JOURNAL OF DEFENSE POLICY
Year:2014 | Volume:22 | Issue:4 (88)|Papers Count:7

The long-standing structural conflicts in the Persian Gulf in 1383 on, took on a more obvious form, causing the formation of divergent interests between Iran and Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. On the other side, the U.S-led war on terrorism built up initiatives like the Greater Middle East Initiative, escalating the internal and external pressures on the Arab countries in the region to accomplish the reforms while there was increasing criticism from the public opinion on the Arab regimes’ foreign policies. This article uses an analytical-descriptive method to explain the reasons why Iran is deemed by member states of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Ghatar, Saudi Arabia and Emirates) as an increasing threat. Additionally, it will address the extent to which regionalism in the Persian Gulf is applied and practical.

The present article studies the national security approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the second decade of the Revolution, proving that there has been fundamental change in it compared with the imposed war period of Iraq against Iran. In answering the question of “what are the effects of the end of war upon the national security approach and Iran’s foreign policy?”, the hypothesis studied is that the main variable in foreign policy and national security orientation has been adopting a convergent approach in dealing with the regional and international environment, as the war ended. Iran’s relations with Europe and the United States, Soviet, and other countries in the region have been studied in order to analyze the hypothesis that focuses on developing the relationship with political entities. It has also been stated that economy lies at the heart of foreign policy and national security where a focus of the relations with European countries, easing of the strained relations with them, as well as deploying the world Bank sources have been defined. The method used in this article is analytical and deductive.

This research is aimed at studying and explaining where the “strategy against strategy” strategy stands in the defense policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This research is an applied one, which has been carried out by a case and field study method using a systematic and interpretative quality and quantity analysis. The statistical community has been estimated according to expert estimates (230 people) where a sample volume of 69 people has been determined by using Cochran formula using an accessible proportional sampling method. The information in this research has been collected using two methods- library and field methods and documents- and analyzed by using the likert scale. The findings achieved indicate that the “threat against threat” doctrine put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran can play effectively in the domain of managing the soft and hard threats (with an emphasis on the missile threats, knowledge-based media threats, preventing the formation of the security-defense treaties against the Islamic Republic of Iran and enforcing the preventive policies). In addition to countering the political, symmetrical, nontraditional and progressive threats, this strategy is effective in cutting the volume of the threatening forces and shifting the focus of the threats away from the environments surrounding the Islamic Republic of Iran. It follows that a new strategy can create a defensive authority through establishing a convergent relationship with foreign actors and power-making.

Iran’s territorial integrity, which was recognized from Safavid Era on, was increasingly challenged by the West and East. In Ghajar Era, Iran’s cultural and political independence came to face a soft threat as well. In both cases, the Shiite authorities played a remarkable role by their presence. This article tries to highlight and interpret some perspectives of this important role in Iran’s history, from the time when the Safavid State was established until well before the Constitutional Revolution, by a descriptive-analytical method using library sources. Ultimately, it proves that the institution of Shiist authorities who serve as one of the most peerless capacities in Shiist soft power, has managed to defeat the enemies’ hard and soft threats. In times when the country was segmented or its independence became demolished, it was due to the shortcomings, inefficiencies, and treasons on the part of the kings and statesmen and their ignorance of the statements made by the guidelines given by the Shiist authorities.

The factors that shape the quality and quantity of Iraq’s security and political equations today can be examined in terms of priority on a trifold scale- internal, regional and trans- regional-respectively. Given that the internal level is the first and foremost level that forms the social and political life in any country, especially if we take it that the internal factors cause crises to occur and continue, it must be admitted that the regional and trans-regional factors play a role in escalating and facilitating the crises as well as sustaining them. On this basis, the main question in this article is “What factors contribute to the formation of the state of continuing insecurity and instability in Iraq?” The hypothesis set forward in answering to this question is that the social and demographical context of Iraq has led to the formation and continuance of the triple crises- identity, state, and security- which are formed in a mutual relation, and provide for intervention from foreign factors (as factors that escalate and facilitate insecurity and instability). Therefore, the present article tests this hypothesis using an explanative-causal method with a historical and process-based perspective. Also, it found out that Iraq’s social political context contributed to the formation of three crises- identity, crisis and state, where state has failed to accomplish the major function- namely the security crisis- as the main authority responsible for creating security.

This article is aimed at explain the reasons for the rise and fall in the mutual relationship between China and America after the end of the bipolar system. Unlike the bipolar-system period of international relations where the behavioral models and relations between the two countries were either cooperationist or controversial, in the modern period, which is referred to as “the order in transition”, the relationship between America and China has increasingly seen a process of ups and downs. In so doing, this article will show that the simultaneity in the behavioral models of cooperation and the conflict within each of the subject areas have affected the macro factors of the mutual relations by determining the order factors in transition and referring to the model variables of the mutual relations between countries as a conceptual framework.

The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Iraq’s failure in invading Iran, and the resistance in face of the ideology introduced by the Islamic revolution of Iran drove the Arab countries of the Southern margin of the Persian Gulf to integrate their own foreign and domestic policies to counter such threats by creating a regional institution. So, with the initiative put forward by Saudi Arabia, and the overt and covert supports given by the West, especially America, an institution was established that consisted of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Amman, Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain under the title of the [Persian Gulf] Cooperation Council. Therefore, this article intends to address the reasons why the Cooperation Council failed to succeed to achieve regional convergence by employing the Regional Security Complex Theory as the theoretical framework using an analytical-descriptive method. The main question in the present research is “What obstacles exist in the way of the Cooperation Council in order to transit into a regional security complex theory? ”Ultimately, it was found out that there are a complex of economic, political-security, and social obstacles in the path of the Cooperation Council in order for it to become a security complex and realize regional convergence in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Gulf that have prevented these from becoming a reality.