RATIONALITY as logical consistency is, formally, directly related to logical derivations. The idea behind reductio ad absurdum is captured in this relation.

RATIONALITY of Faith is one of the most important issues in contemporary philosophy of Religion that most philosophers of religion have discussed it. Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne with theistic approach have discussed this subject. Swinburne with evidentialist approach concludes that religious belief like every another belief can be rational only if it has evidence and of cource theists have evidence for their belives so they are justified and rational. But Plantinga criticizes evidentialism and classical foundationalism. Instead of justification, He uses concept of Warrant and finally concludes that Christian believes have proper warrant so Christians are rational in their believes.In this project I want to survey and compare this two great thinkers ’views. My questions in this project are: 1) what criticisms Plantinga can has to Swinburne approach? 2) Is not Plantinga’s analogy argument a Kind of evidentialism? 3) Way does Plantinga use concept of Warrant instead of Justification? 4) What is difference between Warrant and Justification? 5) Are Christian believes properly warranted?

This paper is an examination of Robert Nozick's argument in The Nature of RATIONALITY that instrumental RATIONALITY is defective, and that the defects of instrumental RATIONALITY can be understood through a careful appraisal of the significance of Newcomb's paradox and the prisoners' dilemma.In both Anarchy, State and Utopia and in The Nature of RATIONALITY, Nozick considers the question of why we should be rational, and concludes that the call of reason issues from the fact that we value what we are. RATIONALITY is so important to us that it becomes a duty because it is in terms of and by means of RATIONALITY that we understand who we are. Our worldview is an artifact shaped, at least in part, by our evaluative standards of cognitive assessment.Nozick goes on to ask why we should value that. And to answer the query, he considers the functions that RATIONALITY may have, beginning with instrumental RATIONALITY. To be instrumentally rational is to pursue one's goals and desires in the most efficient and effective way. Hence, prudence and self-interest commend instrumental RATIONALITY, or, what amounts to the same thing, instrumentality commends itself. Being prudent is itself prudent. However, Nozick concedes that the value of RATIONALITY goes beyond what can be explained in terms of a purely instrumental RATIONALITY.Even if we were to begin with a purely instrumental view of RATIONALITY, we might come to value it for its own sake, and so it may come to have intrinsic value. We should be rational because we value being that way. The endorsement given by reason to instrumental RATIONALITY, however, is not the issuing of a blank check. Instrumental RATIONALITY itself will counsel that we not put too much time and effort into developing the skills of instrumental RATIONALITY, for beyond a certain point the amount gained in overall efficiency will not be worth the lost opportunities for other pursuits. Nozick argues that actions could acquire value not only because of the consequences which can be expected to follow from them, but because of what Nozick calls their symbolic utility. Some, but not all, cases in which one decides to perform an act because of its symbolic utility appear to be rational. All of the convincing cases of rational action performed because of symbolic utility offered by Nozick are cases of action performed in accordance with principle. Consideration of the sage provides the occasion to introduce additional means by which value may accrue to an action, in terms of which we may judge the performance of the action to be rational. There is no harm in considering these means as independent elements of symbolic utility, provided we bear in mind that these elements may be quantitatively incommensurable with those derived from accordance with principle. Rules or principles provide only one way in which actions may be guided. Another way is by consideration of consequences. A third way in which actions may be guided is with reference to virtue. Sometimes the appeal to virtue will be personified in an exemplar. We acquire skills by imitation of the actions of teachers. We may attempt to acquire virtues by acting in ways that are typical of the virtuous exemplar. This mode of practical guidance plays an important role in various traditions, from those of the ancient Greeks to those of the Abrahamic religions.While Nozick argues in favor of an expanded notion of instrumental RATIONALITY, I counter that the notion of practical RATIONALITY should be expanded beyond that which can be considered as instrumental RATIONALITY.