Ma`rifat Falsafi
Year:2009 | Volume:6 | Issue:3 (23)|Papers Count:8

Most Muslim philosophers believe it self-evident that mental images actually present their referents. Ayatullah Mesbah has a different idea in this regard, and thinks that presentation is, in most of its stages (both in concepts and propositions) potential, and it only becomes actual in "true judgments". In this article, the author tries to analyze and explain this view.According to Ayatullah Mesbah, in order to find out how mental images present their referents, one has to study the use of "presentation", so that one is able to analyze those instances of presentation we find in ourselves through knowledge by presence. In this way, one can identify conditions necessary for mental images to present something. Then through qualifying universal concepts by such conditions, one is able to define "presentation".Consequently, "presentation is a psychological reality, pointing to a natural transference of mind from a presenter to what is presented because of complete resemblance between the two." Complete resemblance can be stratified, and hence presentation may be classified into purely possible, non-propositionally apprehensive, propositional apprehensive, judgmental, and true presentation.

What differentiates between objective and factual propositions is the fact that the first one takes only the existents into account, while the second one includes the suppositional existents too. The dispute over the reality of existence notwithstanding, this article supposes the predicate of existence as non-identified, and by adding it to the logic of predicates, introduces three systems of logic: free logic (which is known for a long time), and two other systems (which are called by the author as "the logic of predicates and existence" and "the logic of public existence").The author tries to show that free logic is not a suitable medium for analyzing old logic and for differentiating factual propositions from objective ones. He considers the two alternative logics capable of doing so. He also shows that the logic of predicates and existence is the proper logic for factual propositions, while the logic of public existence is appropriate for objective propositions.

Religious texts put a great emphasis on self-understanding and consider it as a precondition for understanding God. Afdal al-DĪn Kashani, a 7th century philosopher, and Mullā sadrā, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, have their view of intuitive self-understanding on the basis of their own principles. The author, in the first part of the article, reviews the presuppositions of Mullā sadrā's view, and suggests a systematic theory of self-understanding accordingly. Then he explains the stages of self-understanding, reached by the travelers on the path to God. In the second part, the viewpoints of Afdal al-DĪn Kāshāni on self-understanding are probed, and practical ways for attaining such an intuitive knowledge are discussed. At the end, the author compares the two philosophers according to their presuppositions, theories, and consequences of their ideas.

Does Mulla sadra cons ide soul and body as two distinct entities, forced to coexist without any commonality, or he thinks of them as cooperating in a natural way? To answer this question, one has to first determine whether Mulla sadra is a dualist in his anthropology, like Plato and Descartes, or he is a monist, like physicalists, or he is a gradationalist. If the first option is proved to be true, then a discussion of the relation between soul and body, in its classical sense, would be meaningful, but if the second option is true, the conversation would take another form.Mullā sadrā's words are different in this regard. The author studies all possibilities on the basis of Mullā sadrā's works, and comes up with the conclusion that only one option is plausible. Soul-body relation should be explained in the light of the principle of the gradation of existence, according to which, the superior level contains all the inferior levels.

Aristotle has dealt with the idea of essence in his Categories and Metaphysics. It may seem incoherent what he says in the two books about the criteria of essence and its instances; they may even seem completely different. Apart from the possible change of mind that may have occurred to Aristotle in the meantime, one can explain such inconsistency to the difference of approach in his different works. Categories, as a logico-philosophical work, treat subjective aspects of the issue and the relation between concepts as well. This is why it classifies some universal concepts under "secondary essence". On the other hand, Metaphysics has a completely metaphysical approach, and therefore, there is no discussion of the secondary essence therein. Aristotle, in Metaphysics, introduces essence as the true instance of "existent", and hence the study of truth is restricted to the study of essence, and essence becomes the subject matter of philosophy. It is noteworthy that it was only by philosophical innovations of Fārābi and Ibn-SĪnā that the philosophy of essence was replaced by the philosophy of existence.

Aristotle and Ibn-Sina have dealt with the issue of motion, and especially locomotion, in their discussions of natural philosophy. In modem physics, on the other hand, Newton gives a different view of motion.Having compared the foundations, basic concepts, and laws of motion in Aristotelian and Newtonian physics, this article shows that Aristotle's theory, despite some general similarities with Newtonian physics, suffers from lack of coherence, and in most cases differs from the latter. It is noteworthy that each theory is part of a completely different system of thought, and result from diverse methods of argumentation. Newtonian law of motion is an outcome of a major transformation in Aristotelian tradition, and similar propositions and relations in the two systems are hardly compatible.

"Reason", hikmat, philosophy, knowledge, and psychic faculty, are divided, in Greek philosophy, into theoretical and practical ones. Muslim philosophers diverge on the nature and function of these two types of reason. Some of them consider them of the same nature, i.e. comprehension and reasoning. According to them, the difference lies in the fact that the object of first one is knowledge, and that of the second one is action. Still some others put the burden of both on theoretical reason. Some philosophers consider theoretical reason an instance of cognition and practical reason an instance of action, and they deem their cooperation as leading to a mixture of knowledge and action.According to the common view, practical reason gets to particular knowledge by deliberating on theoretical understandings, so that it can guide psychic powers to action. Theoretical reason enables one to understand facts, while practical reason guides one to manage one's personal, as well as social, affairs. The author thinks that it is "heart", and not practical reason, that motivates one toward a set of actions.