The Deficits of Scientific Scepticism: Revisiting the Higher Values of Contextualistic Pluralism in Justification of Truth and Knowledge Claims

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Etuk Anthony

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Philosophical Investigations in Scopus Year:2023 | Volume: | Issue: Page(s): 116-127

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Information Journal Paper

Title

The Deficits of Scientific Scepticism: Revisiting the Higher Values of Contextualistic Pluralism in Justification of Truth and Knowledge Claims

Author(s)

Etuk Anthony | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

scientificQ4

scepticismQ4

knowledgeQ4

EmpiricalQ4

contextualistic pluralismQ4

truthQ4

Abstract

scientific scepticism, fundamentally, questions the veracity and epistemic value of claims not supported by scientific evidence. Motivated by the assumption that only the Empirical investigation of reality leads to the truth, the scientific sceptics often maintain that only scientific method is best suited for this purpose. Claims found to be wanting in scientific evidence are considered untrue, and of little or no epistemic consequence. Using the analytical and critical methods, this paper interrogates this epistemic criterion of justification of scientific scepticism. It shows the inherent epistemic deficits in this criterion of the scientific sceptics, and how absolutizing its demands in such a manner as to undermine the veracity and epistemic significance of claims outside the mainstream discipline of science is not only to entrap themselves in many epistemic burdens, but also to sink under the unsavoury weight of criteriological egocentrism, detrimental to cognitive progress. As a credible alternative, this paper explores the epistemic fecundity of contextualistic pluralism – the pluralism of contextually underwritten cognitive positions – in truth and knowledge justification. It concludes with the relevance of this approach in epistemic justification as evident in its inclusive nature as well as its shift of the focus of philosophical thinking from identity to diversity in an interculturality society.

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