In this paper, discussing the position of realism and antirealism in meta-ethics, first we will explain different versions of moral realism. Then we will discuss Kant's moral teachings to determine his attitude concerning these versions. Moral realism and anti-realism has a strong relation to cognitivism and noncognitivism in meta-ethics. So we will discuss shortly moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism and different schools of moral realism and anti- realism and their differences. Finally by reviewing Kant's most important moral teachings, we will show that based on different meanings of realism we can put Kant in realist or anti-realist thinkers.

By emphasis on cognitive aspect of moral realism, this article surveys various divisions in moral realism and anti-realism and, regarding later Wittgenstein's courses, it explores his views about this matter. Thus, after a short description of Wittgenstein’s courses in Philosophical Investigations which are related to this topic, ideas of his commentators in this area are studied. Since moral realism has a firm relation with cognitive and non-cognitive discussion in meta-moral, thus later Wittgenstein’s view about this topic is also investigated. At the end, it is shown that calling Wittgenstein a realist or anti-realist is due to the wrong usage of reality grammar and he cannot be categorized as such.

By appealing to the no-miracle argument (NM), scientific realists claim that the approximate truth of scientific theories and the existence of their postulated entities are the cause of the predictive and explanatory success of science. Antirealists, however, by appealing to the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMI), claim that a lot of past predictively successful and yet false theories show that there is not any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. One of the most influential responses of realists to PMI is Structural Realism, proposed by John Worral. The aim of this thesis is to show that during theory-shift there has been a continuity at the structural or formal level, and the central terms of successive theories refer to the same entities (structures). In the first part of this paper NM and PMI will be explained. Then, a critical evaluation of structural realism is given in both epistemological and ontological versions. It will be shown that this thesis is unable to rebut PMI conclusively. The conclusion of this paper, however, is that PMI cannot work against structural realists’ thesis if they limit the domain of their claim to existential sentences of scientific theories, to what I call “Existential Realism.”

In this paper, I am going to give an argument in favour of the atomistic and generalistic account in the realm of morality, according to which the behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different cases is answerable to general patterns. It follows from this that the particularistic account with regard the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature is implausible. Unlike generalists, particularists subscribe to holism, according to which the way in which a morally relevant feature contributes to the overall outcome of different cases is fully context-dependent. In order to criticize the particularistic view, firstly, it needs to be explained that in what sense the particularist and his rival, the generalist are realist. Moreover, by borrowing some notions from the philosophy of science, I show that realism requires atomism, both in science and morality. It follows from this that the particularistic account which is associated with the realistic account is implausible

Popper's falsificationism is a theory on scientific methodology and a criterion to separate scientific propositions from unscientific ones. Contrary to inductive method, it does not seek to prove the conclusive truth or even inconclusive and probable truth of scientific theories based on psychological self-evidence of observable and so-called basic propositions. Therefore, theories always remain at the level of conjecture and guessing. However, they can be approximately true guessing, although they are not absolutely or probably true conjectures.The concept of "approximate truth" or "more approximation to truth" is closely related to the reinforcement of propositions, degree of reality-showing or truthshowing, and scientific progress. Such an idea at least necessitates accepting the doctrine of correspondence between truth and realism about the existence of universe and scientific identities independent from men's minds. However, critics claim that Popperian falsificationism and scientific realism are incompatible and one is actually given up at the expense the other. Some scholars believe that realism is at most more compatible with positivism and others hold that falsificationism necessitates the rejection of essentialism and as a result necessitates unrealistic instrumentalism. The present paper tries to elaborate on these claims.

Realistic literature, the basis for contmporary literature, aims at representation of truthfulness and reality. Before world war II, the dispute between fascism and anti-fascism became the decisive factor for social and political life. After the defeat of fascism the new dispute between socialism and imperialist capitalism once again become dominant in world politics and thus the makers of the cold-war aimed to divide humanity into two rival camps. After the defeat of socialism, Imperialism became the dominant thought. For a critical evaluation of Realism and Modernism one must take into consideration its form and dialectics. The political upheavels were like a shadow over the literature of the age, which writers displayed in their writings, as in the formulation of literary characters who suffer from mental disorders, or ultimately some writers may have chosen nihilism as a literary style.