This article analyses the evolution of the Islamist political associations and groups, both Shiites and Sunnis since the independence of Kuwait in 1962 to the last legislative elections which was held in 2016. It tries to assess the roles which the Islamist groups played in a relatively open political environment established by the constitution and the popular support these groups obtained along the interrupted electoral history in which the country witnessed. It also assesses the transformations which the Sunni Islamist groups suffered from the institutionalized opposition role they played until the Arab Spring events to the more informal opposition style since then. The article concludes by stating that this transformation negatively affected the popular support granted to the ISLAMISTS and hindered their influence in the policy making process in Kuwait, losing the opportunity that the Arab Spring uprisings provided for them.

In the last century, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the theoretical, conceptual and field developments in the Islamic world, a suitable opportunity was created to play the role of various types of Sunni Islamism, including the Ikhwan al muslimeen, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Salafism, Wahhabi and Salafism Jihadi (such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS) etc. at national and international levels.Of course, most of these movements failed to achieve their goals, but this did not remove them from the scene of regional and international activism. Rather, in cases like the Taliban, we have witnessed their return to power. Or the Ikhwan al muslimeen is always fluctuating in the dynamic between social action and political action and the anti-occupation movements have also strengthened the resistance front. The main question of this article is what is the current situation of the Sunni ISLAMISTS and where is their position in the Arab world. Which was examined through future study and extracting the drivers, uncertainties, drivers and understanding the side and direction and discursive space of Sunni Islamism, and based on this, the upcoming scenarios have been drawn.

In the field of political thought, concepts are among the main means of giving meaning to the real world, in other words, the field of praxis, which are always changing and evolving due to the change in their use. Takfir and Jihad in Islam are among the concepts whose meanings and functions have changed and had consequences in the field of opinion and practice, especially for radical ISLAMISTS. Based on this, showing how the violent emergence of the radical Islamist current, due to the changes created in these concepts and in relation to the "other", is the concern of the present research. The purpose of the article is to show the evolution of radical ISLAMISTS' view of "the other" and the impact of this evolution on the identity and performance of the so-called Takfiri-Jihad movement in the use of violence. The method of the article is John Pocock's historiography, which deals with the interpretation and analysis of language in the political context. The findings of the article show that the linguistic paradigm of radical ISLAMISTS is "anti-otherness" or "denial of the other". The final result of the article is that in a hierarchical relationship with "the other", radical ISLAMISTS in a global and apocalyptic perspective divide the world into two camps, "Islamic" and "Ignorant", between "themselves" and "the other". Divided and to erase ignorance from the face of the earth, they resorted to violence and demanded the removal of "the other".

The reciprocal relationship between Turkey and Syria until the early years of the 21st century has gone through three major disputes- namely the issue of Kurds, and the territorial dispute over Hatay, and sharing the water of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. However, as the political developments took place with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, this country developed into a scene of international rivalries on which the regional powers acted their parts. Acting its part in the developments that took place in Turkey, the Administration made every effort to acquire a social prestige and secure the support of the West, carrying out different measures on different levels-political, economic, and military- against Syria. Applying the analytical-descriptive method with the use of library and documentary data collection, the present article plans to answer the question of "What effect does Turkey's foreign policy under ISLAMISTS towards the Syrian developments have on the security environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran?"

The identity and performance of the Justice and Development Party of Türkiye since coming to power in 2002 has been the subject of much thought and questions. By emphasizing the legacy of the last Islamic caliphate and relying on new economic-political achievements, Turkish ISLAMISTS have displayed a new formulation of state reason (raison d'état) in the international system under the banner of "Islamic Democracy". They claim to have formulated the requirements of being a Muslim requirements and the secular provisions of today's world together. This formulate of ruling which is based on a new understanding of Turkish Muslim identity contributes to the manifestation of self-confidence in domestic and foreign politics, and this is what have made them to be reckless in pursuing the policy of strategic depth in the Islamic world, the Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa and even Mediterranean area.By applying the theoretical possibilities of the concept of Governmentality in Foucault's thought, this article aims to first shed light on what and how this intellectual and identity transformation is, and then apply it to the politics of the Justice and Development Party.

