According to Article 94 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is mandated to review the resolutions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly for their compliance with Islamic principles and the Constitution. In fulfilling this duty, one of the frequently referenced principles of the Constitution that the GUARDIAN COUNCIL focuses on is Article 3, which outlines the duties of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 16 clauses. Clause ten of this article states "the establishment of a proper administrative system" as one of the government's responsibilities. The term "proper administrative system" is ambiguous and can be interpreted in multiple ways; therefore, clarifying this term is essential. Based on the above premises, analyzing the opinions of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL seems effective for achieving this goal. Thus, this research, using a descriptive-analytical method, aims to answer the question: "What is the concept of a proper administrative system according to the opinions of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL?" Since the administrative system includes structures, relationships, policies, processes, and administrative procedures, its correctness and appropriateness require it to be based on specific principles. Understanding what constitutes a proper administrative system, based on the opinions of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL, relies on extracting these principles from the COUNCIL's views. Consequently, this research categorizes the extracted principles in the current legal literature into two thematic groups: first, the principles governing the administrative organization in two sections—organizational structure and human resource employment; and second, the principles governing administrative actions in three sections—general principles, provision of public services, and collection of public fees.

In comparative public law, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is placed among the institutions of constitutional justice. It is a notion derived from democratic motivations, guarantee of the rights and liberties, restriction of power and in a summery, the protection of normative privilege of constitutional law in the legal hierarchy order. While GUARDIAN COUNCIL has followed France constitutional law COUNCIL formally, it has serious differences in the contents, jurisdiction and practices. The main functional difference between GUARDIAN COUNCIL and other justice institutions in the modern governments is that it acts according to the Sharia’ . Thus the judge whether intentionally or not, cannot be impartial and make the balance. This kind of functions may lead to the creation of some practices which is against the philosophy of constitutional law courts i. e protection of constitutional government foundations. The authority of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is not independent and its legitimacy depends on its loyalty to the political power and not entering to the territory of the founder. The result of constitutional judge and founder power’ s struggle is the reproduction of inefficient cycle, invalidity and illegitimacy of political and legal system. The perception of GUARDIAN COUNCIL as a switchman of the constitution seeks to protect the democratic systems from the constitutional judges’ dictatorship and the development of illegitimacy toward political structure. This article is an analysis on the theory of GUARDIAN COUNCIL as a switchman of the constitution and its features in Iran’ s constitutional justice.

e legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran has foreseen non-judicial control methods to protect the Sharia and the constitution and this is done by the GUARDIAN COUNCIL. While the Iranian constitution on different principles than "constitution" and "Sharia" as the main norms GUARDIAN COUNCIL to review the decisions of Parliament have anticipated; but by examining the practical practice of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL it is clear that this COUNCIL has, in some cases, adopted its own norms, such as ordinary laws, The decisions of the Expediency Discernment COUNCIL, the general policy of the system, the statutes of some revolutionary institutions, and so on. In this article, by carefully examining the norms, it is clear that the implementation of parliamentary approvals with the general policies of the system and the statutes of some revolutionary institutions is justified because it is approved by the Supreme Leader and is considered a government decree and it may also be possible to implement parliamentary approvals of some of these norms in order to improve the quality of the law and to bring transparency to the rules. This is despite the fact that the implementation of parliamentary approvals by the COUNCIL of Ministers by the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is not rational and legal, even if it is aimed at disambiguation and transparency in the laws. This paper tries to criticize the GUARDIAN COUNCIL's practical approach with an analytical descriptive method and providing examples of these norms.

Code writing is one of the most influential and sensitive powers of governance. Using these regulatory tools, government officials directly and indirectly define behavioral frameworks for citizens. The GUARDIAN COUNCIL, as the sole legislative body of the Constitution, is enshrined in the Constitution with unique powers, including the interpretation of the Constitution and election monitoring. Considering the legislative records, it indicates that this COUNCIL, in order to perform its basic duties, directly or with the approval of the ordinary legislator, has initiated various regulations. This article is concerned with identifying the justifiable basis of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL’ s by-laws, the thematic and legal scope of this authority, and the possibility of overseeing the by-laws approved by the COUNCIL. The findings of the investigation show that the GUARDIAN COUNCIL has the authority to write bylaws in accordance with the powers provided for in the constitution and their administrative requirements. The jurisdiction of the COUNCIL in the writing of letters is subjectively limited to the powers provided for in the Constitution and is mainly the subject of Articles 4, 85 and 91-99. The limits of this competence of the coun-cil are in terms of rulings, fidelity to the texts of the constitution, observance of the jurisdiction of other institutions and the pillars of constitutional rights, as well as the necessity of setting a rule. In terms of oversight, it was concluded that the judicial oversight of the Administrative Court of Justice over the decisions of the COUNCIL does not negate the independence of the COUNCIL and is necessary to ensure the rule of law and the implementation of Article 173.

