ADVERSE SELECTION AND POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING CONSISTENT INFORMATIONAL CONTRACTS

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SHARZEHEI GH.A.; MAJED V.

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Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2007 | Volume:- | Issue:80 Page(s): 75-100

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Information Journal Paper

Title

ADVERSE SELECTION AND POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING CONSISTENT INFORMATIONAL CONTRACTS

Author(s)

SHARZEHEI GH.A. | MAJED V. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ADVERSE SELECTIONQ2

PREMIUM DEDUCTIBLEQ3

SIGNALING AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATIONQ3

Abstract

The existence of asymmetric information leads to adverse selection. In the last decade alternative theories had been theories had been developed to prevent it in markets especially insurance markets. According to these theories insurers can categorize their customers using insurance market signaling to avoid adverse selection externalities such as cross-subsidizing among customers with different risk levels.The present study utilizes connected data and testing the signaling and cross subsidizing hypothesis in the IACIM (Iranian Automobile Collision Insurance Market). The results show that the hypothesis of the existence of signaling mechanism in automobile collision insurance market could not be rejected but the hypothesis of the existence of cross-subsidizing customers with different risk levels on the criterion of deductible premium level was rejected.

Cites

References

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONALLY CONSISTENT CONTRACTS: AUTOMOBILE COLLUSION INSURANCE OF IRAN

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APA: Copy

SHARZEHEI, GH.A., & MAJED, V.. (2007). ADVERSE SELECTION AND POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING CONSISTENT INFORMATIONAL CONTRACTS. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, -(80), 75-100. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/11729/en

Vancouver: Copy

SHARZEHEI GH.A., MAJED V.. ADVERSE SELECTION AND POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING CONSISTENT INFORMATIONAL CONTRACTS. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI[Internet]. 2007;-(80):75-100. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/11729/en

IEEE: Copy

GH.A. SHARZEHEI, and V. MAJED, “ADVERSE SELECTION AND POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING CONSISTENT INFORMATIONAL CONTRACTS,” TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, vol. -, no. 80, pp. 75–100, 2007, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/11729/en

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