خردنامه صدرا
سال:1392 | دوره:- | شماره:71 |تعداد مقالات:13

Aristotle discusses the soul in itself in metaphysics, and as its relation to the body in physics. This issue originates in the division of sciences in Aristotle's works. The same trend continues in the works of the philosophers following him. Although Farabi presented a new classification of sciences, he maintained the main form of Aristotle's divisions and posed the related problems like him. Based on his fundamental theories, including the principiality of existence, gradation of being, and the trans-substantial motion, Mulla Sadra considers the soul to be corporeally originated and spiritually subsistent, criticizes early philosophers' ideas concerning the soul and its place, and offers a new interpretation of the soul. He could have removed the distinction between the stations of the essence of the soul and its relation and considered it to be a level of the body and a mode of existence at the beginning of its creation. Accordingly, he transfers the issues related to the soul from physics to metaphysics and contributes to the independence of the latter. Mulla Sadra believes that it is the responsibility of philosophers to discuss the soul, and, in addition to emphasizing the importance of this discussion, he maintains that the issue of providence is the link between the issues of the soul and the third journey. His definition of the soul and perception of philosophy and anthropology made it possible for Mulla Sadra to create some changes in the place of the soul and discuss it in metaphysics, which is something that the philosophers before him were not able to do. This paper deals with the effects and consequences of this issue.

This paper is a review of the theory of relation propounded by the well-known philosopher of the Shiraz School, Muhaqqiq Dawani. It explains his specific ontology (oneness of being), based on which he considers himself to be one of the people of theosophical taste (dhawq ta’alluh). It has also been tried in this paper to compare this theory with one of Aristotle’s famous teachings based on “homonyms in relation to the One” and “ishraqi (illuminative) relation” in Mulla Sadra. This analogy concludes that, as the ultimate origin for Aristotle is the only existent that, in the real sense of the word, is called an “existent”, and other existents deserve to be called so only in relation to Him, in Dawani’s philosophy the real existent is also the same "existence" (the truth), and other existents are called so only in the sense of things that bear a relation to existence (real existent). Clearly, this view presents a kind of ontological unity which is different from the graded unity discussed in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. This is because Dawani's theory indicates the oneness of being and the plurality of existents. However, Mulla Sadra’s ontology represents the oneness of being and existents and, at the same time, emphasizes plurality. Although Aristotle does not say a word about "existence", much less about its unity, his ontology presents an image of secondary existents beside the most real existent, which is undoubtedly based on a fundamental difference in their modes of existence. It appears that, although the basic principles of the abovementioned philosophers might seem different, one can have a positive view of the proximity between their perceptions, particularly those of Aristotle and Dawani, of the ontological meaning of relation and annexation.

Leibniz initially believed in the absoluteness of time and place, but later he changed his idea. His true and final view is that time and place are relative and subjective concepts, whereas Newton believed that they are absolute and have a real and objective existence independent of other phenomena. In his correspondence with Samuel Clark, he refers to the weak points of the views of Newton and Clark and presents several philosophical and theological arguments to reject them. Time and place are treated in his philosophy ontologically, and their existence is relative.Epistemologically speaking, these concepts correspond to phenomena and depend on external phenomena and objects. From a psychological point of view, these concepts are formed in the mind through observing the relations among objective phenomena. Time and place are attributes of phenomena rather than monads or simple substances.In contrast to Newton's idea, the existence of an empty place or vacuum is impossible and in contradiction to Leibniz's accepted principles. He has presented some metaphysical and theological arguments on rejecting this issue in most of his works.

Since the divine names and attributes are among the most important issues in philosophy, gnosis, and theology, the present paper intends to examine the semantics of the divine attributes. In line with this purpose, the writer has referred to the two views of the synonymity and identity of attributes, which have been presented by the two distinguished philosophers of the Islamic world, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. Given the fact that Mulla Sadra has absolutely rejected the Sinnan theory of the synonymity of attributes and considered it to be a corrupt misconception, the writer decided to check if one could present a design to reconcile these two viewpoints with each other, or if there is truly no way to bring them together, and one must inevitably accept one as the correct theory. The result of this research was that if we pay more attention to Ibn Sina's view and meaning, we will learn that there is not much difference between his theory and that of Mulla Sadra, and we can reconcile them with each other.

Although all of Mulla Sadra's work indicate a solid relationship between the Qur' an and demonstration, his interpretation of the Qur' an from among his other books enjoys a particular advantage in his Qur' anic approach. This paper examines the way Sadrian philosophy interprets the Qur' an. Deliberation over the meeting points of interpretation and philosophy, as the distinctive feature of his interpretation from those of others, can reveal the effect of philosophy on interpretation to us.Mulla Sadra believes that explicit narration and complete unveiling are the two fundamental bases of interpretation. Accordingly, he favors neither inflexibility in words nor neglecting it. Rather, he maintains that one should cautiously observe the realities and the interior of meanings. In this paper, the writer has also referred to the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy and the quality of their use in the interpretation of the Qur' an. Mulla Sadra's approach to the Oneness of Godly Light and lack of passivity in the divine mercy and evil forms is based on the principiality and gradation of existence. In the trans-substantial motion, issues such as resurrection and change of species are analyzed. In his view, human beings are divided into different types based on the trans-substantial motion. The meaning of path, cause of death, referring to God, and the secret of immortality in Hell are among the issues propounded on the basis of this motion. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul is the product of the trans-substantial motion of the body. Considering the abilities of the soul, the number of the doors of Heaven and Hell, the number of the angels of Hell, and the criterion for punishing acts develop a specific justification.

Farabi has dealt with the existence and whatness of limit from two perspectives of logic and philosophy and evaluated its epistemological aspect meticulously. Beside the term limit, he has also used some other words such as description, definiens, particular accident, and definition, each of which carries several meanings and, at the same time, indicates an acquired notional perception.He explains the different meanings of limit, its kinds, levels, and component parts, as well as the mode of the commonality of some limits with demonstration. Concerning the acquisition of limit, Farabi presents his own innovative method and then refers to and criticizes the three methods of early philosophers. He believes that a limit that is attained through the approach of the human spirit to the world of creation does not portray the realities of possible things, is not a form including the essential features of an object, and does not reveal its quiddity. Rather, it is a knowledge that merely manifests the attributes and accidents of objects because it is based on sense perceptions. If the soul is polished with the theoretical intellect and faces the world of command, the divine intelligibles will be printed on it in the light of the divine emanation and the real limits of objects are discovered. He has frequently and explicitly said about the essence of the One that there is no limit for Almighty Truth, Who is the Absolute Being, and thus it is impossible to attain His reality. However, man possesses a primary and non-acquired knowledge of the necessity of His Existence through whichthe knowledge of His other attributes is possible for him.