According to the principles of the constitution, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is responsible for safeguarding the principles of Sharia and the constitution in the formulation of ordinary laws. On the other hand, this COUNCIL is responsible for guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms in line with the protection of citizen's rights contained in the constitution, and in this regard, according to article 98 of the constitution, it is also responsible for interpreting the constitution, in one case, the COUNCIL's interpretation of election supervision, to electoral supervision; It created challenges from critics about limiting the freedom of citizens. In this regard, the main question that the current research seeks to answer is: What is the role of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL in guaranteeing and securing the freedoms of citizens by emphasizing its opinions and performance? The findings of the research show that although the interpretations and consequently the performance and restrictions applied by Shuri are based on the constitution, but in practice some interpretations are narrow compared to broad interpretations as well as restrictive functions especially regarding elections. It can be tasteful and limit the freedoms and rights stipulated in the constitution for citizens. The research method of this article is descriptive-analytical and information collection is done in library form.

Discussing the position of expediency in the decision-making of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is one of the important issues. The basic question in this context is what is the position of expediency in the decision-making of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL and what was the decision-making process of this COUNCIL regarding the position of expediency regarding the parliament's approvals in the field of extradition of criminals? The present article is descriptive and analytical and has investigated the mentioned question by using the library method. The results of the research show that in the decision-making process, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL has basically based the two principles of observing the principles of the Constitution and Sharia standards, which is the inherent duty of this COUNCIL. And even though awareness of the requirements of the time and issues of the day is one of the characteristics of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL's jurisprudence stated in the constitution, and this can be the necessity of this COUNCIL's attention to expediency in its decisions, however, the difference of the parliament, which is committed to approving the laws It is according to the interests of the country and the approach of this COUNCIL in not paying attention to expediency in its decisions led to the formation of the Expediency COUNCIL, which is responsible for resolving the differences between the Parliament and the GUARDIAN COUNCIL based on the expediency of the system.

Under Art. 99 of Constitional Law, The supervision on election is construed a duty of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL (Shoraye Negahban). In order to prevent the influence of executors and to guarantee a safe efection, it is obvious that there should be some sort of supervision. The first condition to reach this aim is that the members of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL should not have an effective relationship to political factions and groups,and the rule of prohibition of membership in the COUNCIL with the other executive duties must be observed. In this article, by investigating the «expedient supervision» and «supervision for taking in formation»,while considering the quality of the supervision, it is concluded that the superintendence of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL is disciplinary so that the COUNCIL as an impartial observator by comparing the volunteers identification with the legal conditions anel by sepervising the course of election could guarantee a legal and free election.

