The doctrine of Representationalism is rooted in the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences, but it can also be traced in the philosophy of language. The purpose of this paper is to apply representationalist approaches in language and meaning to knowledge and information science research. Therefore, in the first part, the application and achievements of Representationalism for information retrieval action are analyzed. Studies are categorized according to their level of concern to language and meaning in organization and information retrieval. Then, in the second part, the representational approaches to Language in Information Retrieval Action (LIRA) are analyzed and criticized in the related research. In this analysis, philosophical approaches have been considered because the roots of Representationalism can be traced in semantics and semiotics in linguistic approach. Representationalism with emphasis on the linguistic dimension in the organization and information retrieval research is a theory that is advocated due to the constant relationship between words and the world they represent. In this study Representationalism in semantic tools (such as thesauri, subject headings, and classifications) consists of all processes (from indexing to user information searching and retrieval) called Information Retrieval Action (IRA), and can be criticized in various ways. Some studies focus on the nature of knowledge representation and find it in the philosophy of language. Some theoretical studies criticize Representationalism by addressing cognitive sciences and related areas in the information representation and retrieval or by focusing on fundamental issues in the philosophy of language and its relation to information retrieval. Others go beyond linguistic level and analyze IRA in terms of semiotics and in connection to meaning. Some studies account for the representation (in knowledge organization and especially in classifications) not as a linguistic but paradigmatic issue at the level of modernist domination in the modern era against which postmodernism stands. Finally, this inquiry illustrates that information retrieval has been rooted in the paradigm of empiricism and positivism in these areas. Representationalism places the mind at the center of cognition and ignores other aspects such as context, culture and use of them. The changes that have taken place over time to overcome the problems in the field of retrieval, such as those of headings and thesauruses and the achievement of ontologies and folksonomies, illustrate the shortcomings of these paradigms arising from representational approaches to language and needs to be changed in favor of a pragmatic view point.

Purpose: This paper aims at gaining a deep understanding of Representationalism in knowledge organization and information retrieval analyzing foundations of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Method: The method used is logical inference. The approach is theoretical and argumentative. Accordingly, its feature and nature is speculative. Findings: Representationalism is the indirect realism rooted in seventeenth-century Cartesianism, in Locke and Hume's eighteenth-century empiricism, and in Kant's idealism. Language in this early period of modern philosophy, had no material existence and was fully used to regulate ideas. Since its main consideration is the subjectivity, it is not necessary to enhance the status of language that acts as an intermediary connecting subject with object and that expresses the meanings of the object; since early modern philosophy does not concern itself with the issue of intersubjectivity and the relationship between “ I” and “ the other, ” it is not necessary to pay heed to the function of language that serves as a bridge among subjects or consciousnesses (let alone among cultures). The emphasis of Representationalism in the philosophy of mind is that ideas and perceptions are superior to language, and language is the only representation of thoughts. In the philosophy of language, Representationalism means that language is like a mirror representing concepts, and meaning is fixed according to this representationalist view of language as well. Conclusion: Representation is an accepted principle in the field of knowledge organization and information retrieval. Accordingly, the issue of representation is addressed according to representationalist approaches. In order to understand Representationalism in this field and its connection with language and meaning, it is necessary to pay attention to this theory and its prepositions in philosophy. Our study showed that the theory of Representationalism was indicative and supportive of a marginal rather than a central view of language. Accordingly, changing the representationalist approach to language in information science, can help our field to improve its semantic information retrieval systems. We seek to retrieve relevant and meaning-based information. To present in detail the theory of Representationalism in relation to language and meaning in these areas requires further study. Here, we only showed the presuppositions, origins, and leaders of the theory in philosophy of mind and language.

Theorizing about media, under the influence of prevailing view in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, has been done mostly within a representational framework. Representationalism, however, beside its usual problems, faces a new one in the context of visual media use. In representational approach, the experience of visual media use is something exceptional and separate from everyday experiences. But by adopting an anti-representational view, like extended mind theory, no such problem arises. The basic claim of extended mind theory is that cognitive processes are not confined to our brain and body, but extend to the surrounding environment. We show that this thesis looks much more plausible in the context of visual media use, compared to representationalist approaches, and also that it may be possible to rejoin one of the objections made to the extended mind theory, namely the fallacy of coupling-constitution by pointing to media use experience. Explanatory strength of anti-representationalist approach may be one the reasons why some prominent media theorists like Hugo Mü, nsterberg and Marshall McLuhan, long before Clark and Chalmers, had ideas about mind extension in the media theories.

Richard Rorty gives a descriptive-historical account of philosophical views. He criticizes fundamentalism and Representationalism which, since Descartes, have dominated epistemology. The fundamental assumption of philosophers is that philosophy has a prominent role in our understanding of the world, and that philosophical issues are permanent. This means that philosophy is regarded as the ground for our knowledge. Rorty is against that, and so he is in fact against epistemology. Now, the question is whether Rorty is successful in freeing himself from Representationalism. Rorty declares his pragmatism according to which knowledge requires dialogue and social action. He calls this view epistemological behaviorism. Charles Taylor describes Rorty’s view as a secular viewpoint which leads to unethical consequences. Taylor says that Rorty’s view is still under sovereignty of Representationalism.