Why did the non-Islamist political groups, and the Iranian people in general, enthusiastically welcome the protests of the Islamist clergy in January 1978, while many Egyptians regarded the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the revolutionary scene of 2011 with a considerable caution? This paper seeks to answer this question by using the concepts of ‘, attribution of opportunity/threat’,and ‘, discursive opportunity structure’,and the methodological strategy of ‘, individualizing comparison’, . According to the results, the importance of fighting against ‘, cultural colonialism’,set the intellectual ground for the alliance of non-ISLAMISTS with the oppositionist clergy in the 1970s. Moreover, since there was no record in the contemporary history of Iran for the clergy to hold state power, the oppositionist activities of the clergy was attributed as a political opportunity by other oppositionist groups. With the transition from the Iran of 1978 to the Egypt of 2011, the ideology of liberalism became globally hegemonic and set the stage for value-based tensions between the ISLAMISTS and non-ISLAMISTS. Furthermore, because of a) the emergence of terrorist Islamist groups in Egypt and abroad,b) the retreat of the Mubarak regime from some of its secular policies and, consequently, the reinforcement of the conservative Islam,c) the emergence of ‘, new preachers’,broadcasting an ‘, apolitical’,version of Islam,and d) the long history of Muslim Brotherhood of being in formal politics and their high organizational resources,the revolutionaries regarded the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the revolution with a great caution, if not as a threat.

After the Islamic awakening in Tunisia, the collapse of the dictatorship of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the President of this country and the formation of a democratic and parliamentary political system, the two influential political factions in this country began to cooperate and converge with each other. The Ennahda movement, as the most important political trend in Tunisia, played a decisive role in political developments and other parties, including secular parties, welcomed the formation of a coalition government with the Ennahda. The participation of ISLAMISTS with the opposition (secular) parties in Tunisia and the formation of coalition governments was successful at first, but with the intensification of the differences between the two political factions, did not continue and reached a dead end. In this research work, the reasons for persuading ISLAMISTS and secular parties to form a coalition government and then refusing to do so are investigated. The question of the article is what were the grounds of the initial political alliance between ISLAMISTS and secularists after the Islamic awakening in Tunisia and why did this alliance collapse? The hypothesis of this research shows that "Al-Ghannoushi and the leaders of the Ennahda movement towards moderate Islam and democracy made it possible to form a coalition and political partnership with the opposition (secular) parties, but the disagreement over the approval of the constitution and the activities of the Salafist groups made these two factions refuse to form a coalition, which resulted in the formation of an authoritarian political system in this country. This article is a theoretical research that was written by studying primary sources such as books and articles, and data collection was based on the library method.

The twofold of war and peace has always been a practical and theoretical issue for human in different levels. Meanwhile religious teachings had recommendation for both beliefs. Based on this some insisted on Rahmani aspects of religion and some with dual divisionism such as right or wrong and insider or outsider, insisted on the usage of violence and war in order to reach their social and political goals. In this contemporary world radical ISLAMISTS believe in violence as an introduction of peace. In their beliefs the utopia in which Believers can gain happiness and also flourish their talents in peace and prosperity would become reachable based upon the destruction of whatever exist. And the introduction of this attractive utopia is violence and war. Therefore, removing all disruptive elements and dead-ends in the way of the realization of utopia by using violence and force are of their emphasis in their beliefs and practices. But the question is that how much of violence is allowed? How long do people tolerate the use of violence to reach peace? What is the guarantee that violence will not turn into the goal itself? In which stage of this process due to establishment of the ideal society, violence will subside? Harsh violence of the radical ISLAMISTS such as al-Qaida and Islamic State are good examples of the groups which want to reach peace using violence and war. In this article the author besides eviewing the influential Ideas in the spread of violence by these groups also review the paradoxical situation of “the introduction of the war” for peace.

Tunisia, like other Islamic societies, became acquainted with modernity in the nineteenth century. The arrival of modernity in Tunisia paved the way for extensive political, administrative, military, cultural, and educational developments. Despite these developments, until the early twentieth century, Tunisian modernist rulers and thinkers did not consider women's rights and the reform of their social status. From the first decades of the twentieth century, coinciding with the arrival of French colonization (1881-1956), women and their rights were considered. During this period, the current religious reform spread throughout the Arab Maghreb and Tunisia and gave rise to the current of Islamic modernization. Thus, for the first time, the issue of women's rights was raised by modernists such as Tahir al-Haddad. He was a graduate of Zaytouna Mosque. They defended women and their social rights with an Islamic approach. With new interpretations of religious texts, they put religious concepts at the service of the feminist movement. they challenged issues such as hijab, women's education and employment, polygamy, and the right to divorce. The people and some traditionalist scholars met this issue with an adverse reaction. The main subject of the present study is what factors led to the evolution of the status of women and the formation of women's advocacy movements during the colonial period? And what were the consequences of these developments? Findings show that factors such as the arrival of modernity in Tunisia, the role of colonialism, the support of Islamic modernists for women's rights, and the formation of unions had an influential role in improving the social status of women. Social and political activities were among the essential consequences of the reforms. These reforms paved the way for further broader developments, namely government support for feminism and the emergence of a secular women's movement during Tunisia's independence.