The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness

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SALEHIFARD MOHAMMAD; Nasl Mosavi Seyed Hossein; Pooraghajan Abasali

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT AUDITING Year:2021 | Volume:10 | Issue:39 Page(s): 157-169

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Information Journal Paper

Title

The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness

Author(s)

SALEHIFARD MOHAMMAD | Nasl Mosavi Seyed Hossein | Pooraghajan Abasali

Keywords

Announcement Informativeness

Quarterly Earnings

CEO Power

Abstract

The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness Abstract The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness of listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose one hypotheses are developed and data on the 108 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1389 to 1396 were analyzed. This regression model using panel data with fixed effects approach and tests. The results showed that the concentration CEO Power has significant positive impact on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness. Therefore, the research results indicate that the Powerful executives have more independence and you have more supervisory roles on the board this reduces the disadvantages of stakeholder rights and reduce the agency costs, and thus reduce agency costs reduce information asymmetry and reduce the opacity in financial and thus Increase Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness.

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APA: Copy

SALEHIFARD, MOHAMMAD, Nasl Mosavi, Seyed Hossein, & Pooraghajan, Abasali. (2021). The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT AUDITING, 10(39 ), 157-169. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/1049032/en

Vancouver: Copy

SALEHIFARD MOHAMMAD, Nasl Mosavi Seyed Hossein, Pooraghajan Abasali. The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT AUDITING[Internet]. 2021;10(39 ):157-169. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/1049032/en

IEEE: Copy

MOHAMMAD SALEHIFARD, Seyed Hossein Nasl Mosavi, and Abasali Pooraghajan, “The Effect of CEO Power on Quarterly Earnings Announcement Informativeness,” JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT AUDITING, vol. 10, no. 39 , pp. 157–169, 2021, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/1049032/en

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