NAGEL AND OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES

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MOLA YOUSEFI M.

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Paper Information

Journal: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT) Year:2008 | Volume:6 | Issue:1 (11) Page(s): 111-127

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Information Journal Paper

Title

NAGEL AND OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES

Author(s)

MOLA YOUSEFI M. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

MORALVALUESQ1

MORAL OBJECTIVITYQ3

THOMAS NAGELQ3

ALTRUISMQ1

PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALIZABILITYQ3

KANTQ2

Abstract

In contemporary analytical Ethics there are different theories as to objectivity of moral values of which one set is the practical reason theories. These theories on the one hand insist on distinction between morality and science and on the other hand establish for morality an objectivity which it's source rooted in the practical reason. The later versions of this approach can be divided in two sets: one set of them are the versions which have much relation to Hobbes and the other which are somehow KANTians. THOMAS NAGEL's moral view is one of the KANTian versions. Nagel tries to establish for ALTRUISM, as the common element of morality, rationality which he claims is based on practical reason. As a result we can have moral arguments which have generality and universalizability without any dependence on people's own desires. Nagel says that we can find even formally the generality and universalizability of moral arguments in the agent-neutral arguments. These general and universalizable arguments in morality, as Nagel points out, suggest that there are objective and common values among people. In this paper we try to study and criticize the innovational aspects of Nagel's view with consideration of KANT's moral view.

Cites

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INCLINATION TOWARDS ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIORS (CASE OF STUDY: RESIDENTS OF HAMEDAN)

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APA: Copy

MOLA YOUSEFI, M.. (2008). NAGEL AND OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT), 6(1 (11)), 111-127. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/125889/en

Vancouver: Copy

MOLA YOUSEFI M.. NAGEL AND OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT)[Internet]. 2008;6(1 (11)):111-127. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/125889/en

IEEE: Copy

M. MOLA YOUSEFI, “NAGEL AND OBJECTIVITY OF MORAL VALUES,” PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT), vol. 6, no. 1 (11), pp. 111–127, 2008, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/125889/en

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