According to the solutions provided in the law, the US Federal Reserve is one of the most independent central banks in the world. In Iran, in practice, the composition of the members of the Monetary and Credit Council and the accuracy of the legal conditions for dismissal and appointment of the Governor of the Central Bank and the review of changes in the management of the Central Bank after the change of governments indicate the Central Bank's dependence on the government. From a procedural point of view, a detailed study of the negotiations between members of parliament and the theories of the Guardian Council and the approvals of the Expediency Discernment Council, while passing the relevant laws, shows that there is no correct idea of the central bank's duties and its independence. Regardless of the central bank's domestic goodwill, internationally, the central bank's independence makes it impossible for other countries to seize the central bank's foreign assets under the pretext of the central bank's dependence on the government. In this article, an attempt has been made to compare the independence of the central bank in Iranian and American law with a comparative approach.

Several factors in insurance contracts have led to a situation in which the interests of the insurance companies, as a party of the contract, are provided easily. Among these factors are the complex structure of insurance contract, its adhesive nature, and lack of adequate information and psychological problems in the insured. So using some legal strategies for correcting the unjust structure is inevitable. The law of insurance contracts, with an approach to protection of insurance consumers, is the most proper solution for restoring balance to insurance contracts. “The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law” may be one of the best examples, which could be adopted by other countries and covers a wide range of pre-contractual and contractual obligations of the parties. Using these principles in Iranian law of insurance contracts could guarantee numerous benefits for implementing COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE in insurance contracts. The article examines the most basic factors affecting contractual imbalance of insurance contracts and explains the principles of how to create balance and JUSTICE in these contracts.

Balancing the rights and obligations of the parties in contracts and exchange payments is one of the necessary tools in the interpretation of definite lawa and contracts . The aforementioned definition and the traditional criteria related to it cannot balance people’s rights and the commercial necessities in the modern world; thus, from a more practical perspective, COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE theory means the necessity of balancing the parties’ rights in bilateral contracts and its enforcement guarantee is compensation with the help of other valid legal principles. This theory in Iranian law, although not backed by explicit legal provisions, may be justified as an acceptable theory using analytical and jurisprudential reasons like “Waste of the Object of Sale before its Receipt” and legal options . Accepting this theory in business world today shall require toshare the idea taqydh no reason to obey the law and traditional rules . Based on the JUSTICE of the exchange, the seller faces the buyer who has not paid the full price; He can refuse to sign the official transfer document in order to enforce the lien .

Introduction: Arbitration has a contractual nature and is subject to the sovereignty of the will of the parties, but in some cases, the legislator imposed the referral of claims to arbitration on the will of the parties and caused the contractual nature of the arbitration clause to disappear or be limited. By doing this, he has placed the arbitration outside the will of the parties. This issue causes some moral conflicts in the discussion of compulsory arbitration. Therefore, this research has been done with the purpose of examining the position of compulsory arbitration in Iran's legal system and the ethical challenges in it with a descriptive-analytical approach. Material and Methods: The research was a review method, in order to achieve the goal of the research, in addition to electronic education books and virtual education in this field, articles related to the research keywords from 2004 to 2022 from the databases of Civilica, Magiran, Sid, Researchgate, Science direct, was reviewed Conclusion: Based on the findings of the research, it can be concluded that compulsory arbitration in Iran has ethical challenges in the field of implementation and interpretation, the most important of which is the issue of the right to action and judicial JUSTICE. In the context of ambiguities in mandatory arbitration, even if the method of arbitration becomes ambiguous, the arbitrator has the duty to find out the will of the legislator with the principles and rules of interpretation, which creates a moral conflict for the arbitrator.

