ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT IN FREGE

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GHORBANI MOHAMMAD REZA; AKRAMI MOUSA

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Title

ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT IN FREGE

Author(s)

GHORBANI MOHAMMAD REZA | AKRAMI MOUSA | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

FREGEQ2

THOUGHTQ2

OBJECTIVITYQ2

INTERSUBJECTIVE ACCESSIBILITYQ2

TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISMQ2

Abstract

In general, there are two current views on the interpretation of the concept of OBJECTIVITY in FREGE. The first view addresses OBJECTIVITY in the realm of ontology in which the OBJECTIVITY is independent of everything even human reason. According to this view, one could call FREGE’s philosophy a realist philosophy. On the contrary, the second view sees OBJECTIVITY or the objective in the realm of epistemology, in which the objective is accessible to human reason as an intersubjective thing. Comparing these two views, we would show that every interpretation that regards the OBJECTIVITY as intersubjectivity would lead to Kant’s TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM and introduces FREGE as a critical philosopher in its Kantian sense. Besides entering theoretical inadequacy in the totality of Ferege’s THOUGHT, such an interpretation is incompatible with his philosophy of arithmetic, as, for example, FREGE argues that arithmetic as a branch of logic cannot be based on intuition. Accordingly, believing in internal consistency of FREGE’s philosophy of arithmetic, we make use of necessary evidence to emphasize on ontological interpretation of the OBJECTIVITY of THOUGHT in his views.

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APA: Copy

GHORBANI, MOHAMMAD REZA, & AKRAMI, MOUSA. (2012). ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT IN FREGE. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 14(1 (53)), 73-100. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/98357/en

Vancouver: Copy

GHORBANI MOHAMMAD REZA, AKRAMI MOUSA. ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT IN FREGE. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH[Internet]. 2012;14(1 (53)):73-100. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/98357/en

IEEE: Copy

MOHAMMAD REZA GHORBANI, and MOUSA AKRAMI, “ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THOUGHT IN FREGE,” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, vol. 14, no. 1 (53), pp. 73–100, 2012, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/98357/en

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