This paper seeks to examine the economic institutions of the Pahlavi court as one of the hidden pillars of the Pahlavi regime by analyzing it as a neo-patrimonial regime. The paper seeks to answer two questions: 1. What was the process of formation and development of economic activities of The Royal court? 2. What causes the formation and continuation of the process of personal wealth accumulation by the court? To this end, the evolvement and development of the Pahlavi court's economic institutions, namely the Royal Landed Properties Department, the Organization of Pahlavi Real Properties and most importantly the Pahlavi Foundation, were examined using first-hand sources. Based on the analysis of the reasons for the formation of these institutions, findings of the research show that although the psychological tendencies of two Pahlavi monarchs for personal wealth accumulation cannot be ignored, the most important reasons for these tendencies were twofold: 1. providing the necessary funds for operating various clientelistic mechanisms by the court, and 2. establishing a financial basis for the court to be used in times of crisis independently from the state. The paper argues that without due regard to such institutions and their key functions, understanding the nature of the Pahlavi regime and the role of the royal court at the center of Iranian politics at the time will not be possible.

Economic corruption and governance approach is a matter that is overlooked within the Iranian academic literature. Though the grand/Systemic corruption is more correlated with the field of political economy. However, since the political structure of a state by which the Governance is formed and executed has a direct and dramatic impact on the formation and expansion of corruption, it should also be examined from this standpoint. The political structure of a state should be designed in a way that prevents the possibility of corruption and thus the role of public law here is substantial. It should define what characteristics should not exist in order to eliminate corruption to happen. This article is aiming at exploring and elaborating on the elements of public law in explaining the causes of economic corruption in a political system with reference to Iran.

Multisectoral actions for health, defined as actions undertaken by non-health sectors to protect the health of the population, are essential in the context of inter-linkages between three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental. These multisectoral actions can address the social and economic factors that influence the health of a population at the local, national, and global levels. This editorial identifies the challenges, opportunities and capacity development for effective multisectoral actions for health in a complex policy environment. The root causes of the challenges lie in poor governance such as entrenched political and administrative corruption, widespread Clientelism, lack of citizen voice, weak social capital, lack of trust and lack of respect for human rights. This is further complicated by the lack of government effectiveness caused by poor capacity for strong public financial management and low levels of transparency and accountability which leads to corruption. The absence of or rapid changes in government policies, and low salary in relation to living standards result in migration out of qualified staff. Tobacco, alcohol and sugary drink industries are major risk factors for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and had interfered with health policy through regulatory capture and potential law suits against the government. Opportunities still exist. Some World Health Assembly (WHA) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions are both considered as external driving forces for intersectoral actions for health. In addition, Thailand National Health Assembly under the National Health Act is another tool providing opportunity to form trust among stakeholders from different sectors.Capacity development at individual, institutional and system level to generate evidence and ensure it is used by multisectoral agencies is as critical as strengthening the health literacy of people and the overall good governance of a country.

The present article aims to discuss possible impacts of taxes on distribution of income through an examination of dependent variable of "Human Development Index" (HDI) as well as a study of factors affecting or otherwise are unlikely to affect the taxation system (the entity of government) in advancing an optimal distribution of income in Iran in the course of three specific post-revolutionary development plans. First of all, a deductive method was applied to assess the effect of taxation on the behavior of human development index where a statistical analysis was conducted by means of the E-VIEWS program. Then, an in depth, qualitative research method based on interviews with the elite was applied to examine possible qualitative effects of government taxation policy on income distribution policies. Coefficient and value of tax driven revenues in the model indicate that wherever tax driven revenues increases by one percent, the human development index will decrease by 0. 07 percent and vice versa. It also shows that whenever the coefficient and value of the share of direct tax revenues from the GDP except for oil revenues increases by one percent, the human development index will increase by 0. 14 percent and vice versa. Statistically speaking there is no meaningful relationship between taxation driven revenues and human development index. Given to the fact that the Human Development Index (HDI) stood as a dependent variable indicative of distribution of income in the present article, the paper concludes that taxes show no distributive efficiency in the course of the development plans. As for the role of the entity of government in the distribution of income, rentier government indexes were confirmed which points to Clientelism in economy as well as no dependence on the part of the establishment to tax revenues. Put it another way, with a rentier government in place in the Iranian economy, the taxation system has failed to pick a distributive efficiency.