In examining the sense of predicate we can fmd three import;anttheses in Freges theory: 1.The mode of presentation of referent is contained in the sense of an expression. So, the sense of predicate consists of the mode of presentation of concept as its referent. 2.The sense of predicate is unsaturated. 3.The sense of predicate is part ofthe sense ofthe sentence in which it occurs. In surveying the most important commentarieson the sense of predicate in Freges theory, it was found out that each commentary violates at least one of the above theses. Also, Dummett and Klement give special commentary on unsaturatedness of the sense of predicate, both of interpretations which are inconsistent with The appearence of Ferges theses. It seems, in general, that a proper explanation which will be consistent with all the three theses cannot be given.

In examining the sense of predicate we can find three important theses in Frege’s theory:1- The mode of presentation of referent is contained in the sense of an expression. So, the sense of predicate contains the mode of presentation of concepts, as its referent.2- The sense of predicate is unsaturated.3- The sense of predicate is part of the sense of the sentence in which it occurs.Every given significant commentary for the sense of predicate violates at least one of the above theses. Also, Dummett and Klement give special commentary for unsaturatedness of the sense of predicate, but both of them are inconsistent with what appears from Frege. It seems, in general, that a proper explanation which will be consistent with all three theses cannot be given.

Proper names and definite descriptions have been of controversial and essential issues in the field of philosophy of languuage and philosophers working on them have faced many problems. One of the most important problems is the problem of absurd names - descriptions. The present article first presents some of the most influential theoris. Such as those of Meinong, Russell, Frege, Strawson and Donnellan. Then studies the solutions provided for the mentioned problem and finally presents a new theory about proper names - descriptions.

According to the Platonist a mathematical object, such as a number or a set, is an abstract object. These objects are thought to be non-physical, non-mental and acausal. Mathematical Platonism is the view that there exist such objects and that our theories describe them. What I am going to say in this paper is that at the moment, there is no decisive argument for or against mathematical Platonism. I go through the main arguments of Frege, Godel and Quine in favour of Platonism and try to refute it by E. P. R. thought experiment. At this stage, I advance the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena to support my argument. By discussing Hilbert's formalism and Field's factionalism, I then continue to show how the views of anti-Platonists could be advocated. I conclude that there is no fact of the matter as to whether there are abstract objects or there are not.

How are the words of a language attached to the world? For example, how are proper names, such as “ Socrates” and “ Tehran”, related to the individuals and objects of the world? Such a question has puzzled philosophers for a long time and the main occupation of many philosophers of the 20th century was to find a definite answer to the question. Traditional Muslim logicians believe that a proper name is a “ referring expression” (in Russellian sense) that, unlike Fregean views, simply designates an individual or object, which is its meaning, without having any other sense than the individual or the object it designates. On the basis of their theory of proper names, one can say that the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence like Socrates was a philosopher, wherein the subject position is occupied by a proper name, is a “Singular proposition” about the referent of the name. In this article the theory of proper names is dealt with by examining a number of propositions.

The semantic of proper names is one of imprtant issues in philosophy of logic. In this article I have examined some most famous theories on this subject and evaluvated Mil's, Frege's , Russell's and Kripke's theory. Although I have almost favoured Kripke's opinion, but I think it is insufficient for making clear logical role of proper name. So by revising it and adding some condition, I have tried to defend the view that when proper name designates its referent some descriptions should be considered; those descriptions don't give the sense of proper name, but user thinks , rightly or wrongly, that they fix its referent. This analysis, of course, contains some pragmatical ingredient and is not purely semantical.

How language represents the world? This is a question has long been a major concern of philosophers of language. Many philosophers, such as, Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein, thought that understanding the structure of language could illuminate the nature of actual world. They believe that the main business of a declarative sentence, contrary to a performative one, beside expressing an epistemic - semantic entity, which is called "proposition", is to describe, or report, some state of affairs, which it must do either truly or falsely. But in Austin view there is no substantial distinction between declarative and performative utterances. Since in uttering the sentence we are doing some actions, as well, such as, making statements, descriptions, applications and promises, giving orders, offering apologies, and so on. These actions, which are called , speech acts, are of many types. Any utterance has a performative aspect, or illocutionary force, that determines the kind of action which is performed. Moreover, any utterance has some effects on the hearer, which are called perlocutionary acts. According to speech Acts Theory, speech acts, including illocutionary and perloctionary acts, are not only subjected to semantic and epistemic rules governing what is being said by a speaker, but further they are a matter of governing rules and presumptions of speech Acts Theory, such as the speaker and hearer intentions, their attitudes and the mutual contextual beliefs between them. Speech Acts Theory has some important consequences and effects on Semantics and Religious Epistemology, which will be discussed shortly in this article.