One of the unanimous issues in jurisprudence and Islamic law is that the will is limited to one-third of the heritage and its surplus is subject to permission from the heirs. But if there is no heir, there is disagreement about whether the limitation of third still remains or the Testator has complete freedom. Given that, a group of experts believes that the will is limited to the third and the surplus belongs to Imam (Governor). Another group believes in the absolute freedom of Testator and validity of such testament. Others go into details and separate between wills to charity and other wills and maintain that only charitable testament is valid and other wills are limited to the third. This study examines the arguments presented for different ideas and considers the theory of limitation of the Testator without heir to one-third of the property as a stronger theory. From the legal point of view it is also more compatible with the provisions of the Civil Code.

Background: Human being is owned by God and is allowed to own him/herself and make a decision on his/her organs after demise, including the right of making will on using his/her organs in the case of death.Methods: This study is a review of Jurisprudential and legal investigation of the effectiveness of the Muslim’s will on using bodily organs of the Testator in Iran. The findings that used, based on the studies were carried down in Iran and published in databases such as Google scholar, religious book and request for opinion emulation searching is done by using valid keywords.Results: This study concluded that using of organs of the deceased is acceptable for solving the problems of another live Muslim person. The legal department of the judiciary has declared also that organ donation is acceptable, but no organ may be sold since it is not included as a property.Conclusion: According to different religions and laws in the different countries similar studies are limited also in the Islamic countries, too. But there is disagreement on the studies in our country. There is a fundamental difference between the view of the proponents and that of the opponents of removing organs.

The murder of the Testator by the heir in testamentary disposition (testament for disposition of personal property), while challenging and lacking in research background, raises the question of whether such a murder can deprive the legatee of taking possession of the bequest (legacy). Three jurisprudential views based on the investigations can be considered in this regard that the murder of the Testator by the legatee has no effect on taking position of the legatee according to the famous view and the legatee is still the owner of the bequest (legacy). However, two other views, in a little detail, are based on the fact that murdering a Testator by the legatee as in the case of inheritance would prevent the legatee from the bequest (legacy). The present article considers the famous theory acceptable by using a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources, while critically analyzing and evaluating the jurisprudential fundamentals of the proposed views and also considers the prevention of the legatee from the bequest more acceptable by arguing that on the one hand, no evidence that stipulates the prevention of murdering from testamentary disposition (testament for disposition of personal property) and the absoluteness of verses, traditions and principle as the main reason for the famous point of view, each of them can be undermined in some ways and does not have the authority to prove the famous point of view.

There is a consensus among Muslims that murderers are forbidden from inheritance. The main question of this research is that if the legatee murders the Testator or the chamberlain, is it possible to extend the sentence of a forbidden murderer of inheritance to a will? Three hypotheses were put forward. Each one of the hypothesis was analyzed. The first case is if he commits murder with the intention of acquiring inheritance, and the second case is if he has no intention of acquiring inheritance. The second hypothesis is that the Testator is an heir, and the same two states are assumed for the second hypothesis.

According to the viewpoint of the majority of “ Imamieh Jurists” , in the presumption of death of legatee before the rejection or acceptance of the will, the right to reject or accept a will is inherited to the legatee’ s heirs. Against, the other viewpoint distinguished between the death of legatee after and before the death of Testator and they are believed that in the first case, the will is void and in the latter, the right to accept or reject is inherited. Most Sunni jurists have accepted this view. Some jurists say if Testator intend the will for only legatee, right of acceptance or rejection of this will don't transfer to his heirs unless the Testator intention is to transfer the right of acceptance or rejection. Article 21 of the Egyptian Code of Will accepted the transfer of the right of acceptance or rejection the legatee heirs absolutely, but Iranian law does not have a clear statement in this regard. In this research, after studying the points of view about inheritance of the right of acceptance or rejection of the will and the reasons of proponents and opponents of each views in Islam Jurisprudence, Egypt Law and Iranian Law, The result is that in Iranian Law, the inheritance of the right of acceptance or rejection of the will can be accepted absolutely; unless, the Testator intend to will just for legatee, so that, the will is dissolved as a result of legatee’ s death.

