The primary objective of this article is to elucidate that a comprehensive understanding of Greek political thought necessitates an examination of its origins in Ancient Greece. Traditional scholarship in Greek political thought has typically assumed that it originated concurrently with philosophy and the establishment of the polis. In this research, drawing upon the visions of Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss, we endeavor to establish a refined definition of political thought while challenging the aforementioned conventional assumption. It is argued that political reflection remains intimately intertwined with the theological-mythological beginning of thought in Greece. This theological-mythological mode of thinking initially found expression in the works of Homer and Hesiod, with these poets serving as the foremost intellectual authorities and initial educators of the Greeks. The Greeks, in their self-perception, viewed themselves through a lens of religion and in the mirror of gods and divine forces. Consequently, any exploration into Greek political thought must acknowledge the works of these poets as the seminal intellectual foundations of Greek thought. It is imperative to recognize that political thought in Ancient Greece did not commence with philosophy or the emergence of the polis, but rather with poetry and a distinct form of religious-mythical experience, namely theologia-muthologia.

Quentin Skinner's methodology for understanding political thought has a negative and a positive feature: the negative includes a criticism on the methodology of textual and contextual reading, which has led to illuminating the defects and ambiguities of both and finally underlining their insufficiency in understanding political thoughts. The positive feature is Skinner's own method on the basis of which, for understanding the terminology, concepts and political statements of political thinkers of a particular time, in addition to studying their works and texts and understanding the social and political context of that period, we need to work out their aims and intentions. In order to reach such an understanding, one should go for understanding intellectual currencies and tendencies, arguments and reasons, and questions and answers (in short, the 'linguistic and Political discourse') current at the time.

In both arguments about the faculties of soul and the premises of different kinds of deductions, Ibn Sina discusses briefly practical philosophy. While in the former he regards ethics as the result of practical reason, he recognizes it in the latter based on a specific kind of accepted premises (praiseworthy opinions, wellaccepted opinions) that have been originated from habits, conventions, traditions from the past time and the like. Besides these two viewpoints combined together, by confirming that i) practical reason is called reason merely homonymously, ii) praiseworthy opinions have no other basis but reputation and iii) human reason considered by itself cannot judge about them, Ibn Sina makes his readers ready for his inferences: that a) moral descriptions like good and bad are not descriptions of realities and b) moral judgments are not propositions. Nonetheless, by his ambiguous statement that praiseworthy opinions can be either true or false and it is possible to provide a demonstration for them, he, on the other hand, makes his position, at least in appearance, dark, ambiguous and variously interpretable. This article has two sections. The first section is dedicated to practical reason and its function in moral judgments while the second one focuses on Ibn Sina’ s theory about the premises and materials of moral judgment and their origin. These two considerations are going to illustrate that Ibn Sina’ s theory about the function of practical reason and the origin of moral judgment leaves no place for truthfulness or falsity of those accepted premises that are considered praiseworthy opinions and their demonstration is not possible. However, even if some of them can be either true or false, they must be emplaced somewhere outside the boundaries of moral judgment.

To talk about political thought of Ferdowsi, the Iranian greatest epic poet, in the frame work of modern concepts is rather difficult. Ferdowsi's political thought is not compatible both with classical pattern of political philosophy and models of modern political thought. Therefore, Ferdowsi's theory on politics is in fact a kind of reflection on political conditions and relations and is not considered as philosophical thought.So, we suppose that his political ideas are difinable mainly within political advice and the discussion on power and how to gain and maintain it. This view coincides with theory of kingdom in ancient Persian political thought. The article tries to explain this subject by exploring the characteristics of Ferdowsi's epic poems and his social and political implications.

In the Persian poetry and literature, Omar Khayam is the representative figure of a peculiar worldview and the voice of several thinkers and silent poets who kept silent and as a matter of fact offered their words and speech through his name.Therefore this article intends to show the major principles and characteristics of Khayam's school of thought. The research method chosen for this purpose is a combination of critical methods based on written material, historical events and phenomenal methods. And instead of relying on unfinished issues such as the originality of Khayam's poetry and identity, it offers his message in a rather more balanced manner. Through referring to the previous researches made on Khayam, this goal was made practical.So for earning this purpose various interpretations, and even contrasting ones, made on Khayam's poetry and their relevance with his thoughts and speech was surveyed. Finally for determining the principles and structure of Khayam's school of thought, his thought system was divided into five major categories considering the common concepts and messages within these poems. Then by offering an example from Khayam's poetry, the message and motif that he had in mind was analyzed.

