistemic peers becomes an important problem: if parties are epistemic peers, these disagreements lead to the reduction of beliefs in God. In this article, I examine the peerhood of the disputants in this dispute. Firstly, I describe Frederick Choo’s argument which concludes that the parties of disputes are not epistemic peers by pointing out the difference in the methodologies of disputants. Secondly, I discuss James Kraft’s article which argues in response to Choo and in favor of confirmed peerhood (claims that disputants are epistemic peers). By tracing the significant differences of disputants back to common epistemic grounds, Kraft tries to show that the disputants are epistemic peers. After evaluating and criticizing the arguments, I show that if the disputants use different methodologies to disagree about God’s existence, the awareness of disagreement will not have a serious effect on reducing the justification and rationality of the disputants’ beliefs.

In this paper, we first provide an overview of the debate between realism and antirealism in the philosophy of science,then, we introduce John Worrall’s structural realism as a middle position in this debate. Structural realism is, roughly speaking, the view that our scientific knowledge only concerns the structure of the world. However, James Ladyman goes beyond this by defending a thesis called ontic structural realism (OSR) and arguing that the world itself is nothing but structure. In the three sections after the introduction (2, 3, and 4), we define OSR more precisely, study some of the motivations and arguments in its favor, and distinguish its main versions. Nevertheless, after providing his own formulation of OSR, Bas van Fraassen, the prominent philosopher of science, claims that this view is inherently paradoxical. We argue that his argument for this claim is not conclusive. To do this, we introduce, reconstruct, and then take issue with van Fraassen’s criticism in the next two sections (5 and 6). Not only are the assumptions of his criticism disputable, but we will see that van Fraassen’s simple formulation of OSR may be useful to proponents of this view, who are often accused of ambiguity and imprecision. Although we note a serious shortcoming in van Fraassen’s formulation, in the last section (7) before the conclusion, we will briefly show that perhaps another philosopher-Shamik Dasgupta-has successfully provided a more or less similar formulation of structuralism, without such a shortcoming.

idegger’s the authentic Dasein or Sartre’s pour soi existence (responsible free man). By paying attention to the ontological, anthropological and cognitive foundations of the phenomenological-existentialist perspective, however it is possible to cast doubts on these answers. Therefore, any determination based on originality and authenticity, such as the two above mentioned propositions, may be considered inadequate or even contradictory. It seems that a different (or conflicting) path must be taken to reach this unique subject and subjectivity. In order to provide a perspective on this phenomenological and existentialist subject, this paper concentrates on the views of Jose Ertega y Gasset. Marcel’s priority of être over avoir, Heidegger’s distinction between zuhandenheit and vorhandenheit, Hussel’s idea of the eternal unfinnished perception of things, Heidegger’s interpretation of das Geviert, are some important phenomenological and existentialist insights which pave the way for a new solution. In accordance with all the mentioned insiths and as a sum up of them, Ortega’s unique definition of la circumstancia, as well as his conception of horizonte de posibilidade and, ultimately, his Pueblo promise the emergence of a new subject and subjectivity. Pueblo-one of the most frequently used terms in Ortega’s system of ideas-can be considered as a non-individual and, at the same time, non-universal subject, a determination of subjectivity which is faithful to the foundations of phenomenological and existentialist philosophies.