Contract law is one substantial pillar of Distribution. Contract parties understand themselves to be engaged in a strictly bilateral exchange to which the parties jointly and exclusively control the terms. Upon breach of the Contract, the suit is based upon a conception of COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE. Distributive JUSTICE is concerned with the fair allocation of resources among community members. Liberals who oppose the use of contract law as a redistributive device believe that distributional objectives are always better achieved through the tax system than through the detailed regulation of individual transactions. Contracts involve just two people and distributive JUSTICE involves many. The claims of distributive JUSTICE might require that we enlist contract as a tools to pursue more equitable distributions. A related claim would be that we should interpret interpersonal entitlements in such a way that they do not exacerbate distributive InJUSTICE. Another focus is on the effects of contract on distribution rather than the effect of distribution on the independent morality of contract. Contingent accounts treat on social context and background involuntary duties. The value of promise and the efficacy of contract depend on the kind of relation from which it arises and their social starting points. There is no categorical reason for barring distributive considerations from the contract regulation. Most of the rules that make up contract law are defaults; which could be choose according to distributional considerations, the list that illustrate the distributive nature of contract rules is countless, and spills over into mutual assent, interpretation, breach…

JUSTICE is an ideal concept which human beings have always sought since the beginning of civilization. From the viewpoint of most scholars, JUSTICE is a virtue and a source to other virtues. Some have even gone so far that they give the same weight to JUSTICE as they do to all other virtues.This article reviews JUSTICE from the viewpoint of ancient Greek philosophers and recent western ones. It considers economic JUSTICE from an Islamic perspective and summarizes it in optimum allocation of resources NO.52, Autumn 2009 6 and facilities, elimination of poverty and financial needs, as well as socioeconomic development. Our constitution considers JUSTICE as a major goal and the general policies of Article 44 are aimed to realize this goal.This article also investigates the issue of JUSTICE Stock and provides reasons to prove this programme violates the sacred value of Islamic economic JUSTICE. So it is unfair to use the word “JUSTICE” for such stocks.

We prove that the non-COMMUTATIVE perspective of an operator convex function is the unique extension of the corresponding COMMUTATIVE perspective that preserves homogeneity and convexity

The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebras and investigate their properties. We generalize some results proved by A. Walendziak for the case of COMMUTATIVE BE-algebras. We prove that the class of COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebras is equivalent to the class of COMMUTATIVE pseudo BCK-algebras. Based on this result, all results holding for COMMUTATIVE pseudo BCK-algebras also hold for COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebras. For example, any finite COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebra is a BE-algebra, and any COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebra is a join-semilattice. Moreover, if a COMMUTATIVE pseudo BE-algebra is a meet-semilattice, then it is a distributive lattice. We define the pointed pseudo-BE algebras, and introduce and study the relative negations on pointed pseudo BE-algebras. Based on the relative negations we construct two closure operators on a pseudo BE-algebra. We also define relative involutive pseudo BE-algebras, we investigate their properties and prove equivalent conditions for a relative involutive pseudo BE-algebra. We define the relative Glivenko property for a relative good pseudo BE-algebra and show that any relative involutive pseudo BE-algebra has the relative Glivenko property.

By studying and using the quasi-pure part concept, we im-prove some statements and show that some assumptions in some articles are super uous. We give some characterizations of Gelfand rings. For example: we prove that R is Gelfand if and only if m (Σ,, 2A I,) Σ,= , 2A m(I, ), for each family fI, g, 2A of ideals of R, in addition if R is semiprimitive and Max(R) ,Y ,Spec(R), we show that R is a Gelfand ring if and only if Y is normal. We prove that if R is reduced ring, then R is a von Neumann regular ring if and only if Spec(R) is regular. It has been shown that if R is a Gelfand ring, then Max(R) is a quotient of Spec(R), and sometimes hM(a)'s behave like the zerosets of the space of maximal ideal. Finally, it has been proven that Z ( Max(C(X)) ) = fhM(f): f 2 C(X)g if and only if fhM(f): f 2 C(X)g is closed under countable intersection if and only if X is pseudocompact.

In this paper, it is proven that a semigroup is regular and RGC_n-COMMUTATIVE if, and only if, it is a spined product of a COMMUTATIVE Clifford semigroup and a right regular band