Ayeneh Ma‘refat
Year:2012 | Volume:9 | Issue:29|Papers Count:8

The evolutionary process of change of a technical term is of prime importance in the history of thought. The transformation of the fundamental and important concept of Gradation is not an exception in this regard. This word was first introduced in logic and applied to expressions and later to concepts and then was adopted in philosophy and was made the subject of so many debates and discussions. The present article first introduces the process of change in the meaning of this word and tries to find the differences in meaning and use of it first in philosophy and logic and next in philosophy and mysticism. The article then concludes that the term gradation forms a pair of homonyms in philosophy and logic with different meanings. In philosophy and mysticism, gradation is used with the same meaning but different referents due to differences in the nature of the two fields. The article shows how lack of consideration of these differences has led to philosophical disputes over the term gradation.

In discussing the fancy potential, Avicenna has expressed certain beliefs such as the one which considers this potential as a physical property. From Avicenna’s point of view, there is a close connection between fancy potential and perception on the one hand and fancy potential and body on the other. He has delineated this mutual effect in a special way. The present article intends to provide enough evidence from Avicenna’s works showing the interaction between fancy potential and other soul potentials including the rational soul and its various degrees. The results are presented in accordance with the methodology of Masha philosophy. In this connection, the article attempts to show the effect of fancy potential on internal and external senses from Avicenna’s point of view.

Mulla Sadra’s and Abdol-Jabbar Motazeli’s views on the function of reason in ethics are to some extent comparable. One can find three points of agreements and three points of differences between the two scholars in this regard. The points of agreement are the unification of virtue and knowledge, reason as the basis of moral responsibility and the evils and virtues having different aspects. The first point of difference is their views on the meaning of reason, that is, according to Mulla Sadra, reason is a particular faculty of human’s soul but from Abdol-Jabbar’s viewpoint it is a set of prepositions which are self-evident and reasonable.Based on an ontological approach, according to Mulla Sadra, the function of reason in ethics is its capacity to constitute human grades of existence which leads to transcendental ethics. Whereas, in Abdol-Jabbar’s ethics, due to a lack of philosophical principles, the same issue has led to humanism. The concept of intellectual intuition is the third point of difference between the two scholars.

One of the challenging problems in Islamic thought has been the divine will and its relation with human deeds. It is one of those issues which might have played an important role in the formation of primary theological branches and an issue which has been involved for one reason or another in the discussions of theology, philosophy and even jurisprudence. Imam Khomeini (P. B. U. H.) is one of the scholars who have dealt with this issue. He, as a jurist, philosopher and mystic, discusses this theological issue with a comprehensive view in such a way that his discussions are influenced neither by the restrictions of Motazilite and Asharite theologies nor by the narrow-mindedness of some Shiite theologians.Although he uses Molla Sadra’s principles in his analyses, he considers this issue from a different perspective. He both analyses and critiques Ashaerite’s and Motazele’s views and also shows the problems with some Shiite theologians. Using a philosophical, mystical and narrative perspective, Imam Khomeini further demonstrates that human will is in accordance with divine will.

In human history, all prophets who claimed to have missions from God appealed to miracles and kiramah to prove the authenticity of their claim. Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra and Sohravardi, have all discussed the issue of quality of miracle and kirama and provided intellectual and philosophical explanations for it. They have also tried to explain the distinction between the two concepts and magic. Sohrivardi, in many of his works, has studied human powers, the quality of revelation and divine inspiration as well as miracles and kiramah. According to Sohrivardi, because the human powers in the prophet are pure and elevated compared to ordinary people, the soul of the prophet can influence the natural world as well as his own soul. In other words, the miracle and kiramah issued by the prophet constitute the external influence of his soul on the material world. Therefore, the hypothesis is that a miracle is the external influence of the soul on the material world, while magic is the influence of the soul on people’s imagination and senses. The present article is an attempt to address the fundamental question of the difference between miracle and kiramah and magic from Sohrivardi’s point of view using a document analytic method.

The philosophical explanation of revelation from the perspective of Abu Nasr Farabi, the father of Islamic philosophy, is an intellectual endeavor for the purpose of rationalizing and propounding the teachings of revelation in Islam in their original form through integrating its different elements in a balanced philosophic system. The present article is an attempt to examine the four elements of sender, receiver, intermediary in transmission and the nature of revelation in four different sections. In this system the prime being is the sender, and the prophet’s different levels of intellect and imagination constitute the receiver of revelation.Accordingly, the active intellect is considered the intermediary which transfers the basic truths to the prophet’s soul. This way, the article presents Farabi’s intellectual explanation of revelation in his own philosophical system.

William James is an American philosopher and psychologist (1842-1910) who first introduced radical empiricism. This theory which has philosophical and psychological aspects and is considered an innovative one in both fields, has, in both aspects, a deep connection with his philosophical pragmatism view which is regarded as a new interpretation within the American tradition of pragmatism. A close examination of James’ philosophical and psychological ideas, especially on religious experience, is not possible without a thorough understanding of this relationship.On the other hand, each one of these approaches has a relationship with the way James personally faced such concepts as religion and religious experience or his deistic ideas. Since emphasis on each one of these approaches, when evaluating James’ views on religious experience, may be regarded as biased, the present article aims at showing how these three personal approaches are interwoven in the context of introducing the major feature of his religious experience.