IntroductionThe Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly Principle (4), puts the emphasis on upholding Islamic standards in all legal norms. However, a priori sharia supervision over parliamentary approvals shall be exercised by the faqihs (Islamic jurists) of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL concerning the specific laws outlined in Principles (94), (95), and (96) of the Constitution. Other approvals, notably the regulations specified in Principle (4), lack constitutional provision. To ensure optimal implementation of Principle (4), there is a need for an effective mechanism that can guarantee adherence to Sharia standards in regulations. The current Sharia-based supervision mechanism is executed through the Court of Administrative Justice, but this approach has several shortcomings. First, it does not ensure Sharia compliance for all regulations since it is not comprehensive, only addressing the contested aspect of regulations. Moreover, regulations may possess significant importance based on inclusion, hierarchy of legal norms, authority level, and their impact on citizens’ rights and duties, leading to prolonged violations of citizens’ rights even when there are no complaints. In this respect, the present research aimed to examine the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for a priori Sharia supervision over key regulations, addressing the challenges associated with its implementation. The study is based on the hypothesis that there are factors favoring  a priori Sharia supervision over other types of monitoring when it comes to some aspects of regulations. Although most challenges are manageable, certain challenges make it both desirable and achievable to implement such a mechanism. Literature ReviewThe literature has offered solutions, suggesting the mandatory submission of government regulations and approvals from the Supreme COUNCIL of Cultural Revolution to the GUARDIAN COUNCIL before their implementation—which can ensure supervision over regulations from both a Sharia and constitutional perspective (e.g., Amjadian, 2012; Haji Ali Khamseh et al., 2021). Another proposed solution involves the establishment of boards specialized in Islamic jurisprudence and legal matters, overseen by the GUARDIAN COUNCIL faqihs tasked with proactive monitoring subsequent to the enactment of regulations (Fe’li, 2020). The novelty of the present study lies in its detailed analysis of the feasibility and challenges associated with a priori Sharia supervision over regulations. Materials and MethodsThe study relied on a descriptive–analytical method, using library research to collect and analyze the data. Results and DiscussionA priori Sharia supervision over regulations can viably be applied after the regulations are approved and before they take effect—similar to the supervision over Majlis approvals. A priori Sharia supervision is more aligned with the objective of Principle (4) of the Constitution, so it is favored over other forms of supervision, especially retrospective supervision. Furthermore, it is essential that Sharia-based supervision be applied in advance or a priori to the implementation, at least for critical regulations that are not subject to appeal in the Court of Administrative Justice. Moreover, for the sake of legal security of citizens and the prevention of rights violations, a priori supervision is preferable over alternative types of monitoring because it is difficult to claim and restore the rights of citizens that might have been infringed upon in the past, especially if regulations are retroactively annulled long after their implementation. ConclusionThe challenges related to the principles of continuity and acceleration in delivering public services do not pose a significant obstacle to a priori Sharia supervision because it is feasible to set a deadline for expressing opinions and the GUARDIAN COUNCIL faqihs have opinions aimed at guaranteeing these principles. Furthermore, certain regulations that are not allowed to be delayed in their approval and implementation can exceptionally be subjected to Sharia supervision outside a priori Sharia supervision mechanism. It is plausible that the structure and organization of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL may not be entirely conducive or equipped to implement such a mechanism, given the unique responsibilities of the faqihs. However, it can be limited to a priori Sharia supervision of critical regulations, and it is not challenging as such, given the reforms aimed at reducing the Court of Administrative Justice’s inquiries from the COUNCIL (e.g., the ability to refer to the procedure of the COUNCIL’s faqihs in similar cases), and a comprehensive revision of the COUNCIL’s organization to lay the ground for a priori Sharia supervision. Additionally, the Head of the Judiciary and the President of the Court can notify the GUARDIAN COUNCIL faqihs of cases conflicting with Sharia in order to eliminate the structural defects of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL that render it incompatible with supervising important regulations. It is worth noting that Note (1) of Article (87) of the Law of the Court of Administrative Justice (1402/2023) also lays the groundwork for establishing a suitable structure for Sharia supervision over regulations.

One of the goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to assure compliance of the legal norms with the religious Criteria. In line with this, non-contradiction of all legislations and regulations with Islamic criteria is reviewed by the Jurists of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL, based on the Article 4 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Supreme COUNCIL of the Cultural Revolution is one of the legal normative bodies that has not yet provided a specific mechanism for assessing its enactments by religious Criteria. Accordingly the main question of this study is to examine the desirable mechanism for Religious Review of the Supreme COUNCIL of Cultural Revolution's Enactments by the Jurists of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL in the legal system of Iran? In this research, using the descriptive-analytical method, this hypothesis was proved that the desirable mechanism to ensure the conformity with Islam for typical enactments of the Supreme COUNCIL of the Cultural Revolution is to exercise the “ a priori” and “ active” review of the Jurists of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL. One of the most important benefits of this model is to ensure the maximum Islamic conformity of these enactments.

The explanation and examination of the approach of the jurists of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL in reviewing tax legislation, or in other words, legislation related to taxes and the tax system of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, can not only have theoretical benefits but also familiarize ordinary legislators with this institution's perspective on the Sharia framework of tax laws. Consequently, if legislators pay attention to this framework, it could lead to a reduction in the lengthy legislative process. Investigating the approach of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL and identifying instances where the jurists of this COUNCIL have deemed the tax legislation of the Assembly incompatible with Sharia principles is the main question of this research. Based on descriptive-analytical studies, the jurists of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL have identified several issues as violations of Sharia in the context of aligning the tax legislation of the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Sharia principles, including "lack of attention to the capabilities of taxpayers," "oppression of taxpayers," "holding taxpayers responsible for the tax payments of others," "seizing taxpayers' assets to collect taxes beyond a precautionary amount," "the priority of the tax administration in collecting taxes over other creditors," and "lack of consideration for justified excuses in deadlines." They have deemed legislation containing these issues as incompatible with Sharia.