In this study, the effect of audit quality on agency costs and information asymmetry has been examined. Among the accepted firms 99 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange were selected for statistical samples from 1385 to 1392 in order to attain the research purposes. To measure the audit quality, observable variables such as the percentage of institutional investors, the type of audit opinion, audit size and the audit tenure were used.Furthermore, to measure agency costs variables like assets utilization ratio, the rate of assets revenue, Tobin's Q ratio and leverage ratio were used. The stock price volatility, earning forecast error, film size, growth opportunities and the percentage of non-institutional investors to quantify the amount of variable related to information asymmetry from observable variables were analyazed. After verifying the acceptable process of the research measurement and structural models, the results indicate that the increase of audit services quality leads to a decrease in challenges over the separation of ownership and management including agency costs and information asymmetry. The results of the study also show that the increase of agency costs results in the increase of information asymmetry level.