Background and Aim: One of the most challenging and controversial issues in relating to the will is the difficulty with recognizing the factors imposing suspension on the will. The present paper deals with giving credence to a testamentary disposition by heirs and heiresses. Materials and Methods: This descriptive-analytical research was done using documentary and library studies. Results: A will is a type of possession that a person leaves before their death. When it comes to a testamentary disposition, after affirmation of the Testator, the exact recognition of the nature of the pre-deceased beneficiaries' acceptance will have many effects. If acceptance of succession is considered as a part or fundamental of a will to the extent that the will is invalid without it, then the testamentary disposition is thought of as a contract that the Islamic jurists largely concur with it. Nevertheless, when acceptance of succession is invalid or the will is regarded as one of the irresistible factors of the transfer, the will is possessory. In such cases, having good morals relating to giving credence to such a will is of importance. Ethical considerations: Confidentiality and trustworthiness have been carefully observed throughout this paper. Conclusion: Islamic jurists suggest that a will shall not be valid for a heir except when it is approved by other heirs. When it comes to the nature of the testamentary disposition more than one third of the estate, most jurists have regarded it as a will bequeathed by the Testator which its acceptance needs the consent of other heirs. With regard to the time of ratification, most jurists believe that admitting or denying a will is only possible after the death of the Testator, and so the rejection or acceptance of the will by the heirs during the Testator's life has no jurisprudential or legal value. Therefore, morality requires that the heirs give credence to a will after the Testator's death by approving of what the deceased has bequeathed.

Imamiah jurisprudents have disagreed about the requirement of successor’s justice in contractual will from past to now. Some of them have considered it as the condition of accuracy of will, and others consider it ineffective in accuracy and inaccuracy of will. Considering that this issue has much scientific and practical results and that if we accept any of these two views, our understanding of the successor and his essential conditions will be different, it seems necessary that the opinions and reasons raised by agreeable and disagreeable jurisprudents are examined and the origin of differences is extracted among their writings, and after comparing their reasons and basics, the more accurate theory is chosen, and thereby a comprehensive, accurate and exact view about the requirement of successor’s justice is accepted.

In a taking possession will, heirs of Testator are forbidden to possess property that is subject of a will. There is no distinction, based upon different foundations, among reasons for such prohibition and under different foundations like transferring, appearance, and no need for an acceptance, the result is forbidding heirs from possession of property. The reason for above point is that a Testator has an especial right over one-third of his property, therefore, till the time of rejection or acceptance of the will his legal heirs are not permitted to use the Testator’, s property. For such a limitation, there is no difference either the Testator die or his property transferred to his residuary. Under this foundation that after dying a person his legal heirs becomes owner of the Testator’, s property, so it is possible to accept such a result for them in the case under discussion, since there many examples that a Testator unable to transfer his ownership upon his property to a third person residuary. In all those cases, like conditional sale contracts and mortgage, a common factor for forbidden a Testator is an implying conditions to save property or destroying it by the owner,and a seller would be able to recover the same property or has a right to return it to him by a buyer as well as a mortgager would be able to recover his money by selling the mortgage. In all those cases mentioned in above, a person who is obliged to keep a property itself or has no right to possess it. Because, possession of a property is a matter that is inconsistent with the main purpose of doing legal activities namely a passion either in a form of transferring or destroying it, or condition for saving a property directly or by implication. Under the “, Imamiyyah”,Jurisprudence, it is admitted that until the time of rejection or acceptance of a will by a residuary, those who are Testators of a will have not any right to possess the property of a dead person,of course, this is not a rule that easily to accept it since it is in contradiction to rules of ownership and right of rejection to accept a will. In this article, it is tried to support a reason (s) for a prohibition of possession of a Testator’, s property against those above rules.