Vazgeraee is a theory of meaning that was formed in the context of jurisprudence principles and comments on the process of encoding meaning for words, the nature of meaning, the existential structure of meaning, the relationship between words and meaning, and the process of decoding. In Vazgeraee, with an atomic view of meaning, the content of sentences is determined according to the meaning of constituent words and how they are arranged in the sentence. Each word indicates one or more fixed and determined meanings, that is, mental images, and this indication is also a valid process that takes place through indexing.In this article, after explaining the history of the formation of this theory, with a descriptive and analytical method, while explaining the mentioned components, the problems related to them are explained. According to the researches, this theory faces criticisms such as commitment to linguistic idealism, humanism of the word-coining process, reduction of meaning to the conceptual field, Representationalism and wordism. Also, this theory defends a kind of text-oriented approach in the field of interpretation, which is not compatible with the mission of discovering the divine meaning. By examining and criticizing this theory, the author defends contextualism.

In this article, Rorty’s theory of philosophical paradigm is considered in two stages: at first we describe and analyze his historical view about philosophical problems. In this stage, Rorty shows that philosophical history consists of three paradigms; metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind, each of which has its own special problems. Rorty pointed with his therapeutic method to the errors of philosophers in applying philosophical problems that related to one paradigm to another one, and he criticized Representationalism. After that, his original view about knowledge was considered; he finally comes to this conclusion that philosophical problems should be set aside rather than solved. In the second phase of examining his view, we express some important criticisms including those of Habermas and Tailor. The latter disagrees with Rorty about discontinuity of philosophical paradigm. In the conclusion, Rorty’s view about philosophical paradigms is examined and criticized.

Richard Rorty claims that, during the Enlightenment, philosophy helped the West get rid of medieval religious beliefs, and now it is time to get rid of philosophy and its dogmas too. Attacking foundationalism, he argues that we cannot devise a philosophical system on foundations that are certain and evident for all, and then deduce certain values and norms from it. Philosophy cannot be of any help for making a distinction between warranted and unwarranted assertions in morality and politics. The validity of moral and political values can only be shown pragmatically, when they make human life and coexistence easier in practice. Philosophy at the most can summarize systematically our culturally influenced intuitions, reconcile our judgments in various areas of knowledge, predict the consequences of combining certain strands of thought, and finally provide an argument for whatever we or our clients have decided to do. It may be asked whether Rorty, by separating philosophy from politics, has not deprived us from a valuable tool for recognising and criticising deficiencies and inequalities in a society. In this paper, first, Rorty's educational and professional background in philosophy is reviewed. Then, his arguments against philosophy, in general and Western philosophy, in particular, are mentioned briefly. Finally, the functions of philosophy from his point of view are discussed.

Phenomenology is a well-known trend in continental philosophy founded by Husserl. Recently, some philosophers such as Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher have extended this approach to the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. Cognitive scientists and analytical philosophers often examine the human mind from a third-person perspective and transfer mental states to behavior, brain interactions, and function. However, an aspect of the mind remainsthat cannot be accessed by the experimental method and the third perspective. Phenomenology has much to say about subjective conscious experience and examines it from a first-person perspective, object’s meaning for the subject. Phenomenologists attach extensive importance to intentionality as the main feature of consciousness through which mental states are connected with the external world. They oppose the explanations of reductionists from  intentionality, such as causational explanation. According to phenomenologists, the fact that we can think about objects that do not exist in the external world is a decisive argument against those who have reduced intentionality to causation. Phenomenologists also disagree with the representational approach regardingintentionality. It is unclear why knowing an internal object leads to understanding an external object when these two objects are completely different from each other. We cannot get out of the realm of our consciousness and mind and compare our inner object with the outer object.

Richard Rorty by presenting a new interpretation of pragmatism distinguishes his distance from other tendencies in American philosophy. Philosophy to Rorty has no longer the role of legitimating human knowledge and defending the relations, applications and human and social actions merely philosophical is baseless. Philosophy, at its best is a voice among voices and will perform a refining role. On the other hand, due to the historic relation of philosophy with politics and political and by challenging the role of philosophy, the contemporary political theory in general and egalitarian democracy as the most possible exiting government in particular will changefoundamentally. Therefore, the present research intends to examine the main impact of new pragmatism upon democracy which has an egalitarian tune to Rorty.

The paper deals with a particular group of objections against representational theories about phenomenal experiences. The author, primarily, illustrates the importance of representational theories and clarifies some helpful categories of representational versions which has used in the paper. Then, it focuses on an especial group of objections against the inclusion of these theories. This group of objections undermines the inclusion of Representationalism about "bodily sensations" and "intentional states". Opponents, in fact, make some doubts that representational approach cannot explain the phenomenal character of bodily sensations and intentional states. The paper has described these two difficulties, the first one has been discussed among scholars and the later represented by the author. It, finally, peruses the actual and potential responses of representationalists and, then, concludes that representational theories can come over the objections about bodily sensations, but they should give some explaination in order to unravel the objections about intentional states.