In her Book, Modern Western Political thought, Alireza Ismailzad has written a relatively comprehensive look at the developments in political thought in the West from the seventeenth century to the postmodern situation. The main premise in the critique of this book is based on the necessity of producing such works. Because of the existence of a large number of books in the field of Western Political thought, including authorship and translation, the importance of innovation in the production of new works is doubled. Does this mean that there is basically a new need for rethinking in this area? And, does this book open a new window on Western Political thought? Regardless of its strengths, the book has objections to chronological, thematic, thematic classification, how modern political thought was formed and evolved in the West, the choice of political thinkers, and the methodology of analyzing and interpreting the findings. For example, ignoring the theoretical foundations of the emergence of modern political thought such as the renaissance, not mentioning the theories of thinkers such as Luther, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, lack of sociological approach, and most importantly, the exclusion of the basic foundations of modern political thought, including politics, government, sovereignty, identity, nationality, etc. are the most prominent shortcomings of the book.

According to Sikhism, metaphysics is the study of being and existence in three major aspects: absolute truth, existing reality, and human knowledge of this reality. The ultimate truth can be comprehended when one achieves true vision (darshan). Otherwise, it cannot be described but can only hint at God's attributes, such as being a creator, possessing will, and having a personality to some extent. In Sikhism, the origin of creation is absolute truth. Before creating the world, God was immersed in thought. By creating the world, God seeks a play (Lila), with the world serving as the stage for human struggle. There can be no other intention behind the creation of the world, as God is full, complete, and absolutely perfect. Due to His independence, He does not pursue any intentions or purposes. In Sikhism, human salvation is not achievable through rational and theoretical arguments because a logical entity obtained through reason, disconnected from divine light, cannot accomplish anything unless one connects to the absolute.

In the tradition of metaphysical thought, thinking and knowledge is the pure result of mental and logical activities of man, and the correctness of conclusion is obtained by the correct application of mental faculties and correct exerting of appropriate principles, rules and methods of understanding such as the rules and principles of logic or empirical methods. In our time, questions like “What is theory?” or “What is thinking?” remind us of specialized disciplines like the philosophy of science or epistemology. In our time the various philosophical currents, they are in particular the philosophies of science and epistemological studies in the very tradition of metaphysical thought that treat and contemplate on thought, theory and knowledge. However, this paper tends, through putting the significance of the encompassing in contemplating on the nature of thought and theory, to present a non-humanistic and so a non-metaphysical concept of knowledge. It attempts to put forward a non-observable and non-concrete thing, a thing that could be identified neither with subject nor with object, but the encompassing of both is the foundation of thought, the transcendent condition of knowledge, and the indicator of correctness or non-correctness of human knowledge, and at the same time, it is neither separated from the subject of thought nor the object of knowledge. We live in a time that, due to the dominance of metaphysical thought, the presence of the encompassing, especially in understanding the nature of thought and theory, has already departed from our thinking mind.

The concept of kalahas been interpreted differently in Hindu religious traditions. It refers to magic or heavenly power in Vedas while in Hindu Monotheisms such as Advaita Vedanta it denotes to the deceptive and charming power of gods which is understood as illusion especially the enchanting (unreal) nature of universe as the extended phenomenon that is synonymous to Avidya or ignorance over unique property of ultimate truth. In this interpretation, kala is the veil of illusion over Brahman or transcendental truth. It is neither existent nor non-existent and eludes any definition. In Ancient Vedas, kala refers to magical and miraculous power connoting deception and enticement. In his second volume of the History of Philosophy, Radakrishnan states: The word kala in Rig Veda has been frequently used to refer to supernatural power attributed to gods, particularly Varuna, Mitra and Indra, In many ancient songs, kala has been admired as the power protecting the world. kala means deception and enticement which is an inherent previlage of Asuras against Devas with whom She is in an ongoing battle. The word Maya is rarely witnessed in Upanishads as the real basis of Vedante. In The Vaisesika Sutras of kanandakalaisdravya but The problem of Time in indianphilosophyis so difrrent.

Thinkers and philosophers have constantly benefited from different approaches of reasoning to explore and justify their ideas. Theses reasoning approaches are considered as the principle instruments in speculative activities of the thinkers. To this end to achieve the procedure of thinking and the way philosophers achieve objectives, it is necessary to recognize their reasoning strategies. This article intends to survey on the position of analogy in the thinking of Farabi, and to show how he used this type of analogy as one of his basic reasoning methods in exploring his ideas and thoughts.