Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

Toutounchian Iraj; BEHRAD AMIN MEHDI

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: EGHTESAD-E ISLAMI Year:2018 | Volume:18 | Issue:70 Page(s): 35-61

Download Full-Text

Persian Verion

View:

314

Download:

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts

Author(s)

Toutounchian Iraj | BEHRAD AMIN MEHDI | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Islamic financeQ1

Participation in profit and lossQ2

Moral hazardQ2

Motivational-Compatible ContractQ1

Abstract

The research shows that the problem of Moral hazard due to the lack of proper reporting of profit by the recipient of funds in the contracts for the Participation in profit and loss is the most important issue for banks (financiers) not to use this type of contract. Therefore, the success of the use of financially-participatory finance techniques will depend on solving the asymmetric information problems associated with them. . The present paper discusses the relationship between the parties in the financing contracts by the method of Participation in profit and loss, and features a coherent incentive contract that controls the problem of asymmetric information in this regard. The purpose of the research is to provide a Motivational-Compatible Contract model in such a way that, relying on Islamic verses and narrations, the reliance on encouragement and rewards depends on the receipt of the correct information from the recipient. In order to achieve this goal, a theoretical analysis was used in the form of a mathematical model. The result of the research is that the random audit, along with the increase in the share of the beneficiary of funds in the form of a rigorous report (as a reward for honesty), provides a motivational structure that leads reducing the Moral hazard.

Cites

No record.

References

No record.

Cite

APA: Copy

Toutounchian, Iraj, & BEHRAD AMIN, MEHDI. (2018). Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts. EGHTESAD-E ISLAMI, 18(70 ), 35-61. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/383003/en

Vancouver: Copy

Toutounchian Iraj, BEHRAD AMIN MEHDI. Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts. EGHTESAD-E ISLAMI[Internet]. 2018;18(70 ):35-61. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/383003/en

IEEE: Copy

Iraj Toutounchian, and MEHDI BEHRAD AMIN, “Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts,” EGHTESAD-E ISLAMI, vol. 18, no. 70 , pp. 35–61, 2018, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/383003/en

Related Journal Papers