THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES

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NAVIDI GHAZIANI H.R.; RAHMANI M.; ROSTAMI H.

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Journal: ECONOMIC RESEARCH REVIEW Year:2007 | Volume:7 | Issue:1 (24 SPECIAL ISSUE TAX) Page(s): 119-140

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Title

THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES

Author(s)

NAVIDI GHAZIANI H.R. | RAHMANI M. | ROSTAMI H. | Issue Writer Certificate

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Not Registered.

Abstract

In this paper by assumption the probability of tax collusion and Violation, we study the policy of tax payers, inspectors and government in a triple game. On the base of Nash bargaining solution and determination of appropriate domain of bribery, we analyze separately the policy of government in using honest inspectors, dishonest inspectors and both of them in verification the reports of taxpayers. Then we calculate the optimum revenues of each side in an equilibrium state of each game.

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References

GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS

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APA: Copy

NAVIDI GHAZIANI, H.R., RAHMANI, M., & ROSTAMI, H.. (2007). THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES. ECONOMIC RESEARCH REVIEW, 7(1 (24 SPECIAL ISSUE TAX)), 119-140. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/67352/en

Vancouver: Copy

NAVIDI GHAZIANI H.R., RAHMANI M., ROSTAMI H.. THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES. ECONOMIC RESEARCH REVIEW[Internet]. 2007;7(1 (24 SPECIAL ISSUE TAX)):119-140. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/67352/en

IEEE: Copy

H.R. NAVIDI GHAZIANI, M. RAHMANI, and H. ROSTAMI, “THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES,” ECONOMIC RESEARCH REVIEW, vol. 7, no. 1 (24 SPECIAL ISSUE TAX), pp. 119–140, 2007, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/67352/en

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