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Information Journal Paper

Title

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Moral Responsibility (In Defense of Muslim Philosophers’ Approach)

Pages

  275-290

Keywords

principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) 

Abstract

 According to most Muslim philosophers, Divine foreknowledge, on one hand, is so inclusive that encompasses each and every minor and timed action of moral agents and because of the perfection of God in essence and attributes, any defects in His essence and attributes including any errors in His foreknowledge are impossible. On the other hand, these philosophers, like other defenders of free will, claim that significance of any kind of free will and responsibility of a moral agent depends on their access to alternate possibilities (PAP) and, consequently, their ability to refrain from or do an action simultaneously. This paper aims to deal with this highly debated and fundamental question that whether these two views are essentially in conflict with each other. To answer this pivotal question, based on a modified version of Frankfurt cases and Muslim philosophers’ definition of free will, we attempt to defend their initial approach to eliminating the conflict between Divine foreknowledge and free will or moral responsibility and show that, firstly, this infallible knowledge is contingent on the agent’ s voluntary action, and secondly, despite the principle of alternate possibilities, the agent’ s moral responsibility does not depend on the person’ s avoidance of the forthcoming action.

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  • Cite

    APA: Copy

    Koohi Gigloo, Tavakol, & Aaghazadeh, Seyed Ebrahim. (2019). Divine Foreknowledge and Human Moral Responsibility (In Defense of Muslim Philosophers’ Approach). PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ), 13(28), 275-290. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/741385/en

    Vancouver: Copy

    Koohi Gigloo Tavakol, Aaghazadeh Seyed Ebrahim. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Moral Responsibility (In Defense of Muslim Philosophers’ Approach). PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ)[Internet]. 2019;13(28):275-290. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/741385/en

    IEEE: Copy

    Tavakol Koohi Gigloo, and Seyed Ebrahim Aaghazadeh, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Moral Responsibility (In Defense of Muslim Philosophers’ Approach),” PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ), vol. 13, no. 28, pp. 275–290, 2019, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/741385/en

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