Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors

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KHANDAN ABBAS

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: IRANIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW Year:2018 | Volume:22 | Issue:4 Page(s): 956-989

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Title

Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors

Author(s)

KHANDAN ABBAS | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Lobbying

Bribery

Evolutionary Games

Replicator Dynamics

Cooperation

Abstract

connecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (Lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative Lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used to study the effect of social parameters on firm’ s choice between Lobbying and bribing. The results indicate that social disapproval of Bribery has a negative impact on corruption. The effect, however, depends on the history of countries. Countries with a long history of corruption have much more difficult task in fight with corruption. Cooperation was the second social factor to be investigated. The effect of Cooperation on Lobbying is indirect through alleviating the difficulty and costs of linking to the government. Whenever and wherever linking is difficult, firms by Cooperation, can make it less impeding.

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APA: Copy

KHANDAN, ABBAS. (2018). Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors. IRANIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 22(4), 956-989. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/314510/en

Vancouver: Copy

KHANDAN ABBAS. Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors. IRANIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW[Internet]. 2018;22(4):956-989. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/314510/en

IEEE: Copy

ABBAS KHANDAN, “Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors,” IRANIAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 956–989, 2018, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/314510/en

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