PUTNAM, CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM

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GHADIRI HAMED; SAEEDI MEHR MOHAMMAD

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Journal: Wisdom and Philosophy Year:2017 | Volume:13 | Issue:1 Page(s): 65-78

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Title

PUTNAM, CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM

Author(s)

GHADIRI HAMED | SAEEDI MEHR MOHAMMAD | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

HILARY PUTNAMQ2

CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITYQ1

METAPHYSICAL REALISMQ2

MODEL-THEORETIC ARGUMENTQ1

BRAIN-IN-VATQ1

Abstract

Rejecting METAPHYSICAL REALISM (MR) is a basic element in Putnam's Philosophy. He introduces two arguments against MR: Model-theoretic (MT) and BRAIN-IN-VAT (BIV). However, according to some scholars and commentators who work on Putnam's Philosophy, the phenomenon of CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, as introduced by Putnam in some of his books, is another argument by which MR is rejected. This Phenomenon is a state in which two sentences that are at face value incompatible could be consistently true. However, there is not any explicit and complete formulation of this argument in the writings of Putnam and his commentators. In this paper, first we will formulate a version of CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY against MR. According to our version, Putnam ask the metaphysical realist to explain this phenomenon. Then we will show that this argument is not independent of MT and BIV. Therefore, the phenomenon of CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY could be an argument against MR only of we accept either MT or BIV. Furthermore, any objection to MT and BIV will weaken the argument from CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY against MR.

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APA: Copy

GHADIRI, HAMED, & SAEEDI MEHR, MOHAMMAD. (2017). PUTNAM, CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM. HEKMAT VA FALSAFEH (WISDOM AND PHILOSOPHY), 13(1 ), 65-78. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/123410/en

Vancouver: Copy

GHADIRI HAMED, SAEEDI MEHR MOHAMMAD. PUTNAM, CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM. HEKMAT VA FALSAFEH (WISDOM AND PHILOSOPHY)[Internet]. 2017;13(1 ):65-78. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/123410/en

IEEE: Copy

HAMED GHADIRI, and MOHAMMAD SAEEDI MEHR, “PUTNAM, CONCEPTUAL RELATIVITY, AND METAPHYSICAL REALISM,” HEKMAT VA FALSAFEH (WISDOM AND PHILOSOPHY), vol. 13, no. 1 , pp. 65–78, 2017, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/123410/en

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