STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD PHENOMENON OF BARLEY INSURANCE PLAN IN KHORASAN RAZAVI

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

KARIM M.H.; POURMOGHADAM A.R.

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Agricultural Economics and Development Year:2014 | Volume:21 | Issue:84 Page(s): 103-122

Download Full-Text

Persian Verion

View:

1,152

Download:

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD PHENOMENON OF BARLEY INSURANCE PLAN IN KHORASAN RAZAVI

Author(s)

KARIM M.H. | POURMOGHADAM A.R. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

MORAL HAZARDQ2

INSURANCEQ2

DISCRIMINATE ANALYSISQ2

BARLEYQ2

KHORASAN RAZAVIQ2

Abstract

In this paper an attempt has been made to survey the phenomenon of MORAL HAZARD using information of 300 questionnaires that completing from BARLEY farmers in KHORASAN RAZAVI province in 2009-2010. For this purpose, DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS was used. Standardized coefficients of DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS show that increasing the use of seed led to reduce the willingness of farmers to INSURANCE, and increasing the capital, machinery, fertilizer and water led to increase the willingness of farmers to be insured. Results of no standardized coefficients of DISCRIMINATE ANALYSIS indicate that with increase one unit in capital, machinery, fertilizer and water; discernment degree is increasing about 0.05, 0.8, 0.25and 0.2 respectively. Therefore, insured group in the use of agricultural inputs has not any MORAL HAZARD. Accordingly, it is suggested that to accomplish the policies such as applying discount rate premiums for farmers that do not received any bote.

Cites

References

No record.

Cite

APA: Copy

KARIM, M.H., POURMOGHADAM, A.R., MOHHAMADREZAZADEH, N., RAHNAMA, A., & SARDAR SHAHRAKI, A.. (2014). STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD PHENOMENON OF BARLEY INSURANCE PLAN IN KHORASAN RAZAVI. EQTESAD-E KESHAVARZI VA TOWSE'E, 21(84), 103-122. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/24569/en

Vancouver: Copy

KARIM M.H., POURMOGHADAM A.R., MOHHAMADREZAZADEH N., RAHNAMA A., SARDAR SHAHRAKI A.. STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD PHENOMENON OF BARLEY INSURANCE PLAN IN KHORASAN RAZAVI. EQTESAD-E KESHAVARZI VA TOWSE'E[Internet]. 2014;21(84):103-122. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/24569/en

IEEE: Copy

M.H. KARIM, A.R. POURMOGHADAM, N. MOHHAMADREZAZADEH, A. RAHNAMA, and A. SARDAR SHAHRAKI, “STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD PHENOMENON OF BARLEY INSURANCE PLAN IN KHORASAN RAZAVI,” EQTESAD-E KESHAVARZI VA TOWSE'E, vol. 21, no. 84, pp. 103–122, 2014, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/24569/en

Related Journal Papers