AN APPLICATION OF FEARON’S THEORY TO CONSIDER OPEC’S STABILITY: THROUGH A REPEATED GAME APPROACH

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ABDOLI GHAHRAMAN; NAKHODA M.J.

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Journal: ENERGY ECONOMICS REVIEW Year:2009 | Volume:6 | Issue:20 Page(s): 33-56

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Information Journal Paper

Title

AN APPLICATION OF FEARON’S THEORY TO CONSIDER OPEC’S STABILITY: THROUGH A REPEATED GAME APPROACH

Author(s)

ABDOLI GHAHRAMAN | NAKHODA M.J. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

ORGANIZATION OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)Q2

REWARDING IMPATIENCEQ3

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THEORYQ3

GAME THEORYQ3

FEARON'S BARGAINING AND ENFORCEMENT MODELQ3

Abstract

In this paper, we present a simple version of Fleuron's bargaining and enforcement model and show that impatience (as captured in the discount factor) can be a source of bargaining strength. The outcome of the bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners’ dilemma. Second, we illustrate how to apply this model to the question of the distribution of benefits within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons. We use empirical evidence from OPEC’s fifty year history to test the model.We find countries that discount the future more heavily tend to ask for higher oil production quotas than those that do not. Empirical evidence confirms that OPEC members who are in greater need of oil income are allowed to have higher relative quotas.

Cites

ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WIRELESS COMMUNICATION COMPANY AND ITS SUBSCRIBERS THROUGH DYNAMIC GAMES

References

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APA: Copy

ABDOLI, GHAHRAMAN, & NAKHODA, M.J.. (2009). AN APPLICATION OF FEARON’S THEORY TO CONSIDER OPEC’S STABILITY: THROUGH A REPEATED GAME APPROACH. ENERGY ECONOMICS REVIEW, 6(20), 33-56. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/99473/en

Vancouver: Copy

ABDOLI GHAHRAMAN, NAKHODA M.J.. AN APPLICATION OF FEARON’S THEORY TO CONSIDER OPEC’S STABILITY: THROUGH A REPEATED GAME APPROACH. ENERGY ECONOMICS REVIEW[Internet]. 2009;6(20):33-56. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/99473/en

IEEE: Copy

GHAHRAMAN ABDOLI, and M.J. NAKHODA, “AN APPLICATION OF FEARON’S THEORY TO CONSIDER OPEC’S STABILITY: THROUGH A REPEATED GAME APPROACH,” ENERGY ECONOMICS REVIEW, vol. 6, no. 20, pp. 33–56, 2009, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/99473/en

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