The first chapter of the paper discusses the concept of “propositionality” attributed to logical arguments, and by adopting the criterion introduced by Christopher Martin, the “propositionality” of logical arguments is elaborated based on the Principle of Substitution in compound propositions. The second chapter discusses the viewpoints of Kamran Karimullah on the “non-propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s conditional arguments and “propositionality” of Avicenna to reach a judgment. In this approach, the “non-propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s logical teaching is confirmed not only in its dialectical context, but is also confirmed beyond it. The chapter continues by showing that Avicenna’s viewpoints on the conditional arguments and propositions maintain differs somehow from modern “propositional logic” despite satisfying the criterion of propositionality.

This paper argues that a language can exist and flourish in a community even if none of of the members of the community has any communication intentions; and that reference to the notion of communication intention can therefore be dispensed with in the core account of the nature of linguistic meaning. Certainly one cannot elucidate the notion of linguistic meaning without reference to psychological notions; the communication-intention theorists are right about this. They are, however, wrong about which psychological notions are needed. It is not possession of the ability to (intentionally) mean something that is crucial— the possession and exercise of communication intentions. What is crucial is rather the possession of certain semantic psychological attitudes. To possess such semantic psychological attitudes (semantic attitudes for short) is to be disposed to take certain publicly observable phenomena— such as sights and sounds— as (non-naturally) meaning something. The paper argues that it is possible to describe circumstances in which one can in so doing be said to understand their meaning.