INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM AND SYMMETRIC & ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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ERFANI A.R.

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Title

INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM AND SYMMETRIC & ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

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ERFANI A.R. | Issue Writer Certificate

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Abstract

Often “Moral hazard” is quoted as an impact of insurance on insured. It has been observed that the households, which have fire insurance, have been subjected to more firing; or cars, which have theft insurance, are being stolen more. Such indications express the fact that people after getting insurance for their properties, pay less attention to their insured property. For this reason, the cost of insurance companies has been risen sharply. To solve this problem, insurance companies are thinking about measures such as coinsurance and deductible. However in order to optimize one insurance contract, symmetric and asymmetric information is required. In the case of symmetric information, insurance contract which maximizes insurance company’s profit is of “full insurance” and it has pareto efficiency. But in case of asymmetric information, the insurance company must provide “full insurance” with low-level effort by insured for maximizing profit. This insurance contract is optimal although it doesn’t have pareto efficiency.

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APA: Copy

ERFANI, A.R.. (2002). INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM AND SYMMETRIC & ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH), 3(7-8), 0-0. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/364365/en

Vancouver: Copy

ERFANI A.R.. INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM AND SYMMETRIC & ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH)[Internet]. 2002;3(7-8):0-0. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/364365/en

IEEE: Copy

A.R. ERFANI, “INSURANCE AND MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM AND SYMMETRIC & ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION,” JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH), vol. 3, no. 7-8, pp. 0–0, 2002, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/364365/en

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