In 1970, Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards, Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction operator. Granted the acceptability of the underlying logical system, Godels conclusion that necessarily there exists a God-like being) can be derived from the premises-with Godel and Scott on the scene, who can say otherwise? Sobel, however, proved that the system faces modal collapse-i.e. P↔ðP is derivable from the system. Responding to Sobel, Anderson tried to block this by weakening some axioms and definitions.In this paper, I will be trying to consider Godels ontological argument (Scotts version) from a logical point of view, along with Sobels criticism and Andersons emendations.