Asymmetric information in Iran insurance market (Case study: automobile insurance in Iran insurance company)

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KESHAVARZ HADDAD GHOLAMREZA; Sabouniha Alireza

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Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2015 | Volume:50 | Issue:2 Page(s): 449-478

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Title

Asymmetric information in Iran insurance market (Case study: automobile insurance in Iran insurance company)

Author(s)

KESHAVARZ HADDAD GHOLAMREZA | Sabouniha Alireza | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

adverse selectionQ2

auto insuranceQ2

moral hazardQ2

Abstract

This research aims to test the presence of asymmetric information by using the dynamic information of automobile policyholders in Iran Insurance Company (IIC). The Conditional Independence test is conducted by Bivariate Probit model, the dynamic properties which are presented for bonus/malus system are tsted by a Dynamic Bivariate Probit model. Using a sample of 86637 policyholders in IIC, our finding confirms a positive correlation between risk and coverage in Bivariate Probit Model, which supports presence of asymmetric information. Also, there is a negative correlation between claims in the periods of t and t-1 in Dynamic Bivariate Probit model, confirming that the behavior of insurance policy holders is subject to moral hazard.

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APA: Copy

KESHAVARZ HADDAD, GHOLAMREZA, & Sabouniha, Alireza. (2015). Asymmetric information in Iran insurance market (Case study: automobile insurance in Iran insurance company). TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, 50(2 ), 449-478. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/11800/en

Vancouver: Copy

KESHAVARZ HADDAD GHOLAMREZA, Sabouniha Alireza. Asymmetric information in Iran insurance market (Case study: automobile insurance in Iran insurance company). TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI[Internet]. 2015;50(2 ):449-478. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/11800/en

IEEE: Copy

GHOLAMREZA KESHAVARZ HADDAD, and Alireza Sabouniha, “Asymmetric information in Iran insurance market (Case study: automobile insurance in Iran insurance company),” TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, vol. 50, no. 2 , pp. 449–478, 2015, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/11800/en

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