Journal of Philosophical Investigations in Scopus
Year:2016 | Volume:10 | Issue:18 (SUPPLEMENT) |Papers Count:7

Every culture has its own conception of poetry and approaches it differently. This paper draws on phenomenological approach, in specific that of Mikel Dufrenne, to compare it with Structuralism's approach. Dufrenne makes use of two Husserlian concepts, noema and noesis, to show the difference between these two approaches to poetry. He contends that Structuralist commentaries does not provide much in terms of enjoying and understanding poetry because it says almost nothing to get us in close touch with the lived experience of poet and the world of his work. Phenomenological approach, on the contrary, moves from noema toward noesis and as such gives a way to the world of the work and yields an aesthetic understanding of it. Dufrenne sees the world of the work not as represented, but instead, as a world that can be traced back to poet’s lived experience to which Structuralist rules grant no access. Based on a comparative- analysis method, this paper would compare these two approaches.

In this essay, through a brief sketch of Husserl’s thesis about time- consciousness, especially concentrating on its third level, I will argue that a turn has been taken during his last reflections on time published in the C-Manuskripte in his phenomenology in general, and his phenomenology of time in particular. Husserl, by holding the view that the absolute consciousness is temporal; therefor, by denying a non-temporal point for consciousness as keystone of philosophy as a rigorous science, has abandoned three decades of seeking to founding the transcendental philosophy; and indeed his dream of philosophy as a rigorous science is over. Therefore, the philosophical tradition that had begun with Descartes and aimed to base the edifice of knowledge on the rigorous, undoubtable and unchangeable ground, comes to end in Husserl’s phenomenology, its last heir, and thus clears the way for the appearance of a new version of phenomenology in the works of the frequent thinkers of this movement.

The purpose of this article is to representan obvious understanding of the challenging concept of the science of "life- world" in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology and meaning of this project by Husserl. Hereof, first is very important to perpend distinction and yet relationship between the objective science and the life- world then it seems inevitable to reflect on steps to this transcendental science including epochs of the objective science, epochs of the science of life-world and transcendental reduction. Here, the main focus lays on the possibility of the science of life-world project with tow approachs; a reflective and a non-reflective. The result of first approach was realization of the universal structures of the life-world in an ontology format of the life- world, and the achievement of second approach, by a transcendental turn to the life-world and its maner-of-givenness, is discovering the transcendental solidarity between the world and the world consciousness.

In this paper, showing the relations between the conditions of objectivity and its foundational components in Husser's philosophy, I wan to reveal their mutual and dialectical relationship. Transcendental consciousness and its intentional structure are the main conditions of the possibility of objectivity. The body, time, and perception have been considered to be the other principle conditions of the possibility of objectivity. Based on these conditions, the foundational components of objectivity can be considered. These components are: identity, transcendence, lawfulness or regularity and intersubjective community. This study shows that the objectivity of conditions and components in itself are related to each other, and there is a mutual relation between them. Investigating the objectivity of consciousness in philosophy of Husserl regardless of the mutual relation would be ignoring the importance of Husserl's attitude on consciousness and its objectivity. The essence of consciousness is the intentionality. The other properties of consciousness results from the intentionality. Conditions of objectivity are related to the noetic pole of consciousness and components of objectivity to the noematic pole of it.

Mikel Dufrenne, French phenomenologist philosopher, has elaborated a systematic description of the aesthetic experience in some of his works, especially his most important book, The Phenomenology ofAesthetic Experience. This article addresses an orientation that outlines his phenomenology of art: giving priority to the original sense of the word "aesthetics", i.e. perception (aisthesis) as the integral and irreplaceable element of the aesthetic experience. Dufrenne does this mainly by distinguishing aesthetic object from work of art. In this article, it is shown how this distinction leads to the originality of the sensuous (le sensible) in the aesthetic experience. At the same time, it is explained that Dufrenne's emphasis on sensibility and the sensuous in aesthetic experience is not meant to deny or underestimate the cognitive elements in the experience. However, according to Dufrenne, these elemens are immanent in the sensuous and could not be found and grasped without it. In other words, what can be said "in" work of art, can be said only "by" work of art.

By reducing the history and actuality of things, phenomenology attains to pure phenomena, and so it makes its special realm itself. But we would lose the world by phenomenological reduction, and we must acquire the world by phenomenological constitution, beginning from eidoses. As we would demonstrate, consequences of eidetic reduction are beyond remedy. Parallel to reduction of the world, the transcendental ego would reduce to absolute ego (eidos ego) too, and so we lose the clue of the constitution of the world. Heidegger noticed the problem so soon, and by taking worldliness primitive, attained to a different understanding of the world and subject (Dasein). In this article, alongside analyzing the causality and its relation to the world and transcendental ego, we would consider this problem and the way of departure from it to existentialist philosophy of Heidegger. In fact their separation from each other was begun at very first, at eidetic reduction.