Due to the stochastic nature of wind energy, allocating an appropriate investment Incentive for wind generation technology (WGT) is a complicated issue. We propose an improvement on the traditional Incentive, known as capacity payment mechanism (CPM), to reward the wind generators based on their performance exogenously affected by the wind energy potential of the location where the turbines are installed, and therefore, lead the investments towards locations with more generation potential. In CPM, a part of investment cost of each generator is recovered through fixed payments. However, in our proposal, wind generators are rewarded according to dynamic forecasts of the wind energy potential of the wind farm where they are located. We use an auto-regressive moving average (ARMA) model to forecast the wind speed fluctuations in long-term while capturing the auto-correlation of wind velocity variation in consecutive time intervals. Using the system dynamics (SD) modelling approach a competitive electricity market is designed to examine the efficiency of the proposed Incentive. Performing a simulation analysis, we conclude that while a fixed CPM for wind generation can decrease the loss of load durations and average prices in long-term, the proposed improvement can provide quite similar results more efficiently.

In recent years, the blockchain that is the basis of Bitcoin has received much attention. However, the blockchain also faces many challenges, such as security and scalability, which have been the subject of recent researches. Much work has been done to solve the scalability problem in blockchain; one of these methods is sharding. This method is based on dividing the network into different groups and validating transactions in parallel. These methods use traditional consensus algorithms. One of the problems in this regard is the Incentive that should be provided for nodes to participate in these consensus algorithms. In this paper, Repchain, one of the existing methods in this field, is examined, and the problems that this method has is analyzed. Next, it is proved that the proposed method causes the network nodes not to follow the protocol and also causes collusion between network nodes.

In recent years, the blockchain that is the basis of Bitcoin has received much attention. However, the blockchain also faces many challenges, such as security and scalability, which have been the subject of recent researches. Much work has been done to solve the scalability problem in blockchain; one of these methods is sharding. This method is based on dividing the network into different groups and validating transactions in parallel. These methods use traditional consensus algorithms. One of the problems in this regard is the Incentive that should be provided fornodes to participate in these consensus algorithms. In this paper, Repchain, one of the existing methods in this field, is examined, and the problems that this method has is analyzed. Next, it is proved that the proposed method causes the network nodes not to follow the protocol and also causes collusion between network nodes.

This study explains the individual’s behavior toward profits and losses contained in differently framed combined Incentive contracts. Individual’s risk preferences and loss preferences are measured using Holt and Laury (2002) measure of risk aversion and Brink and Rankin (2013) measure of loss aversion, respectively. The last measure was adjusted with compensation characteristics in Iran. The relationship between these preferences and individual’s behavior under economically equivalent contracts of different frames is examined using experiment. Participating 92 subjects as well as conducting four separate experiments, the result indicated that there is a negative relationship between loss aversion and accepatance of contracts which have penalty component. Also, subjects preferred the first clawback contract (bonus> penalty) rather than the second clawback contract (bonus< penalty). In other words, contracts framing as well as endowment effect play a vital role in individual choices. Failure of common economic theories in explaining of individual behavior is confirmed in this study.