The prime purpose of this Article is to shed light on some aspects of TRIPS and the impact which it may have on the inflow of foreign investment and technology to developing countries. To this end, the Article adopts a broad approach by embarking upon the theoretical exploration of the concept of intellectual property right, its legal implication, and then its economic effect in the developing countries. This is followed by the examination the principles of the Paris Convention and those of the TRIPS.In assessing the economic impact, the Article focuses on the patent rights. Having done so, it concludes that the patent system as a stimulus for R&D activities has been only useful for transnational corporations. This is explicable in the financial and technical risks involved in developing viable products on the one hand, and the problem of expenditure needed for enforcing the patentee's rights on the other. With respect to its role as an incentive for R&D activities it is suggested that such effect has been confined to certain technologies and industries (i.e. pharmaceutical and basic chemical industries). As regards, the causal relation between the existence of patent and the inflow of foreign investment there has been no hard evidence to verify this type of causal relationship. The only limited available evidence shows that the patent effect in this respect is neutral and that, the existence of cheap labour and other economic factors are more influential.The need to facilitate international trading in industrial property rights led to the adoption and coming into force of the Paris Convention. National Treatment, right of priority, independence of patents, and importation of patents constitute the main principles of the Paris Convention. They are designed to ensure that by protecting industrial property rights, international trade is not hindered. However, the speculation that, such exclusive rights might be misused for securing import monopolies and retaining export markets led to the incorporation of a principle under which the patent holder is required to exploit his/her patented technology within a specified period of time; the failure of which would invalidate his/her rights. Yet, in reality, because of the long period needed for achieving such object, this principle has had no. practical implication. The efforts of the developing countries to rectify this defect met with strong opposition from the developing world. The outcome is the introduction of TRIPS agreement.The TRIPS agreement provides for the strengthening of intellectual property rights on a world wide scope accommodating the interests of the developed states. In this respect not only the duration of the patent has been extended to 20 years, but also the ambit of protection has expanded to all types of technologies. This is evident in Section 5 of Part II of TRIPS on Patents. Article 28 of TRIPS is a typical example.Under this Article patent protection is granted not only to patent process but also to. product patent.This is not in harmony with the legislation of most developing countries whose principal purpose, as a step to enhance its technological level, is to confine patent protection to process technology.Furthermore, save the situations where national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency or cases of public non-commercial use exist, resort to compulsory licensing has been made difficult by the qualification that requirements such as what may be followed must be satisfied: to grant such licenses only if an unsuccessful effort has been made to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable terms and conditions within a reasonable span of time; the requirement to pay adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case; taking into consideration the economic value of the license; and the requirement that decisions be subject to judicial or independent review by a distinct higher authority. When, one adds the time requirement of Article 5 of the Paris Convention to the afore-said conditions it will not be difficult to see that the application of the compulsory licensing becomes extremely hard, if not impossible.It is worth recording that Article 71 of TRIPS have provided the opportunity for Member States, where they deem it necessary, to review and amend TRIPS. And to this effect in 2003 and 2005 Member States, in particular developing states, were able to do some modification empowering them to forgo some of the restrictions, which hamper their efforts to have recourse to compulsory licensing. While, one may express some optimism to the current waves of development, but one must also be cautious of the fact that for a country to develop, reliance on external sources is not enough and that genuine domestic technological efforts in this respect are extremely crucial.