ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN

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ABDOLI GH.

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

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Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2006 | Volume:- | Issue:75 Page(s): 21-41

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Title

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN

Author(s)

ABDOLI GH. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

NASH EQUILIBRIUMQ2

ADVERSE SELECTIONQ2

INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTSQ3

AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCEQ3

Abstract

One way of solving welfare loss asymmetric information in insurance is to design INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS. When the contracts are not informationally consistent, ADVERSE SELECTION cause the portfolio insurance to be risky, and consequently the probability of accident and loss will be high. In this paper we investigate Iran's insurance companies, based on informaionlly consistent contracts and Jonh Raily (2001) paper. We find that there are some signals that show Iran automobile collusion contracts are not informationally consistent.

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APA: Copy

ABDOLI, GH.. (2006). ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, -(75), 21-41. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/11621/en

Vancouver: Copy

ABDOLI GH.. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI[Internet]. 2006;-(75):21-41. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/11621/en

IEEE: Copy

GH. ABDOLI, “ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN,” TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, vol. -, no. 75, pp. 21–41, 2006, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/11621/en

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