EX-OFFICIO ASSESSMENT MECHANISM IN AN IDEAL TAX SYSTEM

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NAVIDI HAMIDREZA; TAYYEBNIA ALI; ESKANDARI ZAHRA

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Tax Research Year:2011 | Volume:NEW SERIES - 18 | Issue:9 (57) Page(s): 9-24

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Information Journal Paper

Title

EX-OFFICIO ASSESSMENT MECHANISM IN AN IDEAL TAX SYSTEM

Author(s)

NAVIDI HAMIDREZA | TAYYEBNIA ALI | ESKANDARI ZAHRA | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

OPTIMAL TAX RATEQ3

EXOFFICIO PENALTIESQ3

TAX EVASIONQ3

COLLUSION 1- FACULTYQ3

Abstract

Tax evasion, collusion and tax avoidance both result in non-realization of the estimated state tax revenue, so developing diverse strategies for preventing these phenomena is the most important tax policies in different countries. One of the states' preventive solutions is to encourage and punish taxpayers in different ways.Imposing different penalties for non-compliant taxpayers is the most effective methods and setting effective tax ratio results in increasing tax revenue. By focusing on symmetric tax rate (gross income in an ex–officio and ideal system), this paper aims at preventing TAX EVASION, calculates the final state revenue gained from a given taxpayer.

Cites

FAVORABLE TAX AUDIT IN ORDER TO REDUCE TAX EVASION IN INCOME TAX: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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APA: Copy

NAVIDI, HAMIDREZA, TAYYEBNIA, ALI, & ESKANDARI, ZAHRA. (2011). EX-OFFICIO ASSESSMENT MECHANISM IN AN IDEAL TAX SYSTEM. TAX JOURNAL, NEW SERIES - 18(9 (57)), 9-24. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/89722/en

Vancouver: Copy

NAVIDI HAMIDREZA, TAYYEBNIA ALI, ESKANDARI ZAHRA. EX-OFFICIO ASSESSMENT MECHANISM IN AN IDEAL TAX SYSTEM. TAX JOURNAL[Internet]. 2011;NEW SERIES - 18(9 (57)):9-24. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/89722/en

IEEE: Copy

HAMIDREZA NAVIDI, ALI TAYYEBNIA, and ZAHRA ESKANDARI, “EX-OFFICIO ASSESSMENT MECHANISM IN AN IDEAL TAX SYSTEM,” TAX JOURNAL, vol. NEW SERIES - 18, no. 9 (57), pp. 9–24, 2011, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/89722/en

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