Making a will by the Testator and accepting or disclaiming it by the donee and executor requires the intention. As a rule, the main element of any juridical act (whether a contract or a unilateral juridical act) is the intention. As one of the types of juridical acts, the testamentary (will) is not exempted from this rule. Indeed, as one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia stated: “Intention being the life and soul of a will, it can hardly be imagined, I presume, that a man can make a will without intending to do so, or give by it more than he means to give".In Iranian law, when discussing the intention of individuals in a testamentary (will), it is important to take care of the intention of the Testator, donee, and executor. Thus, in the will, on the one hand, the Testator wants to bring his wish to the fore to manage the affairs and property after death. On the other hand, the donee or executor (of course with exceptions) can disclaim the will for various reasons. Therefore, the principle of sovereignty of the intention in the will can be examined from the angles above.American law is almost similar to Iranian law. In this legal system, when the principle of sovereignty of intention is considered from the perspective of the Testator, the term "Freedom of Disposition" is used. On the contrary, when the topic under discussion is related to accepting or disclaiming the will by the donee, the term "Freedom of Inheritance" is used. Based on this, the principle of sovereignty of the Testator's intention means the Testator is a person who decides which property to transfer to whom and to what extent. The principle of sovereignty of the donee's intention also means the Testator's authority to accept or at least disclaim the will. In this legal system, the "Testamentary Trust" is also used to fulfill the testamentary. In the testamentary trust, the Testator accommodates the desired property to a person named "Trustee" so that he can manage the said property as a "Fiduciary" in favor of the "Beneficiary"."Principle of Sovereignty of the Intention" has now created these questions in the authors' minds: First, what is the basis of the principle of the sovereignty of the intention of the Testator, the donee, and the executor? Second, can we imagine limitations for the intention of the Testator, donee, and executor? If the answer is “Yes”, what are the examples of these limitations?In this article, by a comparative study of Imamia Jurisprudence, Iranian and American Law, an attempt is made to answer the above questions with a descriptive-analytical method and by referring to library sources. The reason for adapting this issue to American law can be summed up in two ways: First, in the legal system of this country, issues related to wills (especially the sovereignty of the will) are very important and have been examined in detail by scholars in the field of inheritance and wills. Second, Iranian jurists consider Imamia Jurisprudence when examining the challenges raised in the realm of wills, contrary to the approach that exists in the law of contracts and civil liability. Although this approach seems to be acceptable and good considering the Iranian civil law based on Islamic jurisprudence, but it cannot stop the curious mind from comparing the will rights with the western legal systems. In the end, after studying the history of the mentioned principle, the following results are obtained: First, the Testator's natural right, his motivation, securing the interests of the Testator, setting the behavior of potential heirs, and duty to social cooperation are considered the basis of the Testator's will. Also, preserving the independence of the donee and executor, the cooperation of the donee in managing the distribution of the estate, and ensuring the interests of the Testator are the basis of the sovereignty of the Testator's will. Second, while the formalities of making a will, the necessary heirs, the mandatory rules, and religion are the limitations of the sovereignty of the intention of the Testator, the formalities of accepting or disclaiming the will and killing the Testator by the donee are the limitations of the sovereignty of the intention of the donee and executor.

In most legal systems of the world, the execution of a will requires the observance of certain requirements. These requirements, which traditionally deal with paper wills, have given rise to formal, holographic, and secret wills in Iranian law, and to formal, holographic, and notarized wills in American law. An important question that arises with the advancement of technology and the development of electronic communications is: if the Testator wants to execute a will in the electronic space, what place will these traditional requirements have in it? In other words, are traditional requirements followed in executing an electronic will or not? In this article, an attempt is made to provide an answer to this question through the library method. In this regard, while reviewing the traditional requirements of executing a will, the hypothesis is proved that in Iranian law, traditional requirements are followed in electronic will-making; requirements that, due to some shortcomings in the field of legislation, have prevented the electronic execution of formal and secret wills. In American law, however, there is a disagreement: on the one hand, the famous Castro and Horton cases in judicial proceedings and the Uniform Electronic Wills Act imply that electronic wills follow traditional requirements. On the other hand, the Nevada Statute, after deviation from traditional requirements, has introduced new requirements for executing